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ABSTRACT tKY <* 939434101
This thesis examines the Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP) Flying Hour
Program (FHP) budget process and analyzes the issues causing underfunding in that
program. The Department of the Navy Flying Hour Program (FHP) is used to fund
requirements and justify the resources required to train aviation crews and maintain Navy
/ Marine Corps aircraft. The thesis begins with a comprehensive overview of the FHP,
including how flying hour requirements are determined and how the funding process
operates. It then analyzes the major factors contributing to CNAP perennial FHP
underfunding and resource variability. Information to explain FHP underfunding is
widely distributed. The thesis provides a single source reference to help CNAP FHP
managers and budget personnel better understand the FHP budgeting process, including
historical and current causes of program underfunding.
This research concludes that key causes of CNAP FHP underfunding and related
problems are: 1) Budget process dynamics, including limited resources and competing
priorities. 2) Unplanned and unfunded requirements, 3) Deficiencies in FHP forecasting
methodology, particularly the failure to incorporate the cost of previous year program
funding shortfalls, 4) Poor AVDLR component reliability, 5) Integrated Logistics
Support (ILS) deficiencies, and 6) Variability in AVDLR pricing methodology and
NWCF surcharges.
The final chapter provides conclusions to address CNAP FHP underfunding and
related problems. It also includes analysis of alternative budget reform concepts intended
to minimize defense resource variability and increase budgeting efficiency. Finally, it





B. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 6
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 6
1. Primary Research Question 6
2. Secondary Research Questions 7
D. METHODOLOGY 7
E. THESIS OUTLINE 8
F. LIMITATIONS 9
G. BENEFITS OF THESIS 10
II. FLYING HOUR PROGRAM (FHP) OVERVIEW AND FUNDING PROCESS 11
A. INTRODUCTION 11
B. DOD BUDGETING: RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS (RAP) 12
1. Phase I, II, III: Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS) 12
2. Phase IV: Enactment 19
3. Phase V: Apportionment 20
4. Phase VI: Execution 20
C. FLYING HOUR PROGRAM (FHP) FUNDING COMPOSITION 21
1. DoD Budget 21
2. FHP Funding Structure 22
D. FHP CHAIN OF COMMAND AND ROLES 26
1. FHP Chain of Command 26
2. Basic FHP Budget Phases 29
E. THE FHP BUDGETING PLAYERS 32
1. Squadron Level and Air Station/CV 32
2. Carrier Air Wing Commander (CAG) - Allocation/Execution 37
3. Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP) 37
4. Commander in Chief United States Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) ... .47
F. SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR THE FLYING HOUR PROGRAM: N-88F....50
1. Introduction 50
2. Overview ofN-88F Program Responsibilities and Relationships 50
3. FHP Categories, Funding and Cost Components 52
4. FHP Requirements Determination 59
G. THE N-88F ROLE IN THE FHP BUDGETING PROCESS 65
1. Introduction 65
2. Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) 65
3. Budget Submission and Review 70
vn
4. FHP Budget Execution 72
5. Chapter Summary 74
III. FHP UNDERFUNDING AND OTHER ISSUES IN BUDGET FORMULATION. ..75
A. INTRODUCTION 75
B. BUDGET PROCESS DYNAMICS 75
1. Introduction 75
2. Defense Budgeting Dynamics 76
3. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) Issues 88
4. Summary 91
C. ENVIRONMENT OF LIMITED RESOUCES AND COMPETING
PRIORITIES 92
1. Introduction 92
2. FHP Funding Decisions and Events 93
3. Trade-off Decisions Between Funding Current FHP Readiness and
Aviation Modernization 98
4. The Incentive to Cut 100
5. Summary 102
D. FHP BUDGET FORMULATION FACTORS AND ISSUES 103
1. Introduction 103
2. Background Information and the Cost Per Flight Hour (CPH) 103
3. FHP Forecasting Methodologies and Other Issues 107
4. Other Variable Factors 110
5. Planned Contingency Funding 1 18
6. The New Training and Readiness Matrix (T & R Matrix) and
Alternative TACAIR/ASW Budgeting Method 119
7. FHP and OP-20 Adequacy 121
E. AVIATION MAINTENACE SUPPLY AND READINESS (AMSR)
GROUP 122
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 124
IV. ANALYSIS OF CNAP'S FHP UNDERFUNDING 127
A. INTRODUCTION 127
B. CNAP FHP: BUDGETED VS. EXECUTION 127
C. AVIATION READINESS AND INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT
(ILS) REPORTING METRICS 133
1. Aviation Readiness Reporting 134
2. Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Reporting Metrics 136
3. Solution 138
D. LOGISTICS ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSAL (LECP) 139
E. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 141
F. AVIATION DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLE (AVDLR): ILS,
VI 11
RELIABILITY AND PRICING 144
1. Definition of AVDLRs 145
2. Logistics Concepts and Naval Aviation Maintenance & Logistics
Support 147
3. Decreasing "Plane-side" Support of AVDLRs 156
4. AVDLR ILS Deficiencies and Component Reliability 160
5. AVDLR Pricing Factors 163
6. Effects ofAVDLR Underfunding at CNAP 179
G. MARINE AVIATION CAMPAIGN PLAN 183
1. Background 183
2. Source of CNAP FHP Underfunding 184
H. REPROGRAMMING DECISIONS AND UNFUNDED
REQUIREMENTS 187
1. Introduction 187
2. Information Technology for the 21 SI Century (IT-21) 187
3. Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) 189
4. Special Interest Category "Funding Other" (FO) 190
5. Unplanned Contingencies 194
6. Section Summary 195
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 196
V. CONCLUSIONS 199
A. INTRODUCTION 199
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 199
C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 202
1
.
What is the purpose of the DoN Flying Hour Program (FHP) and
how does the FHP budgeting and funding process work? Is the
methodology for determining FHP requirements adequate and valid?202
2. What factors cause Cost Per Hour (CPH) increases and variance in
CNAPs FHP, and is the CPH an adequate metric for assigning
program costs?' 204
3. What are some of the reasons causing AVDLR cost increases? 206
4. To what extent is the Navy Working Capital Fund Surcharge and
escalation rates impacting current year execution funds? 207
D. CONCLUSIONS 211
1 Continue with the Aviation Maintenance Supply and Readiness
Group and Other FHP Process Improvement Efforts 212
2. Budget Reform Concepts 217
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 223
APPENDIX A. AFO & AFM LISTING 227
APPENDIX B AVDLR TOP 95 HIGH COST DRIVERS 231
IX
APPENDIX C. DESCRIPTION OF FO PROGRAMS 235
LIST OF REFERENCES 239
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 245
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1. DoN FHP Funding Trend [Ref. 3] 4
Figure 2.1. PPBS: Planning Process [Ref. 4: p. C-5] 15
Figure 2.2. PPBS [Ref. 4:p. 4-18] 19
Figure 2.3. Resource Allocation Process [Ref. 7:p. 52] 20
Figure 2.4. FHP Program/Appropriations Relationship [Ref. 9:p. 7] 23
Figure 2.5. FHP Funding Composition 25
Figure 2.6. Pacific Fleet FHP Operational Chain Of Command 27
Figure 2.7. DoD FHP Financial Organizational & Resource Allocation Flow 28
Figure 2.8. DoN FHP Budget Formulation 30
Figure 2.9. FHP Funding Composition 34
Figure 2.10. CNAP 18 Month Carrier Air Wing Deployment Cycle [Ref. 16] 45
Figure 2.11. FHP Program Coordination [Ref. 18] 51
Figure 2.12. TYCOM Funding Allocation [Ref. 18] 54
Figure 2.13. FHP Schedule Funding Percentages [Ref. 18] 55
Figure 2.14. FHP Cost Components [Ref. 18] 56
Figure 2.15. Cost Per Hour Inputs [Ref. 18] 60
Figure 3.1. CNAP TACAIR/ASW Flying Hours vs. CPH [Ref. 35] 95
Figure 3.2. TACAIR/ASW Flying Hour Formulation [Ref. 18] 108
Figure 4.1. Actual Cost Per Hour vs. Budget Cost Per Hour [Ref. 16] 128
Figure 4.2. Readiness Goals for Navy F-14D Aircraft [Ref. 46:p. 9] 135
Figure 4.3. Aircraft Inventory Reporting Discrepancies [Ref. 47] 138
Figure 4.4. AVDLR CPH vs. FHP [Ref. 45] 146
Figure 4.5. System Cost Effective Diagram [Ref. 53:p. 24] 150
Figure 4.6. Navy Working Capital Fund [Ref. 4:p. N-23] 164
Figure 4.7. FY 98 Surcharge Rate [Ref. 58] 165
Figure 4.8. VAD/APC Calculations [Ref. 59] 167
Figure 4.9. Composite Surcharge Trends [Ref. 58] 176
Figure 4.10. NWCF Revenue Base Reduction [Ref. 58] 177





Table 2.1. TACAIR/ASW OP-20 Formula 63
Table 2.2 Fleet Air Training Calculation 64
Table 3.1. CNAP Total FHP Budgeted vs. Actual CHP 95
Table 3.2. Disparity in T/M/S PMR Percentages 115
Table 3.3. AMSR Issue Items 123
Table 4.1. CNAP FHP CPH [Ref. 16] 128
Table 4.2. RINU LECP [Ref. 50] 140
Table 4.3. SH-60 AFB 0091 [Ref. 52] 143
Table 4.4. ARC-210 Radio Repair Actions (CNAP) [Ref. 52] 159
Table 4.5. Planned vs. Actual MTBF [Ref. 46, 52, 56] 161
Table 4.6. AVDLR Surcharge & VAD/APC Rates [Ref. 60] 169
Table 4.7. Component MTBF [Ref. 46:p. 56] 174
Table 4.8. 2 nd MAW Cannibalization (Data Source: AV3M) [Ref. 46:p. 41] 180
Table 4.9. CNAP UCO FY 98 [Ref. 65] 182
Table 4.10. Effect ofMACP Budgeted vs. Actual FHP Figures 186
Table 4.1 1. Budgeted vs. Actual Cost Difference for NSAWC (FY 96 & FY 97) 190





The purpose of this section is to introduce the Navy Flying Hour Program (FHP)
and highlight the strategic importance of U.S. Naval Aviation. Since the FHP receives
funding through the Defense budget process, an assessment of the current Defense
budgeting environment is presented as well. Prior to transitioning to the purpose and
scope of the thesis outlined in section B, the basis and focus of the research will be
explained.
Naval Aviation plays a central role in every naval mission, from
establishing battlespace dominance to power projection ashore. In a world
in which the United States has vital interests overseas, Navy and Marine
Corps forces provide key forward-presence, crisis-response, and
warfighting capabilities to our nation's leaders and joint commanders.
Thus, forward-deployed naval forces and Naval Aviation are a superb
means of signaling U.S. capabilities and resolve to friends and foes alike
[Ref. 1].
This passage taken from the Navy and Marine Corps document, Naval
Aviation... Forward Air Power ...From the Sea, underscores the importance of Naval
Airpower as one of the key instruments in facilitating the objectives outlined in the
current National Military Strategy Document (NMSD). To effectively translate these
words into actual capabilities, Congress appropriates Operations and Maintenance
(O&M) funding to the Navy on an annual basis. On average, approximately $3.2 billion
dollars are allocated by the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) and Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) to operate and maintain the Navy's aviation capability on an annual
basis. The system used to determine the annual flying hour requirements and the
necessary level of funding, is the Department of the Navy (DoN) Flying Hour Program
(FHP). The overarching objective and purpose of the Flying Hour Program is 1) to
produce highly trained proficient aircrews who are capable of executing the operational
requirements of the unified commanders (CINCs), and 2) to maintain and improve
material readiness of the Navy-Marine Corps aircraft inventory. As a budgeting
mechanism, the Flying Hour Program is the Navy's means to forecast, budget and justify
the fiscal resources required for operating and maintaining all Navy and Marine Corps
aircraft. The FHP budget process is extremely complex because it incorporates a wide
range of warfare communities, levels of command (extending from the squadron to the
CNO), agencies and functional areas of responsibility. The FHP is also subject to many
variable factors, which compound its complexity. These variable factors range from
budget process dynamics, funding uncertainty, unplanned events, aircraft inventory
changes, aircraft component modifications, cost increases and an environment of limited
resources and competing priorities. The current Operating TEMPO and a shrinking
defense budget have also impacted the DoN Flying Hour Program.
Since the end of the Cold War, the defense budget and force structure have been
cut dramatically. Downsizing and a decreasing defense budget are not necessarily
problematic as long as cuts are done prudently and correspond with a reduction in
mission. However, this has not been the case as evidenced by the following data
regarding Navy and Marine Corps utilization around the globe:
During the Cold War from 1946-1989, the Navy-Marine Corps team
responded to some 190 crises, about one crises-response operation every
1 1 weeks. In about eighty percent of these situations, the focus of the U.S.
response was an aircraft carrier battle group, an amphibious ready group
and/or land-based naval air power. In the 1990-1997 period, the Navy and
Marine Corps have been called upon to respond to crises and combat in
over 75 instances or one crisis response every 3.5 weeks - more than
double the Cold-War rate [Ref. 1].
Defense spending has decreased, but mission frequency has not. Today's military
is forced to operate in a high OPTEMPO environment constrained by scarce fiscal
resources. In terms of financial management, it is not only difficult to justify
requirements during the budget process, it is particularly challenging for fleet
comptrollers to meet readiness requirements while staying within assigned budget
controls during execution.
A declining defense budget is not a new phenomenon and is consistent with the
"boom and bust cycle" of defense spending as explicated by (Jones and Bixler 1992, pp.
9-11). Wildavsky also notes this budget instability and offers further insight as to what
parts of the defense budget are consistently decreased.
Both the services and Congress have strong incentives to cut. When
Congress must make cuts, they are made along the path of least resistance.
Traditionally, this means that when defense is cut the burden falls on the
readiness [O&M] and manpower accounts of the services... since these
accounts are quick money, resulting in an immediate decrease in outlays.
When Congress is looking for an immediate way to cut a budget, these fast
spend-out accounts produce quick results. In the environment of defense
budgeting famine is expected to follow feast. When the famine hits,
defense will most likely cut readiness and manpower, knowing that these
funds are easiest to restore and quicker to build than major procurements.
As a bonus to Congress and the military, manpower and readiness can be
spread to preserve the force structure [Ref. 2].
Other factors contributing to the decline of defense spending are the stipulations
outlined in the series of deficit reduction legislation (e.g. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
(GRH), and the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA, 1990)), and the fact that during peace,
Congress and the general public perceive the defense budget as more discretionary.
Despite severe cuts, the defense budget is still viewed by many citizens as a "cash cow".
This perception is also a result of concern over the fiscal demands for resolving domestic
social issues and the budget deficit (at least until FY98). Congress too has influenced
public opinion on defense spending due to publicized debate over the size and efficiency
of military departments [Ref. 5, pp. 87-126]. Another significant factor that leads to
defense budget instability is the annualarity of the budget process itself. This short-term
planning and execution cycle lends itself to excessive congressional oversight, control
and hence, further reductions in appropriation accounts.
As noted earlier, the decreasing trend of defense funding has impacted the DoN
Flying Hour Program as well, particularly since the utilization of Naval Aviation has not
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Figure 1.1. DoN FHP Funding Trend [Ref. 3]
This downward trend in funding has been compounded by increasing program costs and a
budgeting environment of scarce resources and competing priorities. Due to rising FHP
costs and this constrained fiscal environment, FHP supervisors and budget analysts are
subject to increased pressure to ensure that flying hour requirements are accurately
forecasted and allocated funds efficiently executed. However, the dynamics of the
program often make these tasks extremely difficult. As a result, the FHP has been subject
to a great deal of scrutiny. In fact Congress and the DoD have frequently studied the
Flying Hour Program. Congress alone has directed the General Accounting Office
(GAO) on four separate occasions (1976, 1979, 1983, and 1989) to investigate the
efficacy of the Navy's processes in determining flying hour requirements. Today, DoD
and congressional scrutiny persist, especially due to the trend in rising costs coupled with
a decreasing level of aviation readiness. The most significant category of cost increase is
the Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR). AVDLRs, which will be discussed
further in Chapter IV, constitute approximately 51% of the DoN FHP budget and have
been rising at an average annual cost of 7.5% since 1991. However, the rising cost of
AVDLRs is only one cause of the increase in FHP costs and subsequent underfunding.
As of this writing, several Navy and Marine Corps working groups have been convened
to analyze the phenomena of rising costs, funding shortfalls and other related aviation
logistic problems. The current effort has been directed by the CNO and is called the
Aviation Maintenance and Supply Readiness group (AMSR). This study group is a
Navy-Marine Corps wide effort to examine shortfalls in the Flying Hour Program,
AVDLR concerns and recommend specific action to increase readiness and reduce
aviation maintenance and supply costs. Several issues the AMSR group is studying are
directly or indirectly related to the sources and factors that contribute to FHP
underfunding. Therefore the AMSR forms the basis of the analysis in Chapters III and
IV. Since the study evolved from funding shortfalls and related logistic problems
experienced by fleet aviation units under the cognizance of CINCPACFLT, the
Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP) is the focus of this study. It is at this
level that the FHP is initially managed and funds allocated to the aviation units who
execute the program. Additionally, it is at the Air Type Commander level where the
impact of program underfunding and variability must be managed.
In summary, this section highlighted the importance of Naval Aviation,
introduced the DoN Flying Hour Program and briefly explained some of the variable
factors that contribute to its complexity. The DoD budget environment and funding
trends were presented to indicate the FHP is formulated and negotiated in a constrained
fiscal setting. Finally, the basis and focus of this thesis was explained. The next section
will state the objectives and scope of the thesis.
B. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
The primary purpose of this thesis is to explain the FHP budgeting process and
examine the issues causing underfunding in the Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific
(CNAP) Flying Hour Program. Since 1986, there have been several Naval Postgraduate
School theses written about the DoN Flying Hour Program. These theses have examined
portions of the budgeting process and various program costs and have proposed statistical
models to improve forecasting requirements. Yet, none of this research has
systematically examined the myriad of factors which cause the variability and
underfunding of the program. Further, there is very little written that explains in any one
document what constitutes the FHP, how the funding process works, and what problems
can be expected during budget execution. Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to
create a single source document that new FHP personnel may use to obtain a quick
overview of the FHP, how the funding process works, and insight to some of the factors
contributing to program underfunding and variability, during both budget formulation and
execution. When the term variability is used, the authors are referring to unpredictable
events or uncertainty. Specific examples include the unexpected failure of aircraft repair
components before their planned failure rate and/or the funding uncertainty that may
result from having to reprogram money for unplanned events during execution.
The final objective is to present alternative budget reform concepts, intended to
minimize defense resource variability and increase budgeting effeciency.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following research questions are addressed in the body of the thesis:
1. Primary Research Question
What variable factors and decisions ocurr during FHP budget formulation and
execution that explain the historical and current underfunding of the Commander Naval
Air Forces Pacific Flying Hour Program?
2. Secondary Research Questions
The secondary research questions are:
a. What is the purpose of the DoN Flying Hour Program (FHP) and how
does the FHP budgeting and funding process work? Is the
methodology for determining FHP requiremtnts adequate and valid?
b. What factors cause Cost Per Hour (CPH) increases and variance in
CNAP FHP, and is the CPH an adequate metric for assigning program
costs?
c. What are some of the reasons causing AVDLR cost increases?
d. To what extent is the Navy Working Capital Fund Surcharge and
escalation rates impacting current year execution funds?
D. METHODOLOGY
The primary data source used in developing this thesis were personal interviews
with current FHP managers, comptrollers and senior budgeting analysts from CNAP,
Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), Naval Supply Systems Command
(NAVSUP), Naval Supply Inventory Control Point Philadelphia (NAVICP-P), Assistant
Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare (N-88), FMB, and DoD. To obtain the most
objective information, several interviews were also conducted with personnel that
formerly held these positions. Supplemental data were obtained through historical Flying
Hour Cost Reports, Operation Plan 20 's, previous theses, books, articles, federal
publications and Navy policy documents and instructions. Professional briefing
documents and working papers obtained from various Naval agencies and commands
were also used.
E. THESIS OUTLINE
This thesis is organized in the following manner: Chapter I presents the
introduction, purpose and scope of the thesis. This chapter also outlines the research
questions, methodology, limitations and benefit of the study. FHP background
information and a brief look at the current defense budgeting environment is provided.
Chapter II provides an overview of the Flying Hour Program budgeting and
funding process. Since very little material is written on this complex process, it is our
intent to create a comprehensive reference document that new FHP managers, and related
personnel can read to gain insight into the FHP procedures and budgeting processes. The
chapter is divided into six general sections. Section one begins with an overview of the
DoD Resource Allocation Process (RAP), to include a summary of the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting Process (PPBS). Sections two and three will briefly
describe the FHP funding structure and chain of command. Sections four and five
provide a detailed explanation of the roles and functions of the FHP managers and
budgeting personnel, from the squadron to the Major Claimant level, i.e. Commander in
Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). Section six will conclude the overview of FHP
budgeting with an analysis of the role and activities performed by the Navy's Special
Assistant for the Flying Hour Program (N-88F), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
(Financial Management and Comptroller) and OSD/OMB. An understanding of the
intricate FHP budgeting process and the roles of participating budget players will help the
reader comprehend the programs complexity and provide insight into the potential causes
of underfunding. This Chapter will also explain the unique FHP terminology, cost
components, source inputs/outputs and how requirements are determined.
Chapters III and IV are the main focus of the thesis and they analyze the primary
issues contributing to CNAPs FHP underfunding. Chapter III is divided into four
sections and analyzes budget formulation and other issues that may result in FHP
underfunding. The first section describes budget process dynamics. The next section
analyzes the impact of competing priorities and limited fiscal resources manifested in
budget formulation and program trade-off decisions. Section three then analyzes the FHP
funding methodology and issues to assess whether the process is valid for determining
FHP funding levels. Various program cost categories and FHP components are also
analyzed. The last section begins with a summary of the Navy's AMSR effort to correct
some of the FHP problems and associated causes of underfunding.
Chapter IV describes and analyzes some of the perennial problems that have
contributed to CNAPs FHP underfunding during budget execution. The source of
program problems and underfunding are not attributable to any one factor. Rather, it is
the result of a myriad of budgeting and execution decisions, unplanned events and
changing factors that occur in an environment of conflicting commitments and limited
resources. To our knowledge, there is no single document that explains the primary
sources and potential causes of FHP underfunding and variability. Therefore, the intent
of this chapter is similar to the reference nature of Chapter II, in that the goal is to create a
document that chronicles some of the historical and current causes of program variability
and underfunding, since many of these factors are experienced each year during budget
execution.
Chapter V summarizes the answers to the thesis questions presented in Chapter I
and identifies areas for further research. This chapter presents alternative concepts that
may minimize FHP underfunding and improve defense budgeting effeciency. Appendix
A is a list of Aircraft Other Maintenance (AOM) and Aircraft Flight Operations (AFM),
Appendix B shows Top 95 AVDLR Cost Drivers, and Appendix C provides a list of
programs within the Special Interest Category, Funding Other (FO) account.
F. LIMITATIONS
Understanding the complexities of the Flying Hour Program and the causes of
underfunding is a massive challenge. Not only does it require detailed comprehension of
the budgeting process and functional relationships, it requires thorough understanding of
several interrelated areas such as, supply, maintenance, logistics, aviation operations,
training, readiness, pricing, accounting and FHP management policies. Needless to say,
several months of research and scores of interviews were not sufficient to master the
intricacies of all these broad areas. The goal was to learn as much as possible in a short
period, sift out systemic problems and address the primary causes of program variability
and underfunding.
G. BENEFITS OF THESIS
This study will benefit CNAP and newly assigned FHP personnel to help
understand the complexities of the Flying Hour Program, the funding process and some
of the historical and current factors contributing to program underfunding. Since many
other functional areas and personnel are involved with FHP management and funding
(whether directly or indirectly), this thesis will serve as a beneficial reference manual.
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II. FLYING HOUR PROGRAM (FHP) OVERVIEW AND FUNDING
PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The Navy Flying Hour Program (FHP) is the method used by The Department of
the Navy (DoN) to budget and allocate annual funding for the operation and maintenance
of all Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. The FHP provides a systematic approach for Fleet
Commanders and Resource Sponsors to construct defensible budget exhibits that justify
the resources required to attain aviation mission readiness goals for combat, support, and
training aircraft. Attainment of aviation readiness goals contributes directly to the
successful execution of the National Military Strategy. In simplest terms, the FHP
budgeting methodology seeks to forecast and align a specific number of flight hours with
the associated dollar amounts necessary to achieve those hours. The process is complex
and not easily understood. Further, the research conducted for this thesis determined that
there is no formal training provided for CNAP's newly assigned FHP managers and other
personnel working with the FHP. Additionally, the authors were unable to locate any
single source document that methodically "lays out" the intricacies of the program and
the myriad of budgeting players that are involved with the FHP process. Therefore, the
purpose of this chapter and one of the objectives of this thesis is to create a reference
document of sufficient detail that will enable new FHP managers and related budget
personnel to better understand how FHP requirements are determined. Additionally, the
roles and responsibilities of the key FHP budget players are explained to facilitate a
greater understanding of the entire FHP process.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section begins with an
explanation of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget process to understand the
budgeting framework in which the FHP requirements and funding are determined. Next,
an outline of the FHP funding composition and financial / operational chains of command
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are described. The last section presents a comprehensive overview of the budgeting
organizations and players involved with the FHP budgeting and execution process. This
discussion will include a detailed explanation of how the FHP requirement is determined.
B. DOD BUDGETING: RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS (RAP)
The Flying Hour Program Budgeting Process is confusing, but it appears to be
consistent with the greater Department of Defense (DoD) budgeting environment.
Perhaps Wildavsky says it best:
I would be surprised if anyone claims to comprehend fully defense
budgeting. Huge dollar figures, long lead times for weapons built out of
complex technologies, feast and famine in resources, a rapidly changing
world scene, all combine to create confusion [Ref. 2].
Resource allocation is the process in which financial resources are made available
to all federal agencies. A basic knowledge of this process provides a foundation from
which Navy Flight Hour Program Managers can begin to understand the many challenges
faced in "resourcing" the program, as well as to help identify some of the inherent
problems in the RAP.
Resources for all activities in the Department of Defense, whether weapons,
personnel or infrastructure and maintenance, are provided through the RAP. There are
six phases of the RAP:
• Phases 1-3: Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
• Phase 4: Enactment
• Phase 5: Apportionment
• Phase 6: Execution
1. Phase I, II, III: Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is the process which
ultimately produces the DoD portion of the President's Budget. The PPBS process
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originally introduced to DoD in 1962 by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara,
provides a formal and systematic framework designed to assist the Secretary of Defense
in making policy and strategy decisions, and the development of forces and capabilities to
accomplish required missions. The objective of PPBS is to translate national security
interests into military missions and construct budgetary requirements to be presented to
Congress for funding consideration. This action attempts to outfit military operational
commanders with the "best" mix of equipment, forces and support, within the confines of
limited resources available. A model depicting PPBS is shown below: [Ref. 4:p. C-2]
Threat Assessment—* Strategy —> Requirements —> DoD Programs —> Budget
PPBS assesses U.S. security threats, develops a strategic plan to address threats
and develops requirements to support that strategy. Requirements are then translated into
specific DoD programs developed to execute that strategy and ultimately create budgets
to deliver program funding.
The PPBS consists of three phases to achieve its objective. They are: 1) The
Planning Phase, 2) The Programming Phase, and 3) The Budgeting Phase. Planning
addresses the capabilities required to carry out the U.S. national military security strategy
and the resources available for defense. Programming translates the results of DoD
planning into a logical six-year defense program within available resources. Budgeting
converts the program into the congressional appropriation structure, focusing on building
justifiable budgets while ensuring compliance with high level guidance from the
President and Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
a. Planning
The planning phase begins with a review of national security objectives
and ends with development of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The Under
Secretary Defense (USD) for Policy along with Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), The Office of
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Secretary of Defense (OSD) and numerous high-level military and defense agencies
evaluate the national security objectives, the posture of the United States, and the
military's capability to support those objectives. Their focus in planning is to:
Define the National Military strategy needed to maintain U.S. security and
support U.S. foreign policy 2 to 7 years in the future.
Plan military force structure necessary to accomplish that strategy.
Develop a comprehensive framework and roadmap for DoD that combines
priorities and missions within fiscal resource limitations.
Provide decision options to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to help him
assess the role of national defense in the formulation of national security
policy and related decisions.
The output of the planning phase includes two documents, The National
Military Strategy Document (NMSD) and the DPG. The NMSD builds on the
President's security objectives, identifies strategy, provides advice to the President, and is
the input basis for the DPG. It is important to note that the NMSD is not fiscally
constrained.
After a series of reviews is completed, a draft DPG is published and the
unified force commanders are given the opportunity to provide inputs and
recommendations. This provides each of the services with a flavor of the strategic
priorities and their roles in future years. The DPG is the first output document in the
planning process that is fiscally constrained and guides the services in developing their
programs for a six year period. As explained by Jones and Bixler, "The Guidance
indicates annually the assets, forces, and other resources needed to satisfy U.S. security-
objectives. The DPG provides the basis for subsequent service - branch and OSD
programming and budgeting" [Ref. 5:p. 21]. When finalized, the DPG is signed by the
SECDEF, which indicates the planning process is completed and the programming phase












> Service Program ObjectivesMemorandum (POM)
Figure 2.1. PPBS: Planning Process [Ref. 4: p. C-5].
b. Programming
PPBS brings together long-term strategic planning with the programming
process. The programming process is the procedure for distributing available resources
equitably across many competing DoD programs [Ref. 4:p. C-4]. Additionally, the
programming phase attempts to bridge the gap between the broad policy guidance
produced in planning and the line by line pricing that is developed during the budgeting
phase. Programming translates planning efforts into a 6-year fiscal program for forces,
manpower, and material. Programming begins with the issuance of the draft DPG in the
beginning of the budget cycle, and ends with the submission of each service's Program
Objectives Memorandum (POM) to OSD, in mid-summer. The POM is best described, as
each service's plan for the resources needed to accomplish the programs and missions
forecasted for the next six years. Every two years during the even years, the POM is
updated to reflect: 1) new missions, 2) new objectives, 3) alternative solutions, 4)
allocation of the resources, 5) ongoing DoD activities and 6) the forecasted costs of each
program. For the Navy, the POM is the SECNAV's recommendation to the SECDEF on
the best use of the assets and resources allocated to the Navy.
15
There are two elements of the POM in the programming phase. They are
POM Development and POM Review. In POM development, each service develops a
six-year plan for allocating their financial resources. The first two years of the POM are
then used as the basis for budget. During the POM review, OSD reviews each
component's POM inputs and implements policy changes as needed.
The POM is then reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for accuracy
and program risk assessment based on the capability of the U.S. Armed Forces to execute
the strategy approved during the planning phase. Finally, a program review is conducted
and the results are issued in Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs) after final review by
the SECDEF. Final approval also captures all POM decisions regarding manpower,
costs, procurement, and stores them in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)
database. The FYDP database contains the SECDEF's approved list of DoD programs
spread over a six year horizon displayed by program elements and appropriations [Ref
4:p. C-7].
c. Budgeting
The final phase of the PPBS process is the budgeting phase. The purpose
of the budgeting phase is to allocate dollars to the DoD programs approved in the PPBS
framework. PPBS budget formulation as pointed out by Jones and Bixler has five
elements'. 1) issuing budget preparation guidance, 2) estimating specific program costs, 3)
holding hearings to justify budget submissions, 4) ensuring submissions adhere to "both
policy and financial guidelines", and finally, 5) the series of negotiations that take place
to achieve the requested amount of program dollars projected to be available for the next
two fiscal years and four outyears [Ref. 5:p. 24].
Formulation begins when OMB issues Circular A- 11 to all federal
agencies. The A- 11 provides general guidelines, instructions and schedules for budget
submission [Ref. 6:p. 34]. When DoD receives the A-l 1, each service formulates its own
policy guidance document, which provides more detailed budgeting guidance. For the
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Navy, this is known as the Navy Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) Notice 7111 and is issued
by the Navy's Office of Budget (FMB). This notice provides Navy resource sponsors
detailed budget formulation guidance, forecasted inflation rates, deadlines for submission,
and dollar limits for each budget year (called "control numbers")- This signals the
beginning of the budget process, commonly known as the "budget call" [Ref 4:p. B-15,
16]. Upon receipt of this policy guidance, each service constructs detailed budget
estimate submissions (BESs) based on the Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) and
forwards their budget request in September to OSD. These BESs are reviewed by each of
the respective service's financial managers (FM) and are forwarded to the USD
Comptroller for review and modification. Final decisions on the respective services
BESs are made via Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). Once changes are made and
approved, the BESs are then submitted as "the DoD budget" to the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) for incorporation into the President's Budget (PB) for submission to
Congress in February.
During the budget review process, cost estimates in the POM are updated
with the latest pricing information, funding shortfalls are addressed and budget exhibits
are prepared to justify dollar requirements. As the budget exhibits are submitted through
the chain of command, a formal review process is initiated. The review process includes
budget reviews held at FMB, followed by a review at OSD, and finally a joint
OSD/Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review. This joint review is done to
ensure the DoD budget supports the national security strategy. During the review
process, budget analysts hold hearings to review and carefully scrutinize each budget line
item submitted. The analysts can take three courses of action: 1) approve exhibits as
presented, 2) disapprove portions of exhibits by issuing a "mark" or 3) approve additional
funds where shortfalls are detected. In the current budget environment, "marks" are by far
the most common budget review actions taken within DoD. If an item is marked, the
sponsor of the budget is given 48-72 hours to question the marks by submitting a
"reclama". Reclamas are detailed appeals to the marks made by the budget analyst and
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explain the impact of any invalid assumptions made by the analysts. If reclamas are
approved, the marks are removed. If not, the marks "stand" and the budgeted line item is
reduced. Naturally, this process is somewhat subjective and it is important to note that
budget analysts represent part of the checks and balance mechanism within the budget
process. Their role and job is to apply DoD and congressional resource policy guidance
to the various budget requests submitted. Since the budgeting environment is constrained
by the availability of limited resources, budget analysts are tasked to ensure budget
authority is provided to the most needed and defensible programs [Ref. 7: p. 5 1-53]. Jones
and Bixler describe this budgeting environment: "Budgeting is a highly constrained
exercise in pricing the executability ofprograms within the parameters of affordability
and political feasibility" [Ref. 5:p. 25]. FHP managers should be cognizant of this as
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Figure 2.2. PPBS [Ref. 4:p. 4-18]
2. Phase IV: Enactment
Enactment is the process in which Congress reviews the President's Budget,
conducts hearings and passes legislation. The process begins when the President submits
the annual budget to Congress in February and is concluded when the President signs the
annual Authorization and Appropriation bills normally prior to October. Authorization
legislation validates each of the Federal agencies programs and operations and specifies
the maximum funding amount to be made available. The appropriations process creates
the budget authority, which permits each federal agency to incur obligations throughout






















Figure 2.3. Resource Allocation Process [Ref. 7:p. 52]
3. Phase V: Apportionment
After the President signs the authorization and appropriation legislation into law.
funds are made available for DoD and other federal agencies. Apportionment occurs
when OMB provides the funds to the agencies. Funds are distributed throughout DoD
from the USD Comptroller to each service's comptroller and ultimately to the end user
[Ref. 7:p. 53].
4. Phase VI: Execution
Execution occurs when appropriated funds are obligated and spent (outlayed) by
the authorized agencies. An obligation is a legal commitment to provide funds to pay for
services, weapons or supplies. When the "check" is written and cashed, an outlay
20
(transfer) of money from the U.S. Treasury to the recipient is made [Ref. 7:p. 52].
This concludes the discussion of DoD's unique budgeting process. The process is
complicated and not easily understood in a single reading. Also, it is further complicated
by the political nature of congressional oversight and interest in management of DoD's
spending. As Jones and Bixler explain:
...the long-range policy development and resource planning process for
defense is characterized by complexity and plurality. [Furthermore], while
the program budgeting method was discontinued for other federal agencies
20 years ago, this budgeting method continues to be employed within DoD
because it meets the policy - development and participating demands of
multi-source budget advocacy while providing a long-range perspective on
programs and spending.' In the end, 'DoD budgeting is subjected to a
highly participatory Congress that employs inevitable strategic budget
gaming efforts in the review and decisions made on the defense plan and
its budget' [Ref. 5 :p. 31-32].
Since the FHP is part of this larger DoD framework, it to is subject to "gaming
efforts". This observation will be further explained in Chapter III. The purpose of this
section is to briefly introduce the reader to the DoD resource allocation process.
Understanding this process is a necessary building block to comprehending the FHP
funding and allocation process as well as development of a working knowledge of the
dynamics and issues that affect the FHP environment. The next section explains how
appropriated resources fund the Navy's Flying Hour Program (FHP).
C. FLYING HOUR PROGRAM (FHP) FUNDING COMPOSITION
1. DoD Budget
The Department of Defense's annual budget for FY 98 was approximately $248
billion, and represented over 15% of the nation's annual budget. Of this amount, the
Navy's annual Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M, N) account was nearly $22
billion and the FHP represented over $3.2 billion from that appropriation [Ref. 8:p. 3].
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With budget levels of this magnitude, it is not surprising that funding for DoD programs
has increasingly come under congressional scrutiny in the post Cold War environment.
Congressional scrutiny has also been applied to the Navy's FHP.
This section briefly explains how the Navy FHP is organized and how resources flow
to the user.
2. FHP Funding Structure
Congress provides funds to the Navy through appropriations. Appropriations are
categorized by purpose: operations and maintenance, military personnel, procurement,
research and development, military construction and others [Ref. 4:p. A-6].
The Navy Flying Hour Program receives funding through the Operations and
Maintenance Navy (O&M, N) appropriation account. Funding for the DoN FHP is
further categorized via Major Force Program (MFP). MFPs are major categories of
forces, manpower and Total Obligation Authority (TOA) within the DoD budget
function. There are 1 1 Major Force Programs (MFPs) and the DoN Flying Hour Program
currently uses four of these MFPs to program O&M funds. These four MFPs are
Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, Intelligence and Communications, and Guard
& Reserves. (See Figure 2.4 for the complete appropriation / MFP relationship). It is
important to be familiar with the MFPs because they form the basis of two very important
FHP documents discussed later in this chapter.
The following example shows some of the aircraft types and mission activities
funded within the various O&M, N MFPs.
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Strategic Forces (01): VQ-3 (E-6A), VAQ-129 (TC-18F)
General Purpose (02): All TACAIR/ASW, Fleet Replacement Squadron
(FRS). USMC, Vertical On-board Delivery (VOD), Carrier On-board
Delivery (COD), and Staff Activities. Aircraft examples: CH-53E, F/A-18C,
P-3C, UC-12Betc.
Intelligence & Communications (03): UP-3A, EP-3A
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Figure 2.4. FHP Program/Appropriations Relationship [Ref. 9: p. 7]
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As illustrated in Figure 2.4, FHP funding composition comes from the O&M, N
appropriation account. The O&M, N appropriation is then divided into budget activities.
The FHP falls under the "Operating Forces" (BA1) budget activity. Operating Forces are
further subdivided by Activity Groups (AGs) and Sub-activity Groups (SAGs). AGs and
SAGs are codes, which reflect the activity and principle functional areas responsible for
administering the FHP. The primary flight hour program AGs are "Air Operations' 7
(1A00), and "Combat and Operations/Support" (1COO). Since over 90% of the FHP
resources fall under the Air Operations AG, those corresponding SAGs are illustrated in
Figure 6. FHP funding is divided into two major areas, which correspond, to the SAGs.
These are Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO) and Aircraft Operations Maintenance
(AOM). The squadrons receive AFO funding, known as Operational Target Functional
Category (OFC-01) or "01 OPTAR". The 01 OPTAR (AFO) is further comprised of two
fund codes, 7B (fuel) and 7F (flight equipment). The air stations, which support the
squadrons, receive AOM funding, known as OFC-50. referred to as an "Operating
Budget". The air station's OFC-50 (AOM) account is broken down into Aviation Fleet
Maintenance (AFM) - fund code 7L (consumables), and Aviation Depot Level
Repairables (AVDLRs) - fund code 9S (repairables). The CVs and other air platform
ships (LPH and LHA) also receive AOM (OFC-50) funding when the air wing and
squadrons are embarked onboard. This funding is issued to the CVs as an "OPTAR"
rather than an Operating Budget. This distinction is made because financial management
regulations differ for shore and afloat activities. The CVs OPTAR is further subdivided
just like the air station, by AFM and AVDLR [Ref. 4:p. B-12].
This concludes discussion of the FHP funding structure. The next section presents
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Figure 2.5. FHP Funding Composition
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D. FHP CHAIN OF COMMAND AND ROLES
This section has two purposes. The first is to provide a display of the two
functional FHP chains of command, and second to introduce the budgeting phases within
the FHP process.
1. FHP Chain of Command
The dynamic environment of the FHP demands the participation and cooperation
of multiple Navy and DoD organizations. There are two main functional chains of
command that oversee the financing and operation of the FHP. The operational chain,
(depicted in Figure 2.6 for the Pacific Fleet), provides the guidance and direction for the
daily mission tasking for all Navy aircraft. This chain illustrates the flow of authority
from the President to the squadron commander. Although the members of the operational
chain provide input for consideration in budget formulation, they have a minimal role in
formal budget development. The financial chain, depicted in Figure 2.7, illustrates the
flow of the budget process. Before describing the roles and activities of the FHP budget
players, a basic overview of the budgeting framework is provided. Budgeting from the
perspective of the Executive Branch (excluding Congress) consists of four basic phases:
budget formulation (preparation), submission, allocation and execution. An introduction
to these budgeting phases provides the reader with an understanding of the budgeting



























Figure 2.6. Pacific Fleet FHP Operational Chain Of Command.
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Figure 2.7. DoD FHP Financial Organizational & Resource Allocation Flow
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2. Basic FHP Budget Phases
a. Budget Formulation and Submission
Budget formulation and submission is the process of requesting and
justifying the resources required for operating and maintaining the fleet's aircraft. This is
done using budget exhibits designed to justify specific levels of funding required for each
aircraft type. The primary FHP budget exhibit is called the Operational Plan 20, (OP-20).
Assembling the OP-20 is the overall responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO). The CNO delegates this responsibility to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(DCNO) for Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments (N-8), who in turn tasks
the assistant CNO for Air Warfare (N-88) to construct the necessary FHP budget exhibits.
The N-88 staff works closely throughout the year with the Major Claimants and Type
Commanders in receiving the necessary budget inputs required in assembling and
justifying the annual budget funding requirements. Figure 2.8 displays these budget
inputs in relation to the financial organization. It will be helpful in understanding the
formulation steps and sequence of budget events, which are discussed in more detail later
in this chapter. This figure also shows three input mechanisms (all discussed later in
more detail) used at the squadron, air station level, and N-88F level, they are: 1) The
Budget OPTAR Report (BOR), 2) The Flight Hour Cost Report (FHCR) and the
Operation Plan 20 FHP budget exhibit.
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Figure 2.8. DoN FHP Budget Formulation
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b. Resource Allocation and Execution
Resource allocation indicates the presentation, and analysis of, and the
decisions on the distribution of funds from Congress all the way down to the squadron
commanders. Execution is the spending of congressionally provided funds. As shown in
Figure 2.7, after Congress approves the DoD budget and the President signs it, the
Treasury Department issues an Appropriation Warrant to OMB. OMB in turn, apportions
funds via the DoD Comptroller to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Financial Management and Comptroller (ASN (FM & C)), specifically the Office of
Budget (FMB), who allocates funds to the major claimants. FHP funding is released
quarterly from FMB to Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), and on to
Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP), and finally to the air stations and
squadron commanders.
During the execution of FHP funds, several opportunities exist to shift or
reprogram FHP dollars within each step of the chain. This occurs due to changing
priorities, and insufficient funding levels for other programs, among other reasons.
Reprogramming is designed to give operational and financial commanders increased
flexibility to meet unforeseen program changes that may occur during budget execution.
Moving funds within one appropriation account is authorized as long as the funds remain
within specific program elements for which they were appropriated and within the
authorized reprogramming threshold and other congressional requirements. However,
reprogramming FHP funds may create problems and cause future underfunding as budget
analysts often perceive reprogrammed money as excess funds not required for the FHP.
The consequences and the outcome of reprogramming FHP funds is examined in more
detail during Chapters III and IV. The next section will explain the roles and
responsibilities of the players involved in the FHP budgeting process.
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E. THE FHP BUDGETING PLAYERS
This section explains the budgeting actions performed by each of the members in
the FHP financial chain of command, beginning at the aviation squadron, through the
CINCPACFLT level. Sections F and G describe the FHP funding process at the higher
levels. While technically the FHP budgeting process begins at CNAP's level, it is
important to first discuss and understand how FHP funds are allocated and executed at the
user levels to provide a better understanding of all FHP budget actions.
1. Squadron Level and Air Station/CV
a. Funding Allocation - Squadron
The Navy Operations and Maintenance, (O&M, N) appropriation,
provides the funds necessary for the day to day operations of the Navy's FHP. Funding is
made available on an annual basis but is provided to the fleet quarterly. Beginning with
the new fiscal year on October I s', each Navy and Marine squadron and their supporting
air station or ship, if deployed, receives one quarter's worth of flight operations funding
from their respective Carrier Air Wing Commander (CAG) or directly from Commander
Naval Forces Pacific (CNAP). These quarterly funds are called Operational Target
Functional Categories (OFCs) or commonly known as Operating Targets (OPTARS). An
OPTAR represents the anticipated funding level needed to support the costs of a
squadron's flight operations. Receipt of the OPTAR. called an "OPTAR grant", gives the
squadron authorization to place obligations against CNAP's FHP funds up to the amount
of the issued OPTAR grant.
The squadron OPTAR (see Figure 2.9) is comprised of two cost expense
accounts, Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO or OFC-01) and Aircraft Operations
Maintenance (AOM or OFC-50). The OFC-01 and OFC-50 accounts are designed to
show how FHP funds are spent and record the type of materials purchased. (Note: For a
complete listing of all OFC-01 and OFC-50 authorized expenditures see Appendix A
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(OFC-01) Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO) . OFC-01 funding consists of fuel,
oil and lubricants (POL) used during flight operations and any required flight
equipment used in the operation of the aircraft. These funds are accounted
under the 7F (fuel) and 7B (Administrative and flight equipment) fund codes.
(OFC-50) Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM) . The AOM account is
broken down into Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) and Aviation
Fleet Maintenance (AFM).
AVDLR . AVDLRs represent the largest portion of funding within the OFC-50
account and FHP budget. AVDLRs are depot level repairable aircraft
components, financed under the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) system.
Under this system, squadron OFC-50 accounts finance the depot level repair
and procurement of these repairable components. Although the squadron
usually initiates the repair demands, the supporting Intermediate Maintenance
Activity (IMA) has primary control over whether these transactions would
result in an AVDLR charge. Charges are incurred if components are ordered
during AVDLR repair at the IMA and if the AVDLR must be sent "off-
station" for depot level repair. Thus, the supporting IMA and air station
retains control of the AVDLR funds and associated accounting responsibilities
[Ref. 10:p. 12.3.7].
AFM. The AFM portion of the squadron's OFC-50 (AOM) account is
typically spent on "consumables" - inexpensive parts used in support of flight
operations such as paint, wiping rags, towel service, cleaning agents,
compounds used in the corrosion control of aircraft and, consumable repair
parts [Ref. 10:p. 12.3.7].
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Figure 2.9. FHP Funding Composition
b. Funding Allocation - A ir Station/CV
Like the squadrons, supporting air stations also receive a quarterly FHP
operating budget from CNAP at the beginning of the new fiscal year (see Figure 2.9).
This operating budget, called a "dash 1" (in reference to the document it is received on -
NAVCOMPT FORM 2168-1). The "dash 1" provides OFC-50 (AOM) AVDLR and
AFM funding needed to support the repair of AVDLRs for all tenant squadrons. The
OFC-50 (AOM) funds are controlled by the air station's IMA and comptroller office.
This is done because, as noted earlier, the air station's IMA is both the repair and
disposition authority for all squadron AVDLRs. Additionally, this separation of OFC-50
(AOM) funds between the squadron and air station is done for three reasons: 1) gives the
squadron commanding officers direct financial control over flight operational costs
impacting their squadrons' safety and administration, 2) avoids the shifting of OFC-50
(AOM) funds and financial management as squadrons rotate from shore to ship, and 3)
helps to simplify cost reporting procedures by allowing squadrons to report both OFC-50
(AOM) and OFC-01 (AFO) costs through a one source document called a budget OPTAR
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report (BOR) explained in the next section. As explained earlier, the CVs also receive
AOM funding when the air wing and squadrons are embarked onboard. The only
distinctions being the ships receive an OPTAR vice an Operating Budget. This is
because financial management regulations differ between shore-based activities and
afloat units.
c. Funding Execution - Squadron
Throughout the fiscal year squadron commanders are required to keep
track of all FHP expenses and must carefully monitor their OPTAR account to ensure
they stay within their quarterly FHP OPTAR. The accounting procedures used for
obligating FHP funds at the squadron are performed using the Aviation Storekeeper
Information Tracking System (ASKIT). ASKIT is a computer program that records and
tracks all OPTAR grants obligations by 7B and 7F fund codes. ASKIT also provides
several required reports: 1)15 day air wing commander 7F and 7B obligation transmittal,
2) 30 day CNAP 7F transmittal, and 3) a monthly Budget OPTAR Report (BOR). The
air wing transmittal assists in monitoring squadron fuel obligations, while the 30-day
transmittal is used in conjunction with the BOR to account for all squadron expenses
[Ref. 11]. The BOR, along with the Flight Hour Cost Report (FHCR), described in the
next section, are the primary financial management inputs used at CNAP to administer
and track the FHP obligations during the fiscal year. These reports also collectively form
the data used by N-88F to build new OP-20 budget exhibits. The BOR categorizes
obligations by aircraft type and includes the following [Ref. 10:p. 12.3.7]:
• Obligation totals by fund code for OFC-01 and OFC-50 for that month.
• Total gallons and type of fuel (e.g. JP-4/5) consumed for the month and fiscal
year to date (FYTD).
• Flight hours flown for the month and FYTD.
• Number of aircraft assigned by Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) and Type
Equipment Code (TEC).
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• Remaining OPTAR grant balance for the squadron.
During any given budget year, if the squadron is unable to obligate all of
its OPTAR funds before the end of the fiscal year, these funds are returned to CNAP for
reallocation. Most squadrons are able to obligate their OFC-01 (fuel) funds by increasing
their flight operations, and depleting their remaining OFC-50 (AOM) funds by
purchasing needed materials and supplies.
d. Funding Execution - Air Station/CV
The air station/CV, like the squadrons they support, are also required to
track and report a record of their monthly OPTAR (OFC-50) expenses to CNAP. This
tracking and reporting is the responsibility of the air station IMA and comptroller shop.
The means by which they perform this responsibility is through a report called the Flight
Hour Cost Report (FHCR). The FHCR reports reflect the amount of all OFC-50 funds
obligated by the air station/CV in direct support of each squadron. The FHCR records
costs by:
• Type Equipment Code (TEC)
• Organization code - which squadron incurred the obligation
• Obligations by repairable and consumable fund codes
• Posting the remaining OFC-50 balance
The FHCR is submitted automatically via the Standard Accounting and
Reporting System - Field Level (STARS-FL) database. The STARS receives its input
from the air station/CV I-level Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management
Information System (NALCOMIS) and supply Shipboard Uniform Automated Data
Processing System (SUADPS). At the end of each month, after the STARS database
summarizes the total obligated funds, CNAP comptroller personnel review the FHCR to
monitor all cost, obligation and execution rates for the FHP [Ref. 12].
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2. Carrier Air Wing Commander (CAG) - Allocation/Execution
The carrier air wing commanders, called CAGs, play a limited role in FHP
allocation and execution. This next section briefly describes their role. For most fleet-
going squadrons quarterly OPTAR funding is issued by their controlling CAG. For non-
deploying squadrons and a few other exceptions, the OPTAR grant is directly issued by
CNAP or by the Type Wing Commander. The CAG's primary role during allocation and
execution is that of monitoring and distribution the execution of funds. This is done to
ensure each squadron has sufficient OFC-01 (fuel) funds to perform their respective
missions. If one squadron within an Air Wing requires additional funding within the
fiscal year, the Air Wing Operations Officer will distribute funds from one squadron to
another. Distribution is done to alleviate shortfalls or funding surpluses brought on by
unforeseen operating schedules within the air wing. If funding is not available in the Air
Wing, then the CAG will solicit funding directly from CNAP.
The other role CAGs perform during FHP execution is monitoring FHP
obligations. The air wing staff performs a cursory role in monitoring by receiving and
tracking squadron 15-day fuel (7B) obligations and the monthly BORs. The CAG staff
primary ensures the BORs are submitted to CNAP in a timely and accurate manner. [Ref.
11]
3. Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP)
a. Budget Formulation
Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific Fleet (Type Commander), plays an
active and important role in the FHP budget formulation process by representing the
flying hour users' needs and articulating the difficulties to the resource sponsor (N-88) in
executing the FHP budget. The CNAP budget formulation role consists of two activities:
1) collecting and reporting FHP execution data and 2) developing FHP program and
budget submissions.
FHP execution data come from two sources, the BOR and the FHCR. The
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BOR and FHCR data provide the basis for constructing all FHP OP-20 budget exhibits.
Therefore, the accuracy of these reports is extremely important to ensure sufficient future
FHP funding levels. To ensure this accuracy, CNAP closely monitors and audits the
BORs and FHCRs on a monthly basis. After reviewing these reports, CNAP then ensures
this information is forwarded electronically to N-88F where it is collected in the Flying
Hour Projection System (FHPS) database (see section F) [Ref. 9:p.53 & 57].
CNAP has several roles in FHP formulation. The three most significant
are the submission of: 1) POM Issue Papers, 2) The OP-32 and OP-5 Budget Exhibit
Reports and 3) The OM-6 Detail of Unfunded Requirements [Ref. 13].
Each year as part of the POM process, CNAP submits POM Issue Papers.
POM Issue Papers are narrative descriptions from CNAP and CINCPACFLT to address
funding shortfalls and added mission requirements. Typically, POM "Papers" consist of
a list of underfunded or unfunded FHP requirements that CNAP builds throughout the
year. With the help of the CNAP Operations Officer, and the respective CNAP aircraft
class desks, the CNAP FHP manager writes POM issue papers to identify new or
changing fleet flying hour needs that require additional FHP funding in order to
successfully execute the flying mission. The POM Papers offer a brief explanation of
these requirements, what is needed to meet the requirements and the impact on fleet
readiness if funding is not received. After the POM Papers are written, CNAP then
forwards them to CINCPACFLT where they are reviewed, approved or rejected. If the
issues in POM Papers are approved, CINCPACFLT then prioritizes and forwards them to
the Resource Sponsor, N-88 for further review and incorporation into the PPBS process.
A recent POM example submitted by CNAP was a result of the Navy's expanded EA-6B
aircraft mission. Navy EA-6B aircraft were recently tasked to establish permanent
overseas detachments and to perform electronic countermeasure missions previously
performed by Air Force EF-1 1 1 aircraft. Since this mission was not previously budgeted
for during the PPBS process the operating costs were borne by CNAPs existing FHP
budget. Hence, CNAP requested additional funding via a POM Issue Paper.
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Most CNAP POM issues are forwarded to the CNO for consideration,
though some are not. Due to overwhelming additional cost requirements and fiscal
constraints, CINCPACFLT will often place dollar thresholds and limit the number of
issues CNAP may submit. These limits occur for two reasons. CINCPACFLT is limited
to a total of 25 POM issues for all programs under their authority and because the FHP
resource sponsor has limited funding. Imposing a limit on POM inputs at the CINC level
is intended by design to identify and unify the TYCOMs and the CINCs most significant
issues. However, due to CINCPACFLT' s many other funding priorities and conflicting
commitments, some CNAP FHP issues are not incorporated into major claimants POM
Issue Papers [Ref. 13].
The OP-32 (Summary of Price and Program Changes) and the OP-5
(Detail by Activity/Subactivity Group (AG/SAG)) budget exhibits are additional
mechanisms for CNAP to influence FHP funding levels. The "OP-32 is the cornerstone
for all other budget exhibits, and it must match the OP-5 in pricing and program
adjustments between current and budget years" [Ref. 4:p. B-19]. The OP-32 budget
exhibit is submitted each year to CINCPACFLT and forms the basis to justify all O&M,
N budget exhibits. The OP-32 exhibits, provide a detailed summary of how CNAP is
planning to spend its FHP funds by type of purchase from the current year through the
next two budget years. At CNAP, FHP staff members prepare the OP-32 by means of an
Excel spreadsheet provided by CINCPACFLT. The spreadsheet updates fuel, AVDLR
and maintenance costs. The companion document to the OP-32 is the OP-5. The OP-5
supports all changes noted on the OP-32 detailed by AG/SAG and provides detailed
financial and narrative explanations and justifications for each budget activity. It
compares one OP-20 FHP budget exhibit against another for price changes, flight hours
and any type / model / series aircraft changes. The final intent of the OP-32 and OP-5 are
to track all budget and funding changes between the prior year, current, and next two
budget years, as well as, to highlight funding differences, thereby allowing budget
analysts to present and support the OP-20 budget exhibit during budget formulation
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hearings [Ref. 4:p. B- 19 and Ref. 13].
The last event in CNAP budget formulation is the submission of the OM-
6. The OM-6 is a detailed list of all unfunded requirements (UFR) and submitted by
CNAP after the new budget is received - usually March. In essence, the OM-6
summarizes, prioritizes and prices the list of all CNAP unfunded requirements and
provides a detailed "Narrative" and "Impact" Statement to explain the consequences on
mission readiness if funds are not provided. As explained by one CNAP staff member,
the OM-6 posses the question to the fleet, "Now that your new budget is out, can you live
with it or not?" [Ref. 13]. After CNAP completes the OM-6, it is forwarded to the CINC
for further consideration in the expectation that additional funding will be provided [Ref.
6:p. B-22 and Ref. 13].
Two other events that CNAP participates in during the formulation
process are the CNO Flying Hour Conference and the FMB OPTEMPO Review.
The CNO Flying Hour Conference takes place once a year. The purpose
of this meeting is to provide an opportunity for CNAP, CNAL and other high level FHP
budget players to voice concerns regarding the overall FHP program funding and to gain
added resource sponsor understanding and support. These meetings are chaired by N-88F,
the resource sponsor for the FHP, and they are typically characterized by open and frank
discussion. These discussions often center around the FHP program funding and the
numerous difficulties experienced by CNAP in executing the FHP [Ref. 13].
In April, FMB analysts for the Flying Hour Branch conduct an OPTEMPO
review of the FHP budget. This meeting is conducted at CINCPACFLT and attended by
both the CINC and CNAP FHP managers. There are three goals of this meeting: 1) to
determine if the dollars allocated within the FHP are providing sufficient funds for
execution, 2) to review the current fiscal year FHP obligation rates and 3) to gather "fleet
inputs" that help FMB budget analysts support and defend the proposed OP-20 budget
exhibit, prior to and during OSD budget submission and review. FMB analysts in past
years would evaluate the program and provide reprogrammed funds to the FHP budget.
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However, because of dwindling DoD budgets, front-end reprogramming of additional
funds into the FHP has stopped [Ref. 13].
b. Funding Allocation and Execution
CNAP serves as the focal point for allocating, executing and monitoring
flight hour funding for all Navy and Marine Corps Pacific fleet squadrons. The
TYCOM's primary goal and responsibility during allocation and execution is to achieve a
specific level of readiness for each squadron within the constraints of the resources
available. Because of the scope of activities that occur in these phases, a separate
discussion of each will follow.
(1) Allocation. The allocation of FHP funding begins with the
new fiscal year when FMB distributes the quarterly allocation of the congressionally and
DoD approved FHP funding to CNAP in the form of an Operating Budget (OB). The
FHP OB, in theory, should provide the necessary resources to execute CNAP's flying
mission. Because of reduced DoD budgets and numerous competing priorities, financial
resources are scarce. Hence, the funds requested during budget formulation seldom
actually match those required by CNAP to successfully execute the FHP program. Hence,
CNAP's greatest challenge during allocation is to distribute these funds in a manner that
will allow squadrons to achieve mission readiness while avoiding over obligation of FHP
funds.
CNAP's primary method for distributing flight hour funds is
through the Navy Operational Plan 20 (OP-20). The OP-20, as noted earlier, serves as
both a budgeting formulation document and an execution-monitoring tool. The OP-20
(discussed in more detail in sections F and G) serves two purposes. First, during
budgeting, the OP-20 displays funding requirements by aircraft type, model, series
(T/M/S) and becomes the Navy's primary budget exhibit displaying the FHP funding
requirements during submission and review to OSD and OMB. Second, when funding is
approved, the OP-20 document then provides local commanders with a means to allocate
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squadron OPTAR grants by:
• The annual number of flight hours that may be flown by each T/M/S aircraft
• The dollar amounts budgeted for each flight hour by T/M/S
The total dollar amounts authorized for the three OPTAR cost components
(fuel, AVDLR and maintenance).
By using the OP-20 document, the CNAP FHP manager and
comptroller decide how to allocate flight hours to each squadron, air wing, and aircraft-
owning activity; taking into account deployment schedules, and training requirements.
In distributing OPTAR funds to squadrons and air stations, the OP-
20 serves as a "jumping off point. At CNAP the distribution of FHP funds is shared by
two offices, the Flying Hour Program Division (N01F3) and the Aviation Flight Hour
Operations Office (N-3F). The FHP manager (N01F3) is charged with the overall
management of the program, but shares this responsibility with N-3F. N-3F, (also called
the FHP Operations Officer (Ops-O)), is responsible for ensuring the squadrons are
allocated the proper number of flight hours and associated funding levels required to meet
CNO's mission readiness goals for aircraft [Ref. 14]. To determine how many hours to
allocate each squadron the CNAP Ops-O uses five major documents: 1) Status of
Resources and Training System (SORTS) Report, 2) Required Operational
Capability/Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE) 3) Aviation Training and
Readiness Matrix, 4) OP-20, and 5) the Secretary of the Navy's Department of the Navy
Consolidated Planning and Programming Guidance (DNCPPG). A discussion of each of
these documents follows.
The SORTS manual defines specific mission proficiency
requirements necessary to achieve the various combat readiness ("C") ratings, which are
subsequently reported to the CNO and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). It is in effect, a
percentage measurement of how mission ready a unit is to operate in a combat
environment. The ROC/POE delineates general combat capabilities and mission areas for
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each T/M/S expected during wartime. The Training and Readiness Matrix (T & R
Matrix) is a detailed Joint CNAP/CLANT instruction that provides guidance by T/M/S,
mission, and specific goals for air crew competency levels necessary to achieve a
particular "C" rating in the SORTS Report. Lastly, the DNCPPG establishes a measure
termed Primary Mission Readiness (PMR) which serves as a subjective means to
distribute a limited number of flight hour funds among the various activities. PMR,
simply stated, is the number of flight hours required to complete all events scheduled on
the T & R Matrix. Completing all events is known as 100% PMR. However, since
funding has been ratcheted down by Congress and DoD historically over the last 20
years, Navy leadership has been forced to lower this number. PMR is currently
maintained at a Navy wide rate of 83% plus 2% of the flying hours-performed in aircraft
simulators [Ref 13].
The first three documents, SORTS, ROC/POE and T &R Matrix
are tools used by squadron CO's in determining how to allocate their flying hours. At
CNAP, the Ops O takes these documents into consideration but, because of the
complexity in trying to balance the requirements of all four documents, he primarily
relies on the OP-20 and the 83% PMR goal to distribute flight hours by T/M/S.
Specifically, the OP-20 assists in the allocation of funds to the fleet because it is broken
down into three schedules to reflect different mission areas. This is done because each
T/M/S is funded to a slightly different level of hours and dollar amounts due to
differences in operating expenses, e.g., jets versus helicopters. These schedules thus
serve as a rough guideline for flight hour OPTAR distribution throughout the fleet. More
detail on these schedules is addressed in section F. For purposes of understanding
CNAPs role, they are introduced as follows [Ref. 15]:
General Purpose Forces :
• TACAIR/ASW - Carrier air wings, Marine air wings, land and sea based units
committed to combat operations = funded at 83% PMR (1 AlA fund code).
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• FLEET AIR TRAINING (FAT) - Squadrons that are dedicated to training
fleet aircrews in each particular type aircraft = funded at 100% student
throughput (1 A2A fund code).
• FLEET AIR SUPPORT (FAS) - Squadrons which perform combat support
functions = Funding based on Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA)
methodologies and historical execution (1 AlA fund code).
In concert with the OP-20 budget exhibit, final distribution of
funding to fleet squadrons is achieved by matching squadron flying "activity levels" with
the CNO PMR goal of 83%. An activity level denotes where a squadron is during its
typical 18 month "turn-around deployment cycle". A turn-around cycle is simply the
eighteen-month period used for scheduling aircraft deployments, along with all the
requisite aircraft and air wing training in preparation for those deployments. The three
phases of this turn-around are deployment, turn-around, carrier preparation and
deployment. Given the fact that flight hour requirements vary at each stage of the turn-
around cycle, CONUS based air wings are typically funded at the levels shown below:
Month 1 : Personnel turnover and leave 40% PMR
Months 2-6: Turn-around training 65% PMR
Months 7-10: Turn-around training 75% PMR
Months 11-16: Pre-deployment training 95% PMR







Deployment Month 6: 60% PMR
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Figure 2.10. CNAP 18 Month Carrier Air Wing Deployment Cycle [Ref. 16]
Using the 83% PMR goal as guidance, the CNAP Ops-0 uses the
OP-20 schedule and builds a quarterly master flight hour execution plan for each air wing
once CINCPACFLT passes the "controls" (fiscal FHP dollar limits) to CNAP. The
objective is to attain an overall PMR goal of 83% while at the same time ensuring
squadrons receive the necessary funding to fly enough flight hours to meet training
requirements. As illustrated in Figure 2.10, the level of funding and flight hours required
varies from the 83% PMR baseline depending on squadron location within the turnaround
cycle. However, in the aggregate, an 83% PMR level is achieved. In addition to
achieving the 83% PMR goal, the Ops-0 also must take care to avoid any over obligation
of FHP funds and a resulting 1517 Antideficiency violation.
After the master flight hour execution plan is endorsed by the air
wing commanders, and approved at CNAP, the Flight Hour Manager's staff then
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distributes the quarterly OPTAR grants to the air wings, squadrons and air stations by
naval message. Receipt of this message provides authority for these activities to obligate
FHP funds.
(2) Execution. CNAPs monitoring role in FHP execution is to
closely track and review all squadron and air station obligations. This is achieved
through the FHCR and BOR costing information reports. These reports serve to:
• Prevent over expenditure of allocated funds
• Ensure funds are used for approved purposes only
• Compare squadron, air wing and air station readiness training and support
activities to current on-hand FHP funds
• Identify excess funds for redistribution to other units
• Measure ship/station/squadron budget execution performance
• Support and provide justification for subsequent fiscal year budget inputs and
decisions
• Prepare required FHP management control reports
The FHCRs and BORs provide both a feedback mechanism to the
TYCOM on the status of funds for each unit, as well as a check and balance to ensure
over obligation or inappropriate obligations of funds does not occur. The FHCR
delineates fiscal year to date information on the amount of flight hours flown and the
obligations for fuel, maintenance and AVDLR expenses. By continuing to monitor the
FHCR and BOR inputs against the OP-20 cost per hour guidance, any anomalies are
immediately addressed by the CNAP FHP Manager. When funding shortfalls occur, the
FHP Manager is then required to reallocate funds between the squadrons and the air
stations or through a request for additional funding from CINCPACFLT and N-88, the
resource sponsor. Critical shortfalls are common within the FHP and it has become
customary to address these shortfalls through the distribution of "contingency funds'".
There are two types of Contingency Funds; those that are
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appropriated by Congress to offset costs of ongoing known operations, and those that are
appropriated through emergency supplemental bills to cover unforeseen contingencies.
An example of "known" contingency funds, are those used to fund the continuing
military operations in Bosnia. These funds were not budgeted for in PPBS, but were
appropriated and set-aside during the normal congressional appropriations cycle. These
funds are held by FMB and provided to CNAP only in the event that fleet operations - in
direct support of "contingencies", exceed the appropriated FHP budget.
An example of "unknown" contingency funds, were the funds
passed in July 1 998 to cover the unplanned costs of deploying a second aircraft carrier to
the Persian Gulf. The appropriation of these funds occurs when it becomes apparent
through mid-year budget reviews that continued fleet operations would exhaust set-aside
contingency funds. CNAP has received and depended on the release of contingency funds
to help meet PMR goals and cover the increased cost requirements not adequately funded
during annual budgeting [Ref.13].
Overseeing the distribution of flight hour funds within
CINPACFLT requires a tremendous management effort between the squadrons, air
stations, air wing commanders, and the resource sponsor. This is a challenging task, and
at any given point in time, the FHP managers are closely monitoring the execution of
nearly five air wings, a dozen air stations, and over 100 squadrons. The final objectives
and challenges of these task are to spread the limited FHP funding across all activities
while achieving mission readiness goals and to ensure the proper execution of all
allocated funds by the end of the fiscal year.
4. Commander in Chief United States Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT)
The primary responsibility and function of CINCPACFLT as the Major Claimant
for the Flight Hour Program (FHP) is to support and act as an interface between CNAP,
FMB and the resource sponsor, N-88F. These budget responsibilities and functions are
grouped into two areas, budget formulation, and budget allocation and execution. A
discussion of these functions and responsibilities follows.
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a. Budget Formulation
During the FHP budget formulation process, CINCPACFLT receives three
input documents, they are: FHP fiscal control limits, the budget policy and formulation
guidance, both from the FMB analyst, and a copy of the proposed OP-20 FHP budget
exhibit as developed by N-88F. Since CNAP primarily oversees the day-to-day
execution of the FHP, CINCPACFLT budget personnel forward these documents to
CNAP. When these documents are received by CNAP staff, they are validated and
verified against the control limits and the OP-20 to ensure sufficient funds are available to
execute the FHP. Using the Aviation Cost Evaluation System (ACES), CNAP compares
the proposed OP-20 budget document from one year to the next to determine if the
changes between the two years are executable. This analysis is done by matching the
flight hours listed in the OP-20 to the control amounts provided in the OP-32, the OP-5
and other budget guidance notices. As noted earlier, if funding shortages are identified,
CNAP can take two courses of action, 1 ) reprogram funds and flight hours within the
overall allocation limit or 2) request additional FHP funding from CINCPACFLT.
To request additional funding, CNAP forwards both unfunded
requirements documents and POM Papers to CINCPACFLT. Both the unfunded
requirements document and POM Papers help to articulate and identify funding shortages
at CNAP. Upon receipt, CINCPACFLT budget analysts and operations personnel review
CNAP's inputs to determine if the requests are valid. If the inputs are considered valid,
CINCPACFLT then will prioritize and incorporate CNAP's inputs among the other
CINC major programs and forward the requests to FMB via the Resource Sponsor, N-
88F. in early July. When FMB analysts receive CINCPACTFLT's inputs, they also
review and prioritize the requests to determine which shortfalls should be incorporated
into the Navy's budget and submitted to the DoD Comptroller. If approved by DoD,
these shortfalls may ultimately be included in the President's Budget and receive
congressional review for authorization and appropriation [Ref. 17].
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b. Budget Allocation & Execution
CINCPACFLT responsibilities in the allocation and execution phase of
the FHP are more limited. Nevertheless, these responsibilities, particularly in allocation,
can result in significant decisions that directly impact the successful execution of the
FHP.
The responsibility to allocate funds is the job of the CINCPACTFLT
Execution Branch. The Branch distributes the quarterly FHP funding to CNAP as
received from FMB. However, before these funds are allocated at the beginning of a new
fiscal year, an analysis of the funding levels for each of the Navy CINC's programs is
conducted. If this analysis determines any of the CINC's programs are inadequately
funded, CINCPACFLT leadership may determine that reprogramming funds between
programs is necessary. In recent history, many CINCPACFLT reprogramming decisions
have resulted in the transfer of funds from the FHP account to other CINC programs.
These reprogramming decisions can dramatically impact the daily operation of the FHP at
CNAP and result in a number of added challenges in managing this already difficult
program. The significance and impact of these advance-reprogramming decisions will be
brought out in more detail during Chapters III and IV.
Since CNAP is the principle manager of the FHP, CINCPACFLT
delegates the FHP execution responsibility to him. However, CINCPACFLT budget
analysts and operations personnel monitor the program through daily telephone calls and
program monitoring. These personnel monitor CNAP FHP obligation rates to see how
funds are being spent, and conduct monthly reviews of the program by T/M/S to ensure
fleet readiness goals are being achieved, and to discover potential mission trouble areas
[Ref. 17].
This completes the discussion of the roles and budgeting actions
undertaken by the squadrons, air stations, COMNAVAIRPAC, and CINCPACFLT. The
next section of this chapter will continue the analysis of the remaining FHP budget
players beginning with the Resource Sponsor, N-88F.
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F. SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR THE FLYING HOUR PROGRAM: N-88F
1. Introduction
The primary responsibility for budgeting and funding the Navy Flying Hour
Program (FHP) resides with the Office of the Special Assistant for the FHP, N-88F. N-
88F is the resource sponsor for the program, and falls under the cognizance of the
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare (N-88). It is at this level where the
Air Type Commanders' flying hour requirements are translated into monetary amounts to
execute their respective FHPs, and hence achieve fleet aviation readiness. The primary
purpose of this section is to explain how the flying hour funding requirements are
determined and to outline the roles and relationships of N-88F during the budget
formulation process. This section begins with a brief overview of N-88Fs program
responsibilities and relationships, followed by a more detailed description of FHP
categories, cost components, and a comprehensive explanation of the way flying hour
costs are forecasted and calculated to develop the Operation Plan 20 budget exhibit (OP-
20). As explained earlier, FHP budget formulation is not an easy process to understand.
Although the great budget scholar Wildavsky, was not familiar with the Flying Hour
Program, he captured the essence of its difficulties in his analysis of how federal budget
calculations are made: "Budgeting is complex, both because there are so many
interrelated items and because these often pose technical difficulties. " [Ref. 2:p. 44]
2. Overview of N-88F Program Responsibilities and Relationships
The responsibilities and functions performed by N-88F are demanding and
difficult. Principle areas of oversight and responsibility include determining FHP
funding requirements, budgeting, cost projection, coordinating with FHP fleet
representatives, monitoring program execution, and presenting the Major Claimants'
POM issues. The primary task of the N-88F staff as the resource sponsor is to ensure
sufficient flying hour funds are programmed to achieve specific operational and material
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readiness objectives. [Ref. 15] Throughout the PPBS process, the staff participates in
comprehensive meetings and conferences pertaining to FHP requirement assessments,
pricing and execution. During the budgeting cycle, the staff constructs budget exhibits
developed from Fleet inputs and from budget guidance published by the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations for Programming and Assessment (N-80 and N-81), and the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Comptroller's Office (FMB).
In terms of their coordination role, Figure 2.1 1 depicts some of the many fleet commands
















Figure 2.11. FHP Program Coordination [Ref. 18]
Since budgeting requires intense human interaction and negotiation, effective
communication at all levels in the funding chain of command is essential.
Communication with the Air Type Commanders usually pertains to budget issues,
funding discrepancies, readiness implications, and policy changes. Other duties include
hosting the annual Flying Hour Conference and managing the FHP database. The Flying
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Hour Conference is a chance to have a "face to face" with all FHP analysts and budget
players in order to communicate issues, concerns and potentially resolve program
difficulties, such as projected funding shortfalls and potential budget reductions or
"marks". The FHP database is called the Flying Hour Projection System (FHPS) and is
used to store both historical and future FHP information. This information is used during
each phase of the budget process to predict and validate future FHP requirements,
conduct sensitivity analysis with different pricing options, and produce various budget
exhibits such as the OP-20 (Estimate of Flying Hours and Related Costs). [Ref. 15:p. 2-1]
What follows is a brief review of how the FHP is organized in terms of aircraft mission
categories, funding and cost components.
3. FHP Categories, Funding and Cost Components
As noted in Chapter I, the FHP is the system used to predict, budget and justify
the annual fiscal resources required for operating and maintaining all Navy and Marine
Corps Type / Model / Series (T/M/S) aircraft, (including reserve squadrons). The
overarching goal of the Navy FHP is to maintain and improve aircrew proficiency and
aviation combat readiness. To achieve this readiness, the FHP is divided into four
distinct categories or schedules which constitute the organizational basis for the OP-20
and the Flying Hour Cost Report, (both of which will be discussed in subsequent sections
of this chapter.) Each schedule is unique and it is important to understand the distinction
between them as each schedule uses specific source data elements in forecasting their
respective costs. Some of these data elements are exclusively used for only one schedule,
while other data elements are used by all four schedules. These four schedules are
identified by letters, and delineate the various Navy / Marine Corps Aircraft squadrons by
functional mission. A description of each schedule is presented below: [Ref. 1 5:p. 1-2]
Schedule Mission / Definition
A Tactical Air / Anti-Submarine Warfare (TACA1RJASW): This
category constitutes the bulk of the Navy / Marine Corps aviation
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warfighting capability, which primarily consist of those squadrons
capable of executing the "joint strike" and "crisis response"
missions in support of the National Military Strategy. The ASW
component pertains to the squadrons whose mission is to detect
and attack subsurface threats and conducting maritime surveillance
operations.
B Fleet Air Training (FAT): This category (also referred to as Fleet
Replacement Squadrons (FRS)), consists of squadrons that train
pilots and navigators prior to joining TACAIR/ASW and Fleet Air
Support units.
C Fleet Air Support (FAS): The primary mission of these squadrons
is to provide direct and indirect support (including logistics) to
Navy and Marine Corps fleet operating units and shore
installations. Although the FAS mission is separate and distinct
from the TACAIR/ASW and Fleet Air Training missions, it serves
as an integral component in achieving total Naval aviation
readiness. Common mission examples include Carrier-on-Board
Delivery, and Search and Recovery.
D Reserves: This category pertains to all Navy / Marine Corps
reserve squadrons.
The FHP no longer includes the direct program costs associated with the
Undergraduate (new student pilot) training category. Requirements determination for this
training category falls within the purview of Chief of Naval Aviation Training
(CNATRA).
The schedules that fall within the purview and control of the active duty Air
TYCOMS are schedules A, B, and C. Before analyzing program cost components and
how the schedules are calculated by N-88F, a brief review of the program's financial
organization is presented.
a. Program Funding Breakdown
This section reviews the FHP funding composition relative to the
percentage of funds the Air TYCOMS receive, the amount allocated to each FHP
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schedule, and the cost components that the funds are used for.
As explained in Section C, the DoN Flying Hour Program is funded from
the Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M, N) appropriation. Funding for the FHP is
contained in four of the eleven different Major Force Programs (MFP) known as:
Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, Intelligence and Communications, and
Reserves (See Figure 2.4 for the complete MFP / appropriation relationship.) Of the four
MFP's, approximately 89% of the FHP O&M, N funding is contained in the General
Purpose Forces program element (MFP 02). Reserve Forces, (MFP 05) constitute about
10%) of total FHP funds and the remaining 1% is allocated across the other two MFPs.
The resources that pay for the flight operations and maintenance costs for the two active
duty Air TYCOMS come from the General Purpose Forces element. Forty eight percent
is allocated to the Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP), and forty one percent is
allocated to Commander Naval Air Forces Atlantic (CNAL) as depicted in Figure 2.12.










Figure 2.12. TYCOM Funding Allocation [Ref. 18]
The funding for the TACAIR/ASW (A), FAT (B) and FAS (C) schedules
comes from the General Purpose Forces program element. On average, for the last three
fiscal years, (96, 97, 98) these FHP schedules have been appropriated $3.2B (then year)
dollars. Figure 2.13 illustrates the relative funding percentage of each schedule. The
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TACAIR/ASW schedule is the most visible FHP category from both a budgeting and









Figure 2.13. FHP Schedule Funding Percentages [Ref. 18]
As explicated earlier in the chapter and depicted in Figure 2.5, the
appropriation funding is further subdivided into Budget Activities (BA), Activity Groups
(AGs), and Sub-Activity Groups (SAGs). The primary FHP Budget Activity that CNAP
is concerned with is BA-1 (Operating Forces), since it incorporates the funding for the
TACAIR/ASW, FAT, and FAS schedules. The next discussion will outline the major
FHP cost components, the Flying Hour Cost Report (FHCR), followed by a description
of the Flying Hour Projection System (FHPS). An explanation of the cost components
and their relationship to the FHCR and the FHPS is important in understanding how the
TACAIR/ASW portion of OP-20 budget exhibit is developed.
b. Cost Components
FHP costs are delineated into four main categories or cost pools: Fuel,
Maintenance, Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLRs), and Special Interest Category
"Funding Other" (F.O.). The first three are considered direct program costs which are
reflected in the TYCOMs Flying Hour Cost Reports and the OP-20s developed by N-88F.
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The F.O. category, contains the indirect FHP costs and does not appear in the FHCRs nor
the OP-20. Figure 2.14 delineates these FHP costs by percentage of funds for the General
Purpose Forces category. The cost categories are discussed below. Costs not covered by











Figure 2.14. FHP Cost Components [Ref. 18]
Fuel. On average the fuel costs make up approximately 21% of the FHP
budget and reflect all of the fuel and lubricants consumed in support of designated flying
hour requirements. Two types of fuel costs are presently budgeted for in the FHP: JP-4
and JP-5. The Air Type Commanders determine the type fuel and mix required. The fuel
pricing information (per barrel) is stored within the FHPS database. Fuel price
assumptions and escalation rates are provided annually through DoD and are contained in
NAVCOMPT notice 71 1 1 [Ref. 15].
Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR). AVDLRs are repairable
aircraft components or assemblies. These components are generally high cost and require
long procurement lead times. Due to their high cost nature, significant savings can be
achieved by repairing them as opposed to discarding these items when they fail or break
[Ref. 19]. AVDLRs are typically repaired at the Depot Level when the item is
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determined to be Beyond the Capability of Maintenance (BCM) of the Intermediate
maintenance facility. AVDLRs constitute approximately 51% of the FHP budget and are
clearly the most problematic cost component, in that their costs have increased
significantly since 1991 (increasing, on average, 7.5% per year). The AVDLR cost issue
is a major cause of program underfunding and variability, as discussed in detail in
Chapter IV.
Maintenance (MNT). This cost category includes the aggregate
consumable maintenance costs incurred at both the Organizational (O-Level) and
Intermediate maintenance levels (I-Level). At the O-level, these costs consist of
purchases for preventive maintenance and corrosion control materials such as paint, rags
and cleaning agents, as well as common hand tools and various consumable supplies used
during aircraft maintenance. Maintenance costs associated with the removal of engines
and other components are also included in this cost pool. The consumable maintenance
costs incurred at the I-level consist of the outlays for the material used and activities
performed in the repair of aircraft engines and components. Other outlays are made for a
myriad of tools, flight equipment and contract maintenance [Ref. 15]. See Section E 3a.
for a more detailed discussion about the Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM) category.
"Special Interest Category" Funding Other (F.O.). As previously
indicated the FO costs are not included in the OP-20. These "other" costs represents
outlays for flight simulator operations, civilian labor, administrative supplies, material,
equipment, maintenance service contracts, and expense for travel and lodging associated
with pilot and crew Temporary Additional Duty (TAD). Although most of these costs are
considered an integral part of the cost for Naval Aviation, there are no FHP resources
programmed by N-88F. Rather, the FO costs are incorporated in the Major Claimants'
regular budget submission. The Air TYCOMs provide input for the development of this
budget, based on their forecasted requirements for the FO category of funds. The FO
category has become a perennial source of program underfunding, which will be further
explained and analyzed in Chapter III.
57
c. Flying Hour Cost Report (FHCR)
During budget execution, the costs outlined above (less the FO category)
are captured and reported in the Flying Hour Cost Reports (FHCR) by the Air TYCOMs.
The source data for the FHCRs are the Budget OPTAR Reports (BORs), transmitted from
the various squadrons and air stations that fall under the cognizance of the Air TYCOM.
(BORs were explained in Section II-3c.2). In turn, the Flying Hour Cost Reports
(FHCR), are transmitted electronically from the TYCOMs to N-88F and FMB on a
monthly basis. Copies of the FHCRs are provided by the TYCOMS to their respective
Major Claimants as well. The FHCR data is entered into the Flying Hour Projection
System (FHPS) and serve as the primary budget input to develop the OP-20 budget
exhibits [Ref. 15:p. 10-7]. The FHCR itself is delineated by Major Force Program. FHP
Schedule, and program element for both Navy and Marine Corps Squadrons. For each
schedule, the report depicts the cost per hour and total aggregate obligations to date for
each of the three direct cost components (fuel, maintenance and AVDLR), by program
element, and T/M/S aircraft. Flying Hour Projection System (FHPS).
As introduced earlier, the FHPS is the repository for all FHP historical and
current year execution data. The system is used by N-88F to project FHP requirements
and costs for the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and is
physically located at the Naval Inventory Control Point in Mechanicsburg, PA. N-88F
has a direct data link to the FHPS. The most important output of the FHPS is the OP-20.
In addition to producing the OP-20 budget exhibits, the system helps N-88F produce a
myriad of tailored reports to satisfy requests for information from higher headquarters or
agencies including DoD and Congress. The system also allows N-88F to produce sample
OP-20s to conduct simulation or "what if drills regarding different pricing options and
changes in force structure. The key data that the FHPS synthesizes in producing the OP-
20 are the historical Flying Hour Cost Reports, the inventory and location of fleet aircraft
(generated by the Aircraft Planning Data File (APDF)), and cost escalation factors. The
FHPS uses a numbering system to identify the specific version OP-20 as it relates to the
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PPBS cycle. The number and type of OP-20s produced in support of PPBS will be
further discussed in Section G.
Before turning to specific budgeting events and activities performed by N-
88F, the next section describes how the FHP flight hours and costs are determined.
4. FHP Requirements Determination
a. Cost Per Hour and FHP Forecasting Methodology
Two data elements are used to determine the flying hour requirements for
the Air TYCOMs: 1) the number of flying hours required by the aircrews per month in
each T/M/S aircraft, and 2) the cost to operate each T/M/S/ aircraft per flight hour (CPH).
The number of flying hours required by the aircrews is obtained from the CNAP/CNAL
Joint Instruction 3500.67D, Training Readiness Matrices. For example, the Training and
Readiness Matrix indicates that the required number of flight hours for an F/A-18 crew is
25 hours per month. The cost per flight hour refers to the direct and indirect costs
associated with operating an individual T/M/S aircraft on an hourly basis. CPH
calculations for any T/M/S are essentially the sum of the aggregate cost pools delineated
in the FHCRs (AVDLR + Maintenance + Fuel) divided by the number of hours flown:
CPH = Sum of Total Costs / Total Hrs Flown.
The approved methodology for forecasting the FHP cost per flying hour
for each T/M/S has varied over time. Historically, the primary means of projecting the
budgeted cost per hour has been based on a three year moving average of actual FHP
execution. The current methodology, used since FY98 is based on the costs from the
most recently executed FHP budget, that is then adjusted for inflation and other
escalation factors. Hence, in formulating the FY-98 budgeted cost per hour for Fuel,
Maintenance and AVDLRs, FY 96 execution data (with some adjustments) were used.
Variations to this current year execution methodology may occur, particularly when it is
deemed that the specific execution year experienced high cost anomalies. Figure 2.15
provides an illustration of the required inputs needed to determine each T/M/S cost per
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hour used in the OP-20. It is important to note that the CPH for each T/M/S aircraft is
different among the two TYCOMS, AIRLANT and AIRPAC. In fact, it can vary among
different squadrons within the same TYCOM due to varying environmental operating
conditions, missions, utilization rates and several other changing factors. Many FHP
managers, and budget analysts have spent, and continue to spend an inordinate amount of
time and effort in analyzing the variances in the cost per hour in attempt to control or
explain some of the dynamics that drive increases in costs for each of the T/M/S aircraft.
This issue and the adequacy of the current methodology used to forecast FHP cost data is
examined in Chapter III.
Maintenance & Fuel
• Average Cost Last Completed FY





Cost per Flight Hour
NAVCOMPT 7111 Notice
Cost, & Escalation factors
AVDLR
Average Cost Last Completed FY
Plus escalation
Figure 2.15. Cost Per Hour Inputs [Ref. 18]
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b. Description ofthe Operations Plan 20 (OP-20) Exhibit
The OP-20 is the principle budget execution document produced from the
N-88F Flying Hour Projection System (FHPS), that relates annual budgeted flying hours
to forecasted flying hour costs. The OP-20 is broken down by FHP schedule, program
element, and T/M/S which reflect the flying hours and budgeted CPH for each of the cost
components (Fuel, AVDLRs and Maintenance). During budget formulation, the N-88F
produced OP-20 serves as guidance for the Major Claimants and TYCOMs annual
authorized flying hours that may be flown by each T/M/S aircraft, and the top-line
funding allocation for the execution year. The Major Claimants and Air TYCOMs in
turn, use the OP-20 as a guide in preparing their respective budgets and "check" if the
funding and hours provided meet their requirements. Once approved via the budget
process, the OP-20 becomes the primary resource allocation document for the TYCOMs
to execute their respective Flying Hour Programs. The number and type of OP-20s
produced in support of the PPBS cycle is confusing and will be detailed in Section G 2.b.
The process by which N-88F calculates each of the FHP schedules for developing the
complete OP-20 budget exhibit is reviewed next.
c. OP-20 Schedule Calculationsfor the A ctive Duty Forces
Now that a basic overview of the FHP cost components and costing
methodology has been provided, this section completes the analysis of how N-88F
calculates the predicted flying hours and funding requirements for each of the FHP
schedules in developing the OP-20 budget exhibit. The goal of N-88F in this process is
to fund the FHP requirement to the extent possible given funding availability. The term
requirement refers to forecasting the required hours for each Air TYCOM and the costs
associated with flying those hours (Fuel, Maintenance and AVDLR). The first calculation
analyzed is the Schedule A: TACAIR /ASW.
(1) Schedule A: TACAIR/ASW. The formula elements used to
determine the TACAIR/ASW schedule are described first, then the composite formula is
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presented. These formula elements are as follows:
Primary Authorized Aircraft (PAA) - This element refers to the requisite
number of aircraft assigned to a squadron to be fully combat mission capable.
The CNO determines this figure based on the Aircraft Program Data File
(APDF). The APDF is a composite database that contains the inventory and
location of all Navy / Marine Corps aircraft [Ref. 9 and 15].
Crew Seat Ratio - Reflects the relationship of how many pilots are assigned to
fly under combat conditions and integrates factors such as crew rest, illness,
injury and leave time. This figure is established by the Naval Bureau of
Personnel [Ref. 9, 20, and 22].
Aircrew Manning Factor (AMF) - Reflects the number of aircrews budgeted
per aircraft per squadron based on manning levels determined by CNO and
adjusted by N-88F. The AMF has been subject to budget reduction marks
from FMB and DoD particularly, when it is determined that different
information systems reflect lower than 100% crew manning for various
T/M/S's [Ref. 20].
Hours per Crew per Month (H/C/M) - This component refers to the minimum
number of hours that each crew must receive per month in order to be
considered combat ready and technically proficient in the designated Primary
Mission Areas (PMA) of the assigned aircraft. This figure is delineated in the
Joint (CNAP/CNAL) TYCOM Training and Readiness Instruction [Ref. 20
and 21].
PMR - PMR is defined in the CNAP/CNAL Joint Instruction 3500.67D,
Training Readiness Matrices as "the hours required to maintain the average
crew qualified to perform the Primary Mission Areas (PMA) of the assigned
aircraft, to include all weather/day/night carrier operations". PMR is
expressed as a percentage of total monthly flight hours authorized.
Historically, PMR has been as high as 88% in the mid 1980s, but the current
CNO PMR goal is 83% (plus 2% contributed via flight simulators). This goal
is published annually by N-80, and is reflected in the DoN Consolidated
Planning and Program Guidance (DNCPPG). The TYCOMs allocate PMR
based on their Inter-deployment Training Cycle as explained earlier. PMR is
only applicable in determining the flying hour requirements for the
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TACAIR/ASW (Schedule A) portion of the FHP, and is not used in the other
schedules (B, C and D). In summary, PMR is simply a markdown tool used in
the OP-20 calculation to determine the annual budgeted flying hours and cost
for each T/M/S resident in Schedule A. The topic of PMR is revisited in
Chapter III.
The TACAIR/ASW Schedule is an integrated sequential formula,
described below:
FORMULA COMPONENTS OUTPUT
1. (Primary Authorized Aircraft) x (Crew Seat Ratio) = Allowed Crews
2. (Allowed Crews) x (Aircrew Manning Factor) = Budgeted Crews
3. (Budgeted Crews) x (Required hrs per crew, per
month) x (12 months)
= Required annual flying
hours per Squadron
4. (Required annual flying hrs per Squadron) x (No. of
Squadrons)
= Total annual Flying hrs
required
5. (Total annual Flying hrs required) x (83% PMR) = Annual budgeted
flying
hours
6. (Annual budgeted flying hrs) x (Cost per Hour) = Annual budgeted cost
Table 2.1. TACAIR/ASW OP-20 Formula
(2) Schedule B: Fleet Air Training (FAT). Although
Schedule B is calculated in a different manner than Schedule A, it uses the same
historical cost per hour methodology. The level of funding for this schedule is driven
by the projected student throughput (number of students), the students flying
experience and the amount of training required to become proficient in operating the
specific Type aircraft assigned. N-88F defines these student-training categories as
follows: [Ref. 15:p. 4-2]
CAT I First tour aviator who has completed primary training or first tour
in a Type aircraft (Receives 100% of training syllabus).
CAT II Second tour aviator with previous fleet experience in a Type
aircraft (Receives 75%) of training syllabus).
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CAT III Either third tour with fleet experience in the Type aircraft (e.g. CO
or XO) or Transitional aviator (Receives approximately 50% of
CAT I syllabus).
CAT IV An experienced aviator with substantial Fleet experience in the
Type aircraft and requires only a refresher NATOPS check
(Receives 10-20% of the CAT I syllabus).
CAT V A specialized syllabus designed for aviation personnel such as
foreign pilots or pilot's transitioning from fixed wing aircraft to
helicopters (Receives 25-75% of syllabus, contingent on training
needs).
The basic formula for calculating the estimated requirement for
each of these categories is as follows:
FORMULA ELEMENTS RESULT
1. (Number of Students) X (Syllabus hours per category) = Number of Hrs
2. (Number of Hrs from step I.) X (CPH for the
respective T/M/S aircraft)
= Budgeted Cost
Table 2.2 Fleet Air Training Calculation
These figures are adjusted if the number or type of aircraft changes
or if the Pilot Training Rate (PTR) changes due to student throughput [Ref. 9:p. 17 and
15].
(3) Schedule C: Fleet Air Support (FAS). In the past, N-88F has
used historical execution data exclusively to determine FAS funding requirements. The
current approach uses the most recent year's execution data in conjunction with a
methodology developed by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). The CNA
methodology breaks down the FAS schedule into three mission related categories. These
categories are Training, Operational and Other. The "Training" category pertains to the
hours stipulated in the Training and Readiness Matrices that ensures pilot technical and
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tactical proficiency. The "Operational" element refers to the flying hours required to
conduct support missions such as Carrier On-board Delivery (COD) and Vertical
Replenishment (VERTREPS). The "Other" category includes overhead hours such as
ferry flights and maintenance check flights. [Ref. 15:p. 5-1]
The intent of this section was to provide a detailed description of
the flying hour program organization, its components and how N-88F determines the
FHP funding requirements via the OP-20. Understanding the basic mechanics,
terminology and peculiarities of the FHP facilitates an understanding of the specific role
ofN-88F in the FHP budgeting cycle, discussed next.
G. THE N-88F ROLE IN THE FHP BUDGETING PROCESS
1. Introduction
A basic overview of the Resource Allocation Process and PPBS was presented at
the beginning of this chapter to provide a clearer perspective of how the FHP fits within
this greater budgeting framework. Section E 3c. described CNAPs role in formulating,
submitting and executing the FHP budget. To complete the description of the FHP
funding process, an analysis of the N-88F role in FHP budget formulation, submission
and execution within the context of the PPBS cycle follows. This discussion also
includes the roles and relationships with FMB and DoD/OSD, during budget submission
and review.
2. Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
As noted earlier in this chapter, PPBS is a dynamic process that constitutes the
framework in which the Department of Defense (DoD) plans, prepares, negotiates and
makes decisions on policy, programs and resource allocation [Ref. 5]. Understanding the
complexities of PPBS is a massive challenge due to the nature and size of DoD and the
scope of the diverse mission and activities of the military. The DoN FHP is one of the
many programs decided upon within this broader system. This section provides a brief
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overview of how some of the key PPBS events and processes relate to the FHP, and how
N-88F and other tangential FHP budget players interact within this framework.
a. Planning
The key document developed in the planning phase, is the Defense
Planning Guidance (DPG). Section B 1 details how it is contrived. The DPG consists of
force structure and fiscal guidance for the Services to use in preparing their respective
Program Objective Memoranda (POMs). This document also helps the Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations for Programming (N-80) to develop the Navy's Consolidated Planning
and Programming Guidance (DNCPPG). The DPG and the DNCPPG serve as the basis
for developing the Navy's POM within the top-line funding totals for a six-year period.
The DNCPPG also outlines the Naval Aviation Primary Mission Readiness (PMR)
percentage.
b. Programming
The programming process serves as a means of integrating planning and
budgeting in order to decide what programs to distribute available resources to. As the
Resource Sponsor for the FHP, N-88F is continually engaged in the PPBS process to
ensure there are sufficient resources programmed in the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP). The FYDP is the database that contains the DoDs approved programs. It
displays the cost of programs like the FHP, by Major Force Program, Program Element
and appropriation, for a six-year period. The programming process validates and makes
changes to the FYDP. This process begins with the last four years of the program
constructed in the previous PPBS cycle [Ref. 4:p. C-7]. Understanding the POM cycle is
confusing, so an explanation is provided to better illustrate this process, and the years in
question. As discussed earlier, the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) essentially
outlines the Services' spending plan for a six-year period. The first two years of the
POM are the basis for the budget years (BY and BY+1). As an example, in FY 98,
planning was conducted to submit the biennial budget for FY 00 and 01. FY 99 is
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referred to as the current year (CY) which is the upcoming fiscal year. The appropriation
approved for FY 98 is the source of funds used for executing the current year, FY 99. FY
98 is referred to as the prior year (PY). The next four years FY 02-05 are known as the
estimated budget outyears. Collectively, the fiscal years 1999-2005 are referred to as
POM 00. The following display summarizes the POM 00 cycle: [Ref. 4: p. C-14]
98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
PYCY BY BY+1 Budget Outyears
The previous POM cycle (referred to as POM 98) began in FY 96 and
incorporated the following years:
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
PYCY BY BY+1 Budget Outyears
With a clearer perspective of this cycle, a description of some of the other
programming events and review boards follows. The senior management group that
drives the programming process for the Navy is called the Resource Requirements
Review Board (R3B) [Ref. 4:p. C-7]. The R3B consists of representatives from the Navy
Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments branch (N-8). The board's
responsibility is to assess program needs and then prioritize these programs within given
funding constraints. The R3B will eventually brief the CNO Executive Board and the
Secretary of the Navy to obtain final POM approval. To facilitate POM development, the
Resource Sponsors receive topline-funding limits from N-80 to construct their program
budgets. N-88F will begin to develop a tentative POM OP-20, generated from the FHPS
to fit within the given fiscal parameters.
As alluded to in section F 3d., there are many versions of the OP-20
produced during the PPBS cycle. These versions are identified by a specific version
number generated by the FHPS. Although these OP-20s are commonly identified by
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their numbers, they sometimes are referred to as the phase or event they are supporting.
For example, the Sponsor Program Proposal OP-20, POM OP-20, OSD budget OP-20,
(meaning the OP-20 approved by FMB and submitted to OSD). and the President's
Budget (PRESBUD) OP-20, i.e. the OP-20 approved by OSD/OMB and forwarded to
Congress. In the programming phase, the first edition of these OP-20s are developed and
used during the Sponsor Program Proposal (SPP) process. The SPP is the means in which
the Resource Sponsors develop their initial proposals for inclusion in the Navy POM and
FYDP. At the N-88F level, the SPP is essentially an in-house review by N-88 in which a
few variations of the OP-20 are produced to assess different pricing options and funding
plans for the respective budget years. [Ref. 23, 24, 25]
As noted earlier in this chapter, another feature that influences POM
development are POM Issue Papers. Major Claimants like CINCPACFLT will submit
prioritized POM Issue Papers, which mostly address mission concerns and funding
shortfalls. Any issues that the Air Type Commanders wish to present will be
incorporated into their Major Claimants issue papers. N-88F will then address the top
five issues presented by the TYCOMs via their Major Claimants. For those FHP specific
issues, N-88F convenes a working group to analyze and address the presented issues.
The working group will assess the impact of all pricing and programmatic increases and
decreases, and recommend appropriate actions to the N-88 (Director, Air Warfare) Flag
Board [Ref. 15:p. 9-2]. The N-88 decision is difficult because as the Director of Air
Warfare, he/she must make cost trade-off decisions to balance current FHP readiness
against aviation modernization procurement needs, and other programs, within the
confines of limited resources. This perennial phenomenon is the essence of budgeting.
Jones and Bixler succinctly describe this budgeting dilemma, in their discussion of PPBS:
"Budgeting in PPBS is primarily an effort at rationing resources.. .a highly constrained
exercise in pricing the executability ofprograms within the parameters of affordability
andfeasibility" [Ref. 5:p. 25]. The N-88 Flag Board will then approve or disapprove the
FHP adjustments based on planning and policy decisions, affordability and achieving
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readiness objectives. For those POM issues not approved and incorporated into the POM,
N-88F provides written justification back to the Major Claimants. Once N-88 modifies
and approves the SPP OP-20, the results are presented to the IR3B. During this review,
negotiations are conducted and modifications made to the various SPPs. The final event
of the programming phase is dubbed the "End Game" where the CNO Executive Board
reviews the Sponsor Program Proposal to insure that "balance and coherence" is achieved
for all programs in the POM. Once changes and adjustments are made, the Navy POM is
presented for final review and approval to the DoN Program Strategy Board (DPSB),
chaired by the SECNAV [Ref. 4:p. C-10]. The approved POM OP-20 version, as well as
the other programs are integrated into the Navy's overall POM and forwarded to OSD for
review. During the OSD POM review, N-88F works closely with FMB to properly
defend the FHP against any marks that may be assessed by the OSD review team. The
end of the programming phase occurs when the SECDEF issues a Program Decision
Memorandum (PDM) which is the final decision on the POM OP-20 and the overall
POM for the Navy. The PDM signals the completion of the programming phase and
indicates the beginning of the budgeting phase.
c. Budgeting
Once the POM is reviewed and accepted by OSD and OMB, the biennial
budgeting phase begins [Ref. 15]. Budgeting is a more "precise process" in which
monetary amounts are assigned to the approved programs determined in the previous
phases. The formal Navy submission process is initiated when FMB issues the "budget
call" to all budget-submitting offices to submit their budget estimates. This usually
occurs in the Feb/March time frame. The mechanism that formally signals this process is
the transmission ofNAVCOMPT Notice 7111. As mentioned earlier, this notice contains
top-line fiscal limits, instructions and guidance pertaining to the content and submission
of budget estimates, the estimated inflation and escalation rates, the submission schedule
and any deviations from existing financial management regulations. [Ref. 4:p. B-16] In
69
turn, the Major Claimants issue budget calls to their subordinate agencies in the
April/May time frame. Since the process of budgeting as Wildavsky calls it is
"repetitive", the Navy financial chain of command has typically conducted prior budget
planning and development before the budget call is issued [Ref. 2:p. 48].
3. Budget Submission and Review
The Major Claimants and TYCOMS use the POM OP-20 developed by N-88F
during the programming phase as a baseline for formulating their respective budget
exhibits. Once the budget exhibits are prepared and reviewed at the TYCOM and
Claimant levels, their consolidated budget requests are submitted in accordance with the
schedule provided in NAVCOMPT Notice 7111. This budget submission is the
transition point in the budget review process, where the FHP budget is meticulously
screened by each agency in the financial chain of command: N-88F, FMB, OSD/OMB.
and finally Congress. The administrative goal of the review process is to ensure the
Claimants have submitted a FHP budget that is justifiable and executable. The first level
of review occurs at N-88F where the FHP submissions are reviewed to insure compliance
with the DNCPPG and to insure the most current escalation factors are incorporated.
Once N-88F completes reviewing and adjusting the FHP, it is forwarded to FMB where
the review and adjustment process is repeated.
a. Assistant Secretary ofthe Navy, (Financial Management and
Comptroller)
During the budget submission process, N-88F staff coordinates very
closely with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, (Financial Management and
Comptroller) Office of Budget (FMB). This coordination entails responding to marks on
the submitted FHP budget exhibit, as well as providing information to assist FMB in
defending the FHP budget (OP-20) exhibits to the O&M, N budget analysts from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The specific FMB section that manages and
reviews the Navy FHP is Code FMB 121 . This review process is officially referred to as
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the "NAVCOMPT Summer Review". During this review, FMB 121 may make
modifications and changes, but the focus is to ensure that the OP-20 is updated with the
most current pricing information. Additionally, FMB 121 screens the FHP budget
estimates to ensure the following [Ref 4:p. B-40 and 23]:
• That current escalation rates are applied to the budget estimates.
• Budget estimates are executable.
• Budget estimates are developed in accordance with POM, SECDEF
guidance, and other policy decisions and documents.
• Budget estimates are accurate and defensible against the subsequent OSD
and Congressional reviews.
• Budget estimates are financially feasible and balanced against other
funding priorities.
Budget cuts or "marks" are levied on the FHP routinely when the FMB
analyst disagrees with some portion of the Claimants' FHP schedule exhibits. There is a
common perception that all marks are analogous with reductions, but the FMB analyst
can add to or "plus up" portions of FHP funding requirements where shortfalls were
assessed. For example, the FMB analysts wrote a mark during the POM 00 review that
increased funds for portions of the Marines FHP outyear budget. [Ref. 23] If, in fact,
marks are issued from FMB, N-88F responds with appropriate "Reclamas" to appeal and
contest the reductions. These are then negotiated further to resolution; often reclamas are
summarily denied by FMB. Once approved at the FMB level, the FHP budget is
submitted to DoD as part of the budget proposal of the Secretary of the Navy.
b. OSD/OMB
The first time the FHP budget submission is reviewed outside of the DoN
is when FMB forwards it to the DoD Comptroller Office, where the DoD O&M, N
budget analysts conduct a joint review of the budget. The OSD budget analyst is charged
with reviewing all Navy programs funded with the O&M, N appropriation. At this level
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the same repetitive procedures occur that took place at FMB: hearings, adjustments
(marks or plus ups) and then appeals (reclamas) and responses/negotiation/discussion.
Once the appeal process is complete, final decisions on budget submissions are reviewed
with OMB budget staff and are provided in the SECDEF Program Budget Decisions
(PBD). If the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), the CNO or CMC have difficulties with
SECDEF level decisions, "Major Budget Issue" (MBI) meetings are conducted with
SECDEF to resolve the problem areas [Ref. 4:p. B-42]. After MBIs are finished, final
adjustments are decided, and the Navy budget submission (including the FHP exhibit) is
incorporated in the SECDEF budget submission to OMB for subsequent presentation to
Congress by the President. The congressional review and oversight process is
decentralized into committees and subcommittees by each house of Congress and is
complex in itself. One phenomenon that occurs in the review process is the concept of
budget "role reversal". Once the recipient of the FHP budget is finished assessing and
adjusting the funding totals, he/she then becomes the defender and protector of the
budget. An analogy offered by one FHP analyst was one of wearing "different colored
hats". When the analysts wear the "black hats" they aggressively seek out weak areas in
the budget exhibits to "cut" at funding requests to minimize the amount taxpayers have to
spend on the FHP and to protect against higher level reductions. When the budget is
passed to the next level of review they don their "white hats" and become ardent
supporters and defenders of the FHP budget requirement [Ref. 26]. Once OSD and OMB
approve the FHP budget, it is integrated with the rest of the military department
submissions, and incorporated into the Presidents budget request. The completion of the
budget phase occurs when the President forwards the budget to Congress, scheduled
annually for the first Monday in February.
4. FHP Budget Execution
Due to overall federal budget constraints, competing priorities and limited
resources, the final version of the OP-20 approved by Congress contains less funding than
the POM OP-20 initially developed in the Programming phase. Once the budget has
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been approved by Congress and signed by the President, the DoD Comptroller and then
FMB allocates quarterly O&M, N funds in accordance with the approved OP-20 to the
Major Claimants. The Claimants will then allocate OP-20 funds to the Air TYCOMS to
begin execution of their respective FHP programs. Budget execution is ultimately where
the FHP budget is validated to assess whether sufficient funds have been forecasted and
allocated to achieve the flying hour requirements of the Air TYCOMS. The role of the
higher-level budget analysts and officials (N-88F, FMB and OSD) during execution is
primarily that of monitoring and control. As discussed earlier in this chapter the primary
mechanism that N-88F and FMB use to conduct this monitoring role is through the
Flying Hour Cost Reports transmitted from the TYCOMs. During execution, N-88F may
publish additional OP-20s to reflect changes and reprogramming actions. The last type of
OP-20 produced from the FHPS is the final execution OP-20, which summarizes the total
program execution costs of the previous year. This OP-20 helps FHP program managers
and budget analysts to review their predicted performance against their actual FHP
execution for that specific year.
The hope and expectation during the execution year is that the actual FHP cost
data are relatively consistent with the budget estimates. However, in recent years,
execution costs have exceeded the budgeted estimates, which has been the case with
CNAPs FHP. This may indicate that the FHP forecasting methodology is not accurate,
prices are increasing or both. When this occurs, the onus is on the fleet FHP Managers
and Comptrollers to embark upon "creative financing" to continue to try and achieve the
aviation readiness goals without committing an Antideficiency Act violation. The Fleet
will also address underfunding issues during the CNOs Mid-year Review. Regardless of
the causes and contributing factors of underfunding, and this mismatch between actual
and forecasted costs, there is never a concern that the forecasted FHP budget will result in
unobligated funds. This is due to the "spend it or lose it" mentality that pervades all
federal agencies. There is simply no incentive to underspend.
Other decisions and factors that compound budget execution fall within the realm
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of unfunded requirements and unplanned events. Examples include unplanned
operational contingencies, lower than expected failure rates for repair components, and
managerial decisions that reprogram FHP funds for other priorities. These and other
execution problems and factors are discussed in Chapters III and IV.
5. Chapter Summary
This chapter presented a detailed overview of the FHP budgeting and funding
process. The overarching intent was to create a document of sufficient detail that newly
assigned FHP managers and budget personnel could use as it a single source reference to
obtain insight into how the FHP requirement is determined, as well as an understanding
of the roles and activities performed by the key FHP budget players. An overview of the
DoD Resource Allocation Process and PPBS was presented to show how the FHP fits
within this greater budgeting framework. The inherent difficulties and complexities of
FHP budgeting are simply an extension of the larger DoD and Federal Budgeting
Process. Although this chapter describes and analyzes certain FHP processes and
components thoroughly, it has not addressed completely the tedious, day-to-day activities
and negotiations that consume most of FHP budget player time and energy. Further,
there are many other tangential budget players and agencies outside of the FHP budgeting
chain that were not described because this is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Finally, the chapter also intended to provide the reader with sufficient
understanding of the FHP components and mechanics in order to understand why
problems may exist in the FHP and why underfunding may occur in the Air Type
Commanders budgets. The next chapter examines FHP formulation problems, causes of
FHP underfunding, and initiatives in progress to improve the overall DoN Flying Hour
Program.
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III. FHP UNDERFUNDING AND OTHER ISSUES IN BUDGET
FORMULATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The first objective of this thesis is to describe the Flying Hour Program budgeting
and funding process, detailed in Chapter II. Chapters III and IV provide FHP managers
and budgeting personnel insight to some of the perennial FHP issues and causes of
underfunding that occur during budget formulation and execution. The purpose of this
chapter is to explain how FHP underfunding may result from budgeting dynamics, an
environment of scarce resources and the FHP budget formulation methodology used to
determine the flying hour requirement and associated costs. As stated earlier, CNAP's
FHP underfunding is not attributable to one cause, but rather a combination of the effects
of budget dynamics, unplanned events, managerial decisions and cost variance, all
occurring in an environment of limited resources and competing priorities. This chapter
begins by analyzing some of the factors of the budgeting process that contribute to FHP
funding variability and uncertainty.
B. BUDGET PROCESS DYNAMICS
1. Introduction
As noted in Chapter II, the defense Resource Allocation Process is extremely
complex. This complexity is largely due to the size of the DoD organization, its diversity
of missions and the magnitude of its budget. The fact that the defense budget represents
the largest source of remaining discretionary funding in the Federal Budget generates
keen interest and makes it a lucrative target for oversight and reduction. The complexity
of the resourcing process is also due to the many different organizations and agencies that
are involved in formulating and producing the DoD budget and hence competing for their
fair share of funds and/or benefits. The purpose of this section is to analyze some of the
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many dynamic factors that constitute this competitive budgeting process and how these
dynamics contribute to budget instability, funding uncertainty and inefficiency for the
DoD and DoN.
2. Defense Budgeting Dynamics
There are many dynamic factors that influence defense budgeting processes and
funding levels. Since the DoN FHP is a comparatively small program within the DoD,
constituting approximately 1% of the DoD budget, some of these dynamic factors are not
readily correlated to specific causes of CNAP FHP underfunding. However, the effects
of these budget dynamics are far reaching and cause variability and funding uncertainty at
all levels of command within the military. This section first examines how changing
public and political attitudes results in defense resource variability. The next section
analyzes the effects of congressional control and micromanagement of the defense budget
and its impact on efficiency, followed by an analysis of the inherent weaknesses in the
PPBS process that contribute to budget formulation problems and funding variability.
a. Changing Attitudes, Preferences and Competition
The size and quality of the defense budget has historically been subject to
resource variability, driven by changing public attitudes, political agendas and
competition. This notion of changing attitudes is manifested in the traditional debate
between investment in national defense or investment in domestic programs - "guns
versus butter". Public attitude toward the level of U.S. defense spending has and will
continue to be a powerful influence. This influence is particularly strong during
peacetime and or/economic scarcity. During these times, the American public tends to
view the defense budget as more discretionary and of little value, when faced with other
pressing social issues and problems. Congress will in turn respond to constituent
preference for more domestic spending and ultimately trim other discretionary programs
such as defense, vice an unpopular alternative such as raising taxes. Changing attitudes
and public preference clearly has contributed to a "boom and bust cycle" of defense
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funding, and during the times of scarcity, readiness programs like the Navy FHP feel the
fiscal squeeze during budget formulation. Defense funding is also subject to variability
associated with different political views and agendas. Korb states the budgetary process
will always be inherently political and that the "Top-line" budget amount is often affected
by the political situation of the President and how he intends to use it. Korb summarizes
how past administrations have viewed and used the defense budget to accomplish
different agenda / objectives:
The final figure will be decided by whether the President desires to
have a balanced budget like Truman and Eisenhower, whether he
chooses to use the defense budget to stimulate the economy as did
Presidents Kennedy and Nixon, or whether, like Presidents Johnson
and Ford, he wishes to keep the entire federal budget below a certain
amount. [Ref. 27 :p. 345]
Extending Korb's observations to more recent administrations, we still see
how the defense budget continues to vary in response to different political goals and
objectives. During the Reagan era, the DoD budget thrived as this administration
intended to stimulate the economy and use it as a mechanism to facilitate the end of the
Cold War. During President Bush's term, defense funding began to decline sharply (with
the exception of the Desert Storm period) to account for the new post cold war
environment and deficit reduction measures. Under the current administration, the DoD
budget has been reduced considerably to reinvest savings associated with downsizing and
the "peace dividend" into domestic spending programs and other public areas. As
demonstrated, the DoD and Services budgets and programs are subject to the preferences
of society, changing attitudes and the varying goals of different political administrations.
Competition during budget formulation is another dynamic factor that can
result in some programs losing funding and others gaining. Since the amount of
resources and benefits contained in the defense budget is so high, many organizations,
agencies and lobby groups battle intensely for their fair share of the budget. This
competition is especially keen among and within the military departments and Services.
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Not only do the Services compete for missions and funding, so do programs within the
Services. For example, in the Navy, the different warfare communities such as Surface
and Air compete regularly for funding priority and relevance. Wildavsky asserts that the
"competition and stakes" in the DoD budget are higher than in any other federal
department. Others like former Chairman of the JCS, General David Jones describes the
defense budget as an, "intramural scramble for resources" [Ref. 2:p. 224]. Ultimately this
degree of competition causes funding uncertainty for the FHP and/or other programs,
depending on how persuasive arguments can be presented to gain "market share" from
others. For example, if the Army can convince Congress helicopters are the weapon of
choice vice fixed wing aircraft, or if the Navy Surface Warfare Resource Sponsor can
convince Navy decision makers they have a greater need for funding over the Air Warfare
community - reductions may occur in the FHP. The key issue is that in a constrained
fiscal environment if money is competed away from one service to another, this causes
adjustments and cuts to other programs.
Next, we analyze how Congress exercises control over the defense budget
and assess the relative impact of this control on funding for programs such as the DoN
FHP.
b. Congressional Control and Micromangement
Congressional control and micromanagement of the defense budget is a
significant factor that influences budget formulation and efficient resource allocation
decisions. The tendency for Congress to micromanage the DoD and DoN budget process
is due to a myriad of reasons. This section examines these reasons and analyzes its
relative impact on the budget process.
By law Congress has the right and duty to control the defense budget.
This legislative power is mandated in the U.S. Constitution. Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution is clear in stipulating Congress' "power of the purse" as well as delineating
its control over military policy and budgets. Congress has further increased its control
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through the enactment of several public laws requiring the authorization and
appropriation for virtually all-military acquisitions and operational funding (See Jones
and Thompson 1994, pp. 75-79.) In terms of controlling the defense budget some critics
contend Congress goes well beyond the intended purpose of these laws. These criticisms
seem to be well founded as evidenced by congressional action and behavior. What
follows is an analysis of how and why Congress behaves the way it does toward the
defense budget and why the tendency to micromanage exists.
The proliferation of committees involved with reviewing and negotiating
the annual defense budget has contributed to increased micromanagement. Ten Senate
committees and eleven House committees exercise formal jurisdiction over one aspect or
another of defense policy. [Ref. 2:p. 243] The increase in Congressional committees
results in lengthier negotiations, floor debate and budget total revisions. To illustrate the
impact of this increase in the number of committees and their activity, Wildavsky points
out:
...in 1969 Congress made 180 changes to the defense authorization
bill and 650 revisions to the appropriations bill. These numbers
increased to 222 and 1,032, respectively in 1975 and sky rocketed by
1985 to 1,145 authorization adjustments and 2,156 appropriations
adjustments. Out of 2,600 line-items in procurement for weapons and
munitions alone in 1 986, for example, the Armed Services committees
made 1,000 changes in authorizations [Ref. 2:p. 243].
In addition to defense committee expansion, congressional staffs have also
increased in size and expertise due largely to committee competition and the quest for
"good defense information". With the advent of this expansion, Congressional
committees not only have the propensity to meddle in the details of the budget, but
experienced staff members give them added capacity to do so. Cahn asserts that the
increase in congressional staffs is "the single most important factor in enabling the
Congress to engage in more detailed action on the defense budget" [Ref. 5:p. 1 13]. The
increase in staffs also increases the time and effort that DoD and Service budget
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personnel have to devote to responding to a myriad of inquiries and requests for
information regarding a program or mission area, during budget formulation. (For further
analysis and data regarding the impact of increased congressional staffs and the trend in
congressional micromanagement of the DoD budget, see Jones and Bixler, 1992, pp. 113-
126.)
In addition to increased micromanagement of the defense budget, the
overall impact of the increase in committees and congressional staff has been a loss of
efficiency for both DoD budget personnel and Congress. For DoD budget personnel, the
decisions and effort involved with budget formulation and attempting to meet all
requirements in a constrained funding environment are difficult enough without having to
spend inordinate amounts of time responding to staff inquiries and/or adjusting fiscal
resource plans resulting from the annual line item scrutiny of the appropriations and
authorizing committees. For Congress, this loss of efficiency is a product of repeating
the same time consuming annual budget battle when they should be focusing more time
and effort in formulating defense policy and taking action on other broad issues.
Comments from various current and former Representatives and Senators corroborate the
negative impact of the size and staffs and committees, as well as the failure to maintain a
broader policy perspective:
Morris Udall (D-AZ): More Staff creates more work, more projects to
be done, more bills to be written... Congress ought to focus on the big
issues. But I spend about half my time in fights that my staff or
somebody else's staffs gets me into [Ref. 5:p. 119].
Barry Goldwater (R-AZ): For DoD, this situation has become a
nightmare. DoD witnesses have to testify as many as six different
times before six different committees of primary jurisdiction. More
and more other committees and members of Congress claim
jurisdiction over DoD policy. More and more legislation is reported
from subcommittees with only the smallest interest in national security
[Ref. 5:p. 93].
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Sam Nunn (D-GA): We are focussing on the grains of sand on the
beach while we should be looking over the broad ocean and beyond
the horizon. We are not fulfilling our responsibilities to serve as the
Board of Directors for the Department of Defense. Instead, Congress
has become 535 individual program managers that are micromanaging
the department at an alarming rate [Ref. 5:p. 42].
Other reasons for the growth and continuance of congressional
micromanagement include past operational failures like Vietnam, Desert-One, Lebanon
and various occurrences of waste, fraud and abuse in the procurement of military
equipment. Public concern over military waste, fraud and abuse still exists today and is
further heightened by media embellishment of such occurrences. These occurrences and
allegations range from the infamous $600 dollar toilet seats and $100 dollar coffee
machine purchases, to million dollar procurement frauds like the Army's "Sergeant
York" Anti-air defense weapon (DIVAD). Hence, the congressional response to improve
DoD purchasing efficiency has resulted in more micromanagement and oversight.
The desire for accountability of what the public is getting for the dollars
spent on defense is another factor that causes Congressional control and oversight of the
DoD budget. This accountability is manifested by constant inquiries into the
procurement of various weapon systems and /or the procedures of various high cost
programs like the DoN FHP. As noted in Chapter I, Congress directed the GAO to study
the FHP on four different occasions to assess the validity of how the Navy determines the
funding requirement and measures the program effectiveness. Determining the relative
value of various DoD programs is not a new phenomenon as evidenced by a statement
made by a Congressional member from a 1950 House Hearing: "The thing we want to
do... is to be sure we get the maximum value for the money expended" [Ref. 28: p. 108].
Today, Congress is still driven by this duty to ensure the taxpayer and the nation is
spending defense funds properly and efficiently. However this duty tends to get obscured
by other Congressional motives and conflicting commitments, and begs the question that
Jones and Bixler pose: "who is watching the watchers"? [Ref. 5:p. 10-11].
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Some critics contend the most influential reason for congressional
micromanagement is due to the incentives and rewards associated with constituent special
interest and pork-barrel politics. The impact of special interest politics on budget
formulation and long term fiscal planning can be disastrous. This recurring phenomena
and its impact is examined in the following section.
c. Special Interest and Pork-Barrel Politics
Special Interest politics is by far the worst form of congressional
micromanagement. During each annual budget battle "Pork" emerges as a tremendous
force that impedes defense budgeting efficiency and can lead to the Services purchasing
capabilities and equipment which they do not need. The impact of such influence sub-
optimizes DoD spending decisions and can in fact lead to budget cuts and funding
uncertainty for specific programs like the DoN FHP. This section will first examine why
constituent special interest occurs, followed by specific examples of how this interest
impacts DoD and DoN budget formulation and funding decisions.
The reason why this phenomenon occurs is because the incentive for
Senators and Representatives to "bring home the bacon" for local constituencies is very
strong. Essentially this phenomenon is a perfect symbiotic relationship in that
constituents want jobs and politicians want to be reelected. Hobkirk articulates this
incentive issue and its effect on defense nicely:
As has often been pointed out, the separation of powers attracts
pressure groups activity for a number of reasons, and this pressure is
exerted on the individual member of Congress, who is of course,
particularly susceptible to regional or local pressures from the area he
represents. Thus, congressional representatives of areas likely to
benefit from a major weapon purchase might well feel that they owe it
to their constituents to try and obtain the contract for their district or
state, despite doubts about the overall benefit to national defense. [Ref.
29:p. 54]
Similarly. Jones and Bixler note that the search for "pork" leads to
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excessive micromanagement because it is in the details of the budget that ''rewards'' are
found for both politicians and constituents. Wildavsky even asserts "pork" has been
democratized and committee members and legislators view the defense budget as a
chance to benefit their constituents and states, and that there have been "numerous
instances of projects being forced on DoD in order to maintain local employment" [Ref
2:p. 244].
At first glance, the phenomenon of congressional special interest may not
appear to have a measurable impact on the DoN FHP, but its effects are direct and can
easily result in budget reductions during the formulation process. Further, congressional
special interest results in additional work for Service leaders and budget personnel.
When the Service is required to fund special interest projects, further trade-off decisions,
adjustments and re-calculations must be made in an already constrained budget and POM.
To illustrate this problem, the Navy made a recent decision in a program review to cancel
funding for the procurement of a 10 million dollar munitions program. The decision was
made due to budget constraints and the fact that the program was a redundant capability.
The next day a Representative from the district where the munitions contractors lived,
made an inquiry questioning the Navy's decision, suggesting rather emphatically that the
Navy "needed this program" and if funding was not restored the issue would be "elevated
to higher authorities". Due to political pressure funding for the program was in fact
restored, requiring Navy budget personnel to make additional funding trade-off decisions
and adjustments in the POM to accommodate the "new" purchase [Ref. 30]. The
inefficiency demonstrated by this example is consistent with comments made by
Representative Lee Hamiliton (D-IN), emphasizing the terrible waste associated with
special interest politics:
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Political interests in Congress are often the cause of military
misspending. For purely political reasons, Congress will sometimes
direct the armed forces to buy a weapon or keep a base open even
when military planners strenuously object. It has been estimated that
$5 billion dollars could be cut from the defense budget if legislators
stopped seeking unjustifiable outlays for the benefit of their own
constituents [Ref. 5:p. 95].
Special Interest politics is not just confined to creating pressure for the
Services to purchase items they don't need, but can also impede their decisions to
modernize and become efficient. For example the Navy was planning for and conducting
R&D efforts to procure a new Common Support Aircraft (CSA) to gradually replace the
existing multiple inventory of aircraft types (S-3, ES-3, E-2, and C-2) that perform the
same support missions. The intent was to achieve savings associated with the economies
of scale in procuring and maintaining one common aircraft type. However, this new
design concept was met with fierce resistance from a Congressman whose district
currently produced one of the older support aircraft (the Grumman E-2) that the new
CSA was intended to eventually replace. The final action resulted in a "zeroing out" of
the CSA R&D effort, meaning the funding programmed by the Navy was deleted from
the budget. In this case the Navy was penalized for initiating smart procurement
practices to achieve savings and operating efficiency. The future impact of not replacing
these older support aircraft will result in higher maintenance and logistic support costs
reflected in the Flying Hour Cost Reports and ultimately the OP-20 budget [Ref. 30].
Sometimes special interest procurements result in extended and unfunded
support costs. For example, when political pressure results in the procurement of "extra"
aircraft or other military equipment, the logistics tail (spares, test equipment, facilities,
maintainers, etc.) must be procured as well. That tail carries with it a huge price tag. The
end result is more funding adjustments, trade-off decisions and potential offsets in
specific readiness programs like the FHP or Ships Steaming program.
Senator McCain recently addressed this problem as well, stating;
"Congress is to blame for using readiness for parochial and other special interest
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projects", citing the perennial Air Force C-130 add-ons as a prime example, commenting
there, "will soon be enough C-130s to distribute one to every schoolyard in America"
[Ref. 31:p. 4].
Since the incentives to continue this behavior are strong for both
politicians and constituents, congressional special interest and "good old pork" will
persist as a dynamic budget factor that influences the DoD and DoN budgets.
d. Deficit Reduction and Budget Gaming
Pressure to reduce the National deficit is also a dynamic force that can
lead to defense budget reduction and further Congressional control. Despite the fact that
the DoD budget has been reduced significantly in recent years and suffers from a lack of
real growth, the public still perceives the defense budget as a discretionary "cash cow",
and therefore the target of choice for reduction. From the public's perspective, cutting
defense is the logical choice since the other alternatives would entail tax increases and or
less spending on other public programs and jobs. For this reason, deficit reduction
legislation has increased congressional scrutiny of the budget. As the budget decreases in
this Post-Cold War period, Congress reviews the defense budget with extra zeal to insure
that defense dollars are spent properly and to protect against program cancellations and
base closures when constituent jobs are at stake. The pursuit of deficit reduction also
gives rise to another dynamic budget phenomenon referred to as "gaming" and/or "budget
gimmicks".
When faced with discretionary budget constraints and difficult spending
decisions Congress has the propensity to contrive gimmicks to comply with fiscal
constraints while at the same time satisfying public demand. An example of these
gimmicks is manifested in the way Congress manipulated budget figures to avoid the
sequestration penalty associated with the Gramm-Rudman-Holings (GRH) deficit control
Act. As Rosen explains:
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In its [GRH] first year of operation, one trick involved backdating
hundreds of millions of dollars in Medicare checks, so that
expenditures could be counted against the previous year's budget.
[Additionally] to reduce the 1990 deficit, telephone companies were
told to pay taxes a week early, adding 102 million in revenues that
otherwise would have accrued in 1991. [Ref. 32:p. 147]
Similarly, Schick states that both the Congress and the Executive branch
use bookkeeping tricks to show that spending or the deficit have been cut. He describes
other cutting strategies as follows: "...disapprove requested increases, slowdown
purchases and other expenses, and abolish vacant positions. Funds could be saved by
giving agencies less than a full adjustment for inflation and in a particularly tight budget,
resources could be taken away from them". Schick also asserts that budget gimmicks are
not new and may even be more extensively used than previously in an era of fiscal
constraint. [Ref. 33 :p. 3-86]
What is the relevance of all this to the DoN FHP budget? In an
environment of fiscal limits and budget decline, this notion of "gaming" and modifying
the budget occurs at all levels in DoD, simply because the requirements have to fit within
the top-line. Hence, "gaming" occurs to a degree in the FHP formulation process and that
results in underfunding the program. This is examined further in section D. Next we
briefly analyze the notion of efficiency in budgeting.
e. Loss ofEfficiency
The preceding sections assert that excessive congressional control,
micromanagement and other budget dynamics impede the efficiency of the budget
process and DoD/DoN resource allocation decisions. To clarify this notion of efficiency
and how congressional control and micromanagement degrades efficiency, we briefly
examine the concept of a perfectly competitive market and how the conditions for
efficiency are achieved.
In a market economy, efficiency is achieved when market prices, and the
quantities supplied by the seller and quantities demanded by the buyer are allowed to
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fluctuate freely. When the market operates in this manner, supply and demand tend
toward equilibrium and efficiency is achieved. However, when prices are artificially
restricted from adjusting (e.g., through price controls such as ceilings or floors), this
impedes buyer and seller behavior and hence efficient exchanges are not achieved and the
market tends toward disequilibrium.
Similarly, congressional micromanagement can be viewed as a form of
price control that restricts efficient resource allocation decisions in both formulation and
execution. If budget planners and warfighting commanders could freely decide the
efficient allocation of resources within budget constraints, efficiency could be naturally
achieved similar to the functioning of a market environment. If decisions were not
constrained by micromanagement, special interest and other budget process limitations,
planners and warfighters would make the necessary trade-off decisions that maximize the
output of different requirements, missions and functions, e.g. surface warfare, air warfare
(FHP), procurement, and base operating support, etc.
Relative to budget process reform, Lerner argues if the DoD were allowed
to operate more like a market economy, the necessary conditions for efficient allocation
of resources would occur. Specifically, he asserts that if the resource allocation process
could be decentralized to the degree that spending authority were allocated directly to the
combatant commanders, their marginal rates of substitution or trade-off decisions
between all of their output missions and responsibilities would tend toward equilibrium.
In economic terms this condition is called allocative efficiency which refers to
maximizing the output of two or more resources relative to a budget constraint and or a
utility function. Lerner' s decentralization argument is interesting and begs the question:
why don't we decentralize the resource making process down to the warfighting
commanders to allow them to make the decisions that will determine the best use of these
resources in the production of their missions and responsibilities? The conditions for the
DoD to mimic a perfectly competitive market are not likely, but decentralizing the
funding process to the point of output (the combatant commanders) makes good sense.
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However, to achieve a more decentralized funding process where there is a better link
between the budget and mission, requires some degree of organizational change. The
concepts of decentralizing the budget process to achieve greater efficiency and
organizational change are further addressed in Chapter V, where the authors present
alternative budgeting concepts that might minimize congressional micromanagement and
improve the efficiency of the defense budget formulation and execution processes.
The next section examines some of the dynamics and issues associated
with the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System.
3. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) Issues
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) has evolved since its
inception under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the 1960s. Although DoD
budgeting process and forecasting methods were improved with the introduction of
PPBS, the process under McNamara was too centralized and agencies outside the
Pentagon were largely excluded from providing budget input [Ref. 29:p. 343]. Since this
time, improvements have been made, but deficiencies still exist that impede budget
formulation and execution efficiency. This section analyzes three weaknesses of the
PPBS process that contribute to FHP variability and funding uncertainty. These are: 1)
the length of the PPBS cycle, 2) excessive centralization and 3) the annualarity of the
budget process.
The first issue has significant budgetary effects on the FHP in that the present
process extends over too long a period of time, resulting in a budget that typically lags
current year requirements. For example, from the time the Defense Planning Guidance
(DPG) is developed until the time the budget is submitted to Congress, nearly two years
have elapsed. During this lengthy period, many changes may occur in the economy or
world situation, rendering planning and program decisions obsolete. Similarly this "lag"
effect on the FHP invariably results in budget modification during the execution year to
reflect changes, unplanned events and unfunded requirements. The impact of this time
lag is best illustrated by Jones and Bixler with the following observation during one of
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the budget cycles: "The DPG issued to the Services for use in developing the 1992 fiscal
year defense budget scheduled for a February 1991 release was finalized in October 1989
-just a month prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall" [Ref. 5:p.l4]. Problems associated
with the length and overlap of the process are also noted by Korb who indicates it, "tends
to confuse many participants about where they are in the cycle" [Ref. 27:p. 343]. To
further illustrate the confusion caused by the length and overlap of the process, we will
briefly review the different activities occurring in the POM 00 cycle. In fiscal year 1998,
military agencies and budget personnel were formulating and working on the basis of the
biennial budget years (00-01) and the budget outyears. At the same time, Congress was
negotiating and deciding upon the upcoming FY 99 budget, requiring Service testimony
and short fused staff action by budget planners and Resource Sponsors. It is easy to loose
sight of who is working what and when given the multiple year overlap in budgets. Since
this perpetual process consumes a substantial amount of key FHP budget players and
agencies time, it is difficult to communicate program changes and modifications that may
occur during the upcoming budget year and the outyears. The significance of not
capturing current changes as budgets are formulated has severe funding impacts. This
and other FHP forecasting issues are addressed in section D.
Korb also suggests that the length of the cycle renders the planning aspect of
PPBS irrelevant, in that it is difficult for political leaders to provide definitive guidance
for military planners and warfighters about how they will operate in specific
contingencies and deal with unplanned events [Ref. 27:p. 345]. Implicit in Korb's
argument is that the process should be more decentralized to provide military
commanders the flexibility to respond to contingencies and changing operational
requirements.
The need for greater budget decentralization transitions into the second weakness
of PPBS; the DoD resource decision and allocation system is still highly centralized and
involves too many participants. Although the CINCs do participate in the Programming
phase of PPBS through the submission of POM papers and Integrated Priority Lists
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(IPL), the output of the process still results in an annual spending plan that doesn't
provide them with much flexibility during the execution year. Thompson and Jones
argue for a more decentralized DoD budget process that provides unified and specified
commanders with greater flexibility and multiyear spending authority [Ref. 34]. This
concept is referred to as "mission budgeting" and requires organizational change to better
align DoD strategy with its organizational structure. Other defense budget experts
including Michael Hobkirk agree that proper defense organization is critical for military
commanders to respond to different mission requirements. He states, "defense
organization must be able to react to the unexpected and mount operations for which no
previous plans exist" [Ref. 29:p. 1 18]. The details of mission budgeting and how a better
alignment between DoD's strategy and structure can improve the current budgeting
process are analyzed in Chapter V.
Another flaw in the PPBS process that prevents efficient resource allocation
decisions is the annual nature of budgeting and the recurring line item review that
Congress imposes on the DoD budget. Because Congress continues to review and
appropriate much of the defense budget on an annual basis, DoD is unable to achieve the
intended flexibility and efficiencies associated with a biennial budget process. [Ref. 5:p.
29] As Jones and Bixler explain, this is frustrating for Service and Fleet Comptrollers
because DoD initiated the biennial budget system at the request of congressional
authorization committees. They further indicate that prospects of DoD budget reform are
•unlikely in view of the incentives to continue this annual review [Ref. 5:p. 32].
Wildavsky also comments on the inefficiencies of the annual nature of defense budgeting.
He states:
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The United States is the only nation, so far as I know, that budgets for
defense on an annual basis. This is said to be too short and frequent. The
annual appropriations and authorization process has been blamed for what
the [former] Senate leader on defense, Democratic Senator Sam Nunn of
Georgia, often refers to as the "trivialization of Congress' responsibilities
for oversight... and excessive micromanagement". [Further] Considering
[resource allocation] one year at a time, it has been argued, leads to short-
sightedness (only next year's expenditures are reviewed), overspending
(because huge future disbursements are hidden), and parochialism
(programs tend to be viewed in isolation rather than comparison to future
costs in relation to expected revenue). [Ref. 2:p. 249, 268]
Implementing a multi-year budgeting approach would lead to greater efficiency in
budget formulation and execution. Congress may resist the notion of multi-year defense
budgets due to perceived loss of control. However, some critics contend that a multi-year
defense budget would lead to greater control by enabling Congress to conduct a more
comprehensive and thorough review of defense policy vice "line item" scrutiny over the
budget. For the military, a multi-year budget could result in greater flexibility and less
variability by having greater resources available to respond better to unplanned and
unbudgeted events. Since unplanned and unbudgeted events often result in funding
decrements for operational budgets such as the FHP (see Chapter IV), multi-year budgets
would minimize funding uncertainty and problems generated by a rigid annual spending
plan. Greater spending efficiency is also achieved by minimizing the incentive to spend
every last penny before the end of the fiscal year. This alternative of multi-year
budgeting for defense is examined in greater detail in Chapter V.
4. Summary
This section has attempted to explain how budget dynamics produce an
environment of funding uncertainty, budget instability and inefficiency for the DoD and
DoN. In turn, this environment causes funding difficulties for the CNAP Flying Hour
Program. In fact, we have shown how the FHP and other DoN programs become
"hostage" to larger political forces such as micromanagement and the "pork-barrel".
Further, it is important for CNAP FHP managers and budget personnel to understand
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budget process dynamics because they influence how decisions are made and how FHP
budget requests are subject to oversight and funding cuts during budget formulation and
review processes. In addition to budget dynamics, the environment of limited resources
and competing priorities further influences FHP funding problems. These two topics are
analyzed next.
C. ENVIRONMENT OF LIMITED RESOUCES AND COMPETING
PRIORITIES
1. Introduction
Perhaps the most influential factor that creates flying hour program funding
problems is the fact that there are limited fiscal resources to fund any program among the
other competing priorities within both the DoN and DoD. A constrained fiscal
environment coupled with other resourcing priorities often drives unpopular funding
decisions made within the parameters of affordability. To illustrate the magnitude of this
resource problem, let us briefly examine the projection of funding shortfalls determined
in the FYDP by a recent N-88 Program Review (PR-01). During this review, it was
determined that the "raw" program shortfall could be as much as $30 billion to fund all
aviation programs for the next five year period (2001-05) [Ref. 30]. This resourcing
problem is not a new phenomenon. Similar funding shortfalls have been projected
throughout the Post-Cold War period. The relative impact of this projection on the FHP
is yet undetermined, but is likely that all programs will experience some budget
degradation as affordability decisions are made to properly balance future Naval Aviation
requirements. This section examines the impact of constrained resources on FHP
decisions and how this environment provides additional incentives for budget reviewers
to cut funding. Trade-off decisions between funding current FHP readiness versus
aviation modernization requirements are also analyzed.
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2. FHP Funding Decisions and Events
This section analyzes how different events and decisions occurring in an
environment of constrained resources have influenced FHP funding levels during budget
formulation.
Some critics contend that the single most influential factor contributing to FHP
underfunding in fiscal years 97 and 98 was a decision made by FMB in July of FY 96 to
not recognize FHP cost escalation during the POM 98 summer review. Due to funding
constraints, FMB chose not to re-price the FHP and allocate additional funding to
accommodate this cost growth. The overall impact of that affordability decision resulted
in a flawed budget base that was perpetuated throughout the POM. The exact amount of
underfunding experienced by CNAP resulting from this decision was difficult to
determine. However the impact on CNAP was manifested by their need to conduct
creative financing measures in FY 97 and 98 in order to continue flying operations and
attainment of assigned readiness goals.
The specific "financing activity" that CNAP used to get through the execution
year is called "bow-waving". Bow-waving refers to deferring the cost of Aviation Depot
Level Repair parts (AVDLRs) from the current FY, to the next FY in order to keep the
aircraft operating in the current year. Technically, when a Ready for Issue (RFI) repair
part is taken from the "shelf the bad or broken part is sent to the Depot facility for repair
provided the item cannot be fixed at the Aviation Intermediate Maintenance activity
(AIMD). To prevent the charge in the current fiscal year the AIMDs will retain the
AVDLRs until the next FY. This necessary "cash flow" activity is a risky venture and
can produce severe budgetary consequences. Although bow-waving enables the fleet
units to continue flying when the budget is exhausted, it is financially risky because the
subsequent year's cost could be considerably higher due to the effects of a higher
surcharge rate. In addition to incurring a higher surcharge, the cost of the bow wave is
not calculated and included in the OP-20 forecast for the next budget year. Hence, the
FHP is underfunded and underpriced by at least the amount of the bow wave,
perpetuating the shortfall in each subsequent budget cycle.
The reason why the cost of the bow wave is not included in the OP-20 calculation
is because CNAP does not report the cost on the current year Flying Hour Cost Reports
(FHCR) sent to N-88F and FMB. Since the OP-20 calculation is based on the most
current year cost execution data (aggregated from the FHCR), the bow wave is never
included, resulting in an actual Cost Per Hour (CPH) that is higher than the OP-20 CPH
(budgeted CPH). Table 3.1 displays the disparity between budgeted and actual CPH for
the total program from FY 1992-1998. Figure 3.1 shows the divergence in CNAPs
budgeted and actual CPH for the TACAIR/ASW Schedule from FY 1991-1997. Because
the actual CPH was higher than budgeted, CNAP flew less than the budgeted amount of
hours for fiscal years 92-94, and 96-98. This disparity is shown in the bar graphs for
those years. Figure 3.1 is further referenced and explicated in the next sections.
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CNAP TACAIR/ASW HRS VS. CPH
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CONSTANT 97$
Figure 3.1. CNAP TACAIR/ASW Flying Hours vs. CPH [Ref. 35]
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Budgeted CPH $1621 $1766 $1856 $2316 $2079 $1962 $2686
Actual CPH $1710 $1896 $2095 $2365 $2186 $2232 $3518
Table 3.1. CNAP Total FHP Budgeted vs. Actual CHP
The other reason for omitting the bow wave in future budget forecasts is due to
affordability. The Resource Sponsor and the Navy Programmers simply don't have
enough resource to fund the FHP requirement as well as buy back existing bow waves.
Hence, from the Fleet perspective, the most significant cause of recent underfunding is
the failure to recognize and include bow wave costs in subsequent budget predictions.
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The consequence of this failure understates the true cost of the execution year and results
in an underfunded program during the next year, and throughout the POM.
When executing a FHP budget that is not properly resourced, CINCPACFLT and
CNAP have two basic choices. The first one is to bow wave and continue to fly and
achieve the CNO directed PMR goal. The more cost conscious approach is to stop flying
when the funds are exhausted and accept the degradation in readiness associated with
flying less than the stipulated PMR goal. However, the second strategy (not flying the
aircraft) can result in additional maintenance costs and safety problems associated with
not "exercising" the aircraft. The cost of recent bow waves has been extremely high and,
as noted earlier, is the result of an underfunded FHP budget determined during the
formulation process. For example, the bow wave that was generated in FY 96 was $32
million and the AVDLR bow wave generated in FY 97 was $65 million. These bow wave
bills are further compounded by other significant factors such as poor AVDLR reliability,
unfunded requirements, and unplanned events. These other factors and the consequence
of bow waving, is further examined in Chapter IV. Next we analyze an execution year
event that resulted in favorable funding consequences for CNAPs FHP during one budget
year.
Wildavsky terms the budgeting process "repetitive " because few problems have
to be decided upon and solved "once and for all" since they can be re-addressed the
following budget year. He calls this phenomena "problem succession", not "problem
solving" which appears to be the perennial budgeting norm [Ref. 2:p. 48]. The military
departments and Services also engage in problem succession, particularly since there isn't
enough money to solve all problems and fund all requirements during any given year.
However, when events or even calamities occur during the budget execution year
problems tend to get fixed more quickly. This was the case during the FY 94 execution
year, when the Commander in Chief of Pacific Fleet directed CNAP to fly only the
amount of hours that the budgeted dollars provided. CNAP was forced to "park planes",
which generated a lot of concern and attention regarding the FHP and the funding process
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from higher headquarters. Although CNAP did not specifically use the term "bow-
waving" back in 1992 and 1993, they did "bow-wave" to a small degree to achieve the
PMR goals. In these years relative underpricing occurred during budget formulation as
result of deficiencies inherent in the three-year moving average approach used to
determine the budget requirement. As a forecasting technique, a moving average uses a
number of recent actual data values to generate a forecast. A moving average doesn't
pick up trends very well but can be useful, provided that market demand stays fairly
constant over time [Ref. 36:p. 165-167]. Assuming constant demand in the flying hour
program from year to year is not always a reasonable assumption. Poor reliability of
various spare parts and unpredictable events producing higher aircraft and spare part
utilization rates, thus rendering this assumption inaccurate. Hence, the three-year rolling
average underfunded the FHP at relatively 4-6% lower than actual requirements, which
resulted in some bow-waving in those years. The bow wave carried over into 1 993 caused
a considerable disparity in the budgeted CPH and the actual CPH as depicted in Figure
3.1. Operating the CNAP aircraft at the higher CPH expended available funds in the OP-
20 for FY-94 and in the 4 th quarter caused the CINC to "park planes" as opposed to cash
flowing his way to achieve higher readiness through bow-waving. As noted, this event
caused considerable pressure to "fix" the funding process. As a result, the FHP in fiscal
year 95 was priced properly. The unfortunate side effect is that the additional funding
had to come from other sources, particularly the Navy modernization accounts. As
indicated in Figure 3.1, sufficient funds were allocated, as evidenced by the relatively
equal budgeted and actual cost per hours. Hence FY 95 was a well-funded and executed
year from the Fleet perspective. However, rising AVDLR costs, poor spare part
reliability, and more underpricing in the budget process resulted in additional funding
difficulties in subsequent FYs.
In summary, this section demonstrated how the FHP is subject to funding
variability due to affordability decisions, deficiencies in the old forecasting methodology
and dramatic events enhanced by an environment of limited fiscal resources. Deficiencies
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in the current forecasting methodology and other FHP components are examined in
section D.
3. Trade-off Decisions Between Funding Current FHP Readiness and
Aviation Modernization
In a budget-balancing era. it has been impossible for Congress to satisfy all of the
claims and requirements from society. Similarly, provided with limited fiscal resources,
the DoD and Navy find it difficult, to satisfy the many claims for their unique services
and capabilities. The shortfall projection by N-88 in PR-01, presented earlier, is a good
example illustrating the magnitude of the problem of resourcing all Navy and Marine
Corps aviation programs and requirements. The purpose of this section is to briefly
examine some of the recent trade-off decisions between funding current FHP readiness
and modernization to further highlight the severity of this uncertain funding environment.
The big loser in these trade-offs has not been the FHP. Rather, the loser is the
Navy's re-capitalization and procurement accounts, as well as other programs that have
been required in many ways to subsidize current readiness. Some pundits have criticized
the DoD for not properly preparing for future battlefields and emergent threats, as Paul
Braken implies in his article "The Military After Next" [Ref. 37]. Braken argues the
military needs to develop new strategies and invest in the right technology to better
prepare for new emerging competitors in the world. However, it remains a tremendous
challenge for DoD/DoN planners, programmers and comptrollers to even look beyond the
"Quarter after Next". With limited funding, the ability to allocate resources to all of the
competing short-term and long-term requirements is virtually impossible. Further, as the
competition for limited funds increases so does the difficulty in optimizing funding
decisions. In his analysis of federal budgeting, Wildavsky explains. Congress is also
faced with this annual dilemma of balancing limited funds against the endless claims and
commitments to society. To solve this annual challenge. Congress often pursues a
strategy called "satisfying" in that they try to allocate a "piece of the pie" to all players
and programs, so they may "get by" and "come out all right" [Ref. 2:p. 48]. However,
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during Navy budget formulation, planners and programmers are often required to go
beyond the strategy of "satisficing", to make vertical cuts and to eliminate some programs
to maximize available funding for current programs. This is especially true with the DoN
FHP, where many aviation modernization and improvement programs have been
eliminated to fund current FHP readiness. As one budget analyst put it, "We are often
faced with trading a hundred tomorrows for one today" [Ref. 30]. Recent decisions
during budget formulation are consistent with this comment. For example, the following
is a list of new equipment items and or missions that were canceled in the course of one
year to free up additional funding for the FHP [Ref. 30]:
Funding for Selected Aperture Radar (SAR) for the S-3B
Funding for the AESA Radar for the F/A-l 8
Funding for ejection seat upgrades
Funding for the Decoupled Cockpit for the F/A- 1 8F
Survival Radio upgrades
APN-6 spare parts funding
Avionics test equipment
Helicopter Crashworthy Seats




ASW mission from the S-3B
Although this list reflects Navy commitment to ensure Naval Aviation remains a
viable warfighting capability, it indicates a bigger problem than funding the FHP.
Rather, it reflects a substantial opportunity cost and a glaring need for an increase in Total
Obligation Authority (TOA). Moreover, this list is not isolated to the Navy. Recently,
former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Neal stated before Congress:
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''Without raising the top-line of the defense budget the price of maintaining this degree of
readiness, given our aging equipment and increasing operational demands, has been paid
for out of our modernization, base-infrastructure and quality of life accounts" [Ref. 3 1 :p.
18].
During budget formulation, the DoN FHP has been subject to various "marks"
from year to year, but available information indicates the FHP has not been recently
required to forfeit much funding for other programs and priorities. However, during
budget execution this is not the case. The CNAP FHP is often used to cross-subsidize
other underfunded programs and funding priorities such as IT-2 1 and the Special Interest
Category "Flying Other" accounts. These and other unfunded requirements during
execution and their relative impact on CNAPs FHP are described in Chapter IV.
The relevance of this section to CNAPs FHP is to highlight the fact that the FHP
is resourced in a very precarious and uncertain funding environment. Although some of
the recent trade-off decisions involving the FHP in the budgeting process have resulted in
fortuitous outcomes, without an increase in the top-line, it is only a matter of time before
the program will be required to provide off-sets or reduced to pay for other Navy funding
priorities.
The next section analyzes how the incentives to cut funding impacts programs
like the FHP. and how this incentive is further heightened in a constrained funding
environment.
4. The Incentive to Cut
In a scarce budgeting environment, the incentives to safeguard funds and look for
ways to cut budget requests are intensified. Interviews with DoD and DoN budget
personnel confirm this assessment and indicate the trend has increased in recent years
along with the intensity to scrutinize and "trim" budget requests. There are two primary
incentives for "budgeteers" to cut program funding. The first is to prevent the next level
of review from reducing budget requests that are not well justified or supported. Thus,
one of the goals during the DoN POM and budget review processes is to ensure that
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poorly justified requests are identified and cut. In this way, funds can be "kept in house"
and shifted to other budget priorities, minimizing the chance of losing the funding when
budget requests are passed on for DoD scrutiny. The other primary incentive is to
safeguard taxpayer money and insure Navy funding is well spent. Other incentives exist
including cultural pressure and competition to make marks. It is generally perceived as
"unproductive" or ineffective behavior if a budget analyst doesn't make his or her share
of marks. Budget analysts are paid to cut budgets. This is their role. The analogy
presented in Chapter I regarding the "black hat" (the cutting role) may also incentivize
cutting behavior to some degree. Although this assertion is difficult to prove, the
reference to the behavioral incentives of the "black hat" was mentioned during
interviews with budget analysts at different levels in the FHP budget chain. The term
"black hat" may be construed as an organizational metaphor that can in fact influence
behavior to cut budgets.
As noted in Chapter I, the incentive for Congress to cut readiness programs like
the FHP is strong because cuts in these areas result in an immediate decrease in outlays
that is used to "satisfice" other constituent demands. Wildavsky suggests, that when
Congress cuts the defense budget they take the path of least resistance, which means
cutting the one year spending accounts such as "Readiness and Manpower". Since the
outlay rates for procurements are distributed over several years, an identical cut in a
procurement program would result in a smaller annual decrease in outlays [Ref. 2:p. 247].
Another cutting strategy employed by Congress is to "cut less visible items" [Ref. 2:p.
63]. When Congressmen feel obligated to support a particular program or agency due to
constituent pressure, cuts are often made in support areas that don't seem to have a direct
impact on program activities [Ref. 2:p. 63]. Similarly, Wildavsky identifies
"housekeeping" activities that don't appear to be connected with a program can be "put
off for another year", but warns that deferring these activities may cost more in the end
[Ref. 2:p. 63]. This budget reduction strategy and its negative consequence are also
manifested within FHP budgeting, particularly in resourcing the Special Interest "Flying
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Other" account, explained in Chapter IV.
One final observation from the interviews conducted with budgeting personnel is
the need to articulate precisely why deviations have occurred between requested budgets
and actual execution. It is often an "easy mark" to cut funding when analysts see the FHP
was underexecuted, indicating to them that the Fleet couldn't fly all of the budgeted hours
in the OP-20. As noted in Figure 3.1, this inability resulted from an underpriced program
and other unplanned events/decisions that decremented current year funding.
Nevertheless, it is important to articulate precisely why deviations and changes have
occurred between the budgeted request and actual execution. Not fully executing a
budget as requested is often construed by budget cutters that funding that was not needed
in the first place.
In summary, the intent of this section was to identify powerful incentives to cut
budgets and the importance of ensuring all funding requests and spending anomalies are
justified and articulated clearly.
5. Summary
Operating in a limited resource environment is one of the biggest drivers of FHP
problems and underfunding. This conclusion is not a great revelation. However, in the
quest for quick answers to other systemic FHP problems, it is often overlooked and
results in laborious staff studies that never logically conclude that the DoD/DoN needs
more money to resource the unique requirements it is tasked to perform. If the need for
an increase in TOA is overlooked, then perhaps a more pragmatic solution is to
decentralize the resource allocation process as Lerner and other budgeting experts have
suggested to achieve greater efficiency. This notion of decentralizing the resourcing
process is fundamental to alternative budgeting concepts termed "Mission Budgeting"
and "Responsibility Budgeting". These concepts as explicated by Jones, Thompson and
Bixler could lead to more optimal budgeting for the DoD, and are presented and analyzed
in Chapter V.
What follows is an analysis of specific deficiencies inherent in the FHP budget
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forecasting methodology and other formulation issues that often lead to underfunding in
Air Type Command Budgets.
D. FHP BUDGET FORMULATION FACTORS AND ISSUES
1. Introduction
The OP-20 budget formulation methodology was detailed in Chapter II-F to
explain the process and to provide sufficient understanding to analyze whether the
methodology and model components are adequate for determining the resource
requirements for the Air Type Commanders. The purpose of this section is to examine
the FHP forecasting methodology and sources of variability that may affect budget
forecasts. Weaknesses in some of the model components such as the Cost Per Hour
(CPH) and Primary Mission Readiness (PMR) are examined. The last section describes
some of the budget "gaming" strategies that have been used during the formulation
process to produce a more affordable OP-20 budget to fit within assigned controls. This
section concludes with an explanation of how planned contingency funding is factored
into CNAPs FHP and a brief overview of some of the ongoing work conducted by N-88F
to improve the FHP requirements determination and formulation process. As background
information, this section begins with a review of some recent studies of the DoN FHP
Cost Per Hour (CPH) and forecasting methods.
2. Background Information and the Cost Per Flight Hour (CPH)
The Flying Hour Program cost per flight hour basis and budget methodology have
been subject to a great deal of study. Part of this effort was to determine the degree of
correlation between flying hours and the three basic cost pools: fuel, maintenance
consumables and AVDLR. For some time, it has been assumed these cost components
vary directly with the number of flying hours flown. Logically then, if fewer hours are
flown, there should be proportional savings in cost. However, this is not the case. It is
now better understood that there are elements of fixed cost embedded in the cost per
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flight hour and the amount of these fixed costs vary among different T/M/S aircraft.
Although flying less will result in some cost savings, the savings associated with flying
less hours does not result in the same proportional decrease in the marginal cost per hour.
For example some costs are still incurred regardless of the number of flight hours flown
such as, costs for corrosion control, ejection seats, electronic radios and some hydraulic
components. Costs for other items like engines and landing gear do vary with the
frequency of flying. Studies regarding the variable and fixed cost relationships were
heightened in the late 1 980s and 1 990s in an attempt to control increasing Naval aviation
costs.
During this period Naval Postgraduate School theses analyzed this degree of
correlation, but with mixed results. One thesis conducted in 1989 (Byrne) examined FHP
cost data at the Pacific Missile Test Center. This author concluded that only fuel costs
behaved as variable costs and that a relatively low correlation existed between the
AVDLR and maintenance consumable costs. However, closer examination of the
statistical results of the fuel costs revealed only one T/M/S aircraft (F-14) demonstrated
somewhat of a significant coefficient of determination (r-squared) of 75%. [Ref. 38:p. 41]
The R-squared values for the other T/M/S aircraft were too low to conclude the
regression equation sufficiently explained the variation in fuel cost. Another thesis
conducted in 1994 (Arkley) concluded different results. This study examined F/A-18
FHP cost data in Navy/Marine Corps Reserve units. The results demonstrated both fuel
•and maintenance consumables were significantly correlated to the cost per hour, but the
degree of correlation between AVDLRs and flight hours was low, concluding that some
AVDLRs behaved more like fixed cost [Ref. 39:p. 72-78]. Recently another NPS student
(Gardner, 1998) examined FHP cost data from Marine squadrons under Commanding
General Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT). After extensive effort in adjusting
the data, the results determined a low statistical correlation with any of the cost pools.
The relatively low correlation among the cost pools in this study indicates a larger
problem that affects all of Naval Aviation - no standard cost accounting system, which
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contributes to significant variability in how costs are reported and displayed.
Other studies. Due to FHP shortfalls and pricing problems experienced in FY 97,
N-8 directed N-88 in April 1997, to initiate efforts to improve the FHP forecasting
methodology so that the program is "properly resourced, executable, balanced and fully
defensible to OSD and the Congress" [Ref. 40]. With this guidance, N-88F requested the
Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) to analyze the FHP budgeting methodology to
improve forecasting accuracy of the existing method and/or determine a better predictor
of FHP costs. NCCA developed a simple regression model that proved to be accurate in
predicting top-line aggregate FHP costs. Costs were consistent with past FHP cost data
from 1988-1997 [Ref. 41 :p. 1]. However, the model was unable to predict costs
accurately at the Type Commander or T/M/S level. The data set used to develop the
model consisted of FHP cost totals from fiscal years 1992-96 for only the active duty
flying schedules: TACAIR/ASW, FAS and FAT [Ref. 41:p. 2]. The data were adjusted
to FY 97 constant dollars. In the equation, total flight hours were used as the independent
variable and total FHP costs were used as the dependent variable. In terms of statistically
significant relationships, they found fuel and maintenance consumable costs highly
correlated with flight hours flown as evidenced by an R-squared value of 92.7%.
AVDLRs demonstrated no significant relationship with flying hours flown and behaved
like a fixed cost. Some of NCCA's other findings were interesting. Up until 1991, the
number of flight hours flown each year was relatively constant (about 1 .4 million flight
hours). However after 1992, the number of annual hours flown decreased significantly.
Despite this decrease, the cost per flight hour has continued to go up each year, and the
AVDLR costs remained constant. These findings seemed counterintuitive. The
regression analysis determined that over half of the data behaved as fixed cost, which
means that as these fixed costs are spread over fewer hours, the cost per hour increases.
This finding was significant and as mentioned earlier contrasted the assumptions that the
costs that constituted the cost per hour were relatively variable. This phenomenon
partially affected the increase in FHP costs experienced by the Marines, when they flew
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considerably fewer hours in FY 97 under their new Aviation Campaign Plan (MACP).
The effect of the MACP as a source of CNAP underfunding is explained in Chapter IV.
Further, NCCA confirmed the former 3 -year moving average approach lagged
actual costs, and the current approach of using current year execution costs as the basis
for the future budget year tracked relatively closely with the NCCA model for the budget
year, but understated the program costs in the outyears. [Ref. 41]
In summary, the NCCA statistical model proved to be an accurate predictor of
aggregate FHP cost, but the simple regression formula is not adequate for justifying the
hours and funding required for the DoN FHP during the budget process. The bottom line
is that an algebraic equation would not hold up well under FMB, DoD and congressional
budget scrutiny. Simply predicting incremental cost growth does not justify the
requirement and expenditure of funds. Budgeting requires the Navy to justify cost
growth, and accurately justify the requirement in terms of performance measures as per
normal budget review procedures and enhanced by the guidance stipulated in the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). Justifying the requirement
and tying flying hours to readiness goals are becoming increasingly important,
particularly when resources continue to be constrained. An effort by N-88F to improve
this process is reviewed in section 6. Currently N-88F, does use the NCCA model as a
benchmark to verify top-line OP-20 budget forecasts and to conduct "what-if ' pricing
drills.
Cost Per Hour Variance. Another topic that has received considerable attention is
why different flying squadrons using the same T/M/S aircraft have experienced different
cost per hours. This attention has evolved from increased pressure for FHP cost control
and the assumption that similar type aircraft should experience the same CPH. There are
several reasons why a variance may occur. Perhaps the most significant factor is
differences in operating environments. For example, l sl Marine Air Wing (1 SI MAW)
squadrons operating in Hawaii and Okinawa experience significantly higher maintenance
costs than the 3 rd Marine Air Wing (3 rd MAW) based in Southern California. [Ref. 42]
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The weather conditions in Southern California are far more conducive to aircraft
preservation than in Hawaii and Okinawa. The increased exposure to salt water corrosion
for the Hawaii and Okinawa units has been particularly costly because the effects of this
corrosion accelerate the cost for repairs on electrical equipment, hydraulic components,
rubber seals, and other components. The disparity in costs between the two operating
environments is manifested in the number of maintenance man-hours (MMH) required
for corrosion control. In 3 rd MAW, approximately 240 MMH per aircraft per year are
expended for corrosion repair as opposed to approximately 1000 MMH per aircraft per
year in the 1
st MAW units [Ref. 42].
Other factors that can drive variances in the CPH are different aircraft utilization
rates due to different mission requirements or changes in mission requirements,
differences in aircraft age, difference in maintenance manning and experience, and timing
of the installation of modification and reliability improvements. All of these variables
can cause differences in the CPH among different operating squadrons using the same
aircraft and result in increased variability in funding requirements.
3. FHP Forecasting Methodologies and Other Issues
As noted in section C of this chapter, the FHP budget methodology in the past
was based on a three year moving average. This approach did not accurately predict
flying hour costs due to the inability of moving averages to pick up data trends. The
NCAA analysis confirmed this. Further inaccuracies in this averaging technique resulted
from the fact that program costs were not varying up and down over time; rather they
were consistently increasing. Coupled with rising FHP costs, inherent deficiencies in the
moving average approach and adjustments made in the interest of affordability produced
a budget for the Fleet that was underpriced and contained a lower than actual cost per
hour to operate the aircraft. Figure 3.1 depicts this CPH disparity for fiscal years 1992-97
(less FY 95).
The current OP-20 forecasting methodology used since FY 98 applies the most
current year execution data in determining the number of flying hours required and the
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new budgeted CPH for each T/M/S, based on the historical aggregate cost for each cost
category: Fuel, Maintenance consumables and AVDLR. Escalation rates are then
integrated in this projection to balance funding against the Navy Working Capital Fund
surcharges and price increases. Hence, in formulating the FY98 budget cost per hour for
Fuel, Maintenance and AVDLRs, FY 96 execution data (with some adjustments) were
used plus the escalation factor provided through FMB. The OP-20 components and
formula sequence used within the Flying Hour Projecting System to calculate the
required hours and cost is outlined in Chapter II-F. Figure 3.2 summarizes this formula
sequence and its components. An assessment of some of the weaknesses inherent in the






























Figure 3.2. TACAIR/ASW Flying Hour Formulation [Ref. 18]
OP-20 Forecasting Weakness. The OP-20 is not valid for defining future
requirements and predicting future cost. Such criticism is the result of funding
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difficulties experienced during execution and not attributable exclusively to the model
itself as a forecasting tool. For example, not including bow wave costs and disregarding
the effect of important external factors will undermine any budgeting technique. NCCA
found the current N-88F methodology for predicting annual flying hours and associated
costs for the current budget year to track fairly closely with the model they developed,
provided that the flight hours are constant throughout the POM. There has also been an a
study conducted by CNA (Sep 1998) to develop a new budgeting approach for
determining the flying hour requirement. This CNA prototype approach was validated
against the current methodology and the results indicated the current methodology has
been accurate in predicting the proper number of annual flight hours. (An overview of
this CNA study is presented in section 6.). However, the key weakness inherent in the
methodology that contributes to underfunding is the fact that the FHP budget forecast
"looks backwards", meaning the approach relies heavily on historical execution data to
predict future costs. Historical data are inadequate due to unpredictable changes in many
different variables. For example, the demand and usage of AVDLR and maintenance
consumables always change from year to year. The variance in demand is further
compounded by poor reliability in AVDLR components and unplanned events that result
in higher OPTEMPO, aircraft utilization rates and cost. Aside from poor component part
reliability and funding constraints, other significant factors that distort the forecasting
accuracy of the OP-20 model are as follows:
• Changes in the "market basket of goods"
• Maintenance philosophy changes (O-D/OEM vs. O-I)
• Maintenance modifications and Engineering Change Proposals (ECP)
• Failure to include savings and cost of reliability improvement programs such
as Logistic Engineering Change Proposals (LECP)
• Budget Gaming
• Escalation Rate Variability
• Unplanned events and requirements
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All of these factors contribute to FHP budget underfunding and make the OP-20
useless as a forecasting tool.
From the Fleet perspective, if the model was left unchanged, it is believed that it
would predict and provide the proper number of hours and funding to meet flying
requirements. Although less than perfect as a budgeting tool, we conclude that the OP-20
model in itself is valid for determining the requirement for the budget year if conditions
are static, other things being equal. It is a useful budgeting mechanism because it
attempts to integrate many dynamic components that constitute the naval aviation flying
hour requirement, (e.g. air crew personnel, crew seat ratios, number of training hours, fuel
and maintenance cost etc.) Given its inherent weaknesses, it is the effect of other external
factors that cause the OP-20 forecast to break down that results in underfunding. Ideally,
what is required is a total cost model that integrates all aviation costs and externalities
that have budgetary consequences. The Resource Sponsor is working diligently to
improve the budgeting process and how the requirement is stated. These efforts are
highlighted in section 6.
The flying hour program forecasting methodology is revisited in Chapter IV, with
an analysis ofAVDLR pricing and its effects on the CNAP FHP budget execution. What
follows is a brief examination of some of the other variable factors occurring during
budget formulation that contribute to weak budget prediction and FHP underfunding.
4. Other Variable Factors
a. Changing Escalation Rates
The way in which escalation rates are applied to the OP-20 forecast can
also lead to underfunding. The term escalation rate refers to the change in surcharges
from one year to the next (that is the change in rates for fuel, maintenace and AVDLR.)
N-88 uses these escalation rate changes to change the pricing of the flying hour program.
Escalation rates are issued to N-88 via N-82 in NAVCOMPT notice 7111. NAVSUP. in
conjunction with NAVICP, contrives the escalation rates associated with the Navy
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Working Capital Fund and the Defense Working Capital component [Ref. 43]. Due to
time constraints in budget formulation, the way in which escalation rates are integrated
into the OP-20 forecast is backwards. According to the Resource Sponsor, when they
produce a budget they use a specific OSD escalation rate and apply it to each T/M/S for
each of the cost pools: fuel, maintenance and AVDLR. Hence, the budget is essentially
built from the micro-level to the macro-level. However, when the rate changes (due to
changes in costs), they are issued a specific dollar amount calculated by N-82 to spread
across the FHP, as opposed to being issued the rates and then telling N-82 what is
required when the rate is applied to the current OP-20 forecast.
When the surcharge rate structure stabilizes the resource sponsor
calculates what funding they should have received compared to what was received and
there is typically a delta, hence another way the forecast is underfunded. This rate
variability is illustrated by the following example. During the development of POM 98
prepared in FY 96, the rate that was applied to build the FY 98 budget was estimated to
be 2.5 % (the projected change in surcharge rates from FY97 to FY98). This 2.5% was
applied to the T/M/S level as described earlier. The final rate applied to the FY98 budget
was 24. 7 %, which accounted for the actual surcharge rate increase from FY 97 to FY 98.
The actual surcharge in FY 97 was 27.4 % and the FY 98 surcharge was 57.5%. The
change in the escalation rate of 24.7 % was received in the form of aggregate dollar totals
to be applied across-the-board for the FY 98 OP-20 budget vice applying the rate down to
each individual T/M/S aircraft to come up with a more accurate change in price. In this
example, it was not possible to quantify the funding impact on the CNAP budget. This
demonstrates how additional variability can result in underfunding or pricing errors for
some T/M/S aircraft. The escalation rate, surcharge and pricing system relative to
AVDLRs are examined further in Chapter IV.
The bottom line from the perspective of the Resource Sponsors is that if
there was less variability in the escalation rates from year to year, they would be able to
predict a more accurate budget in the future years and minimize the impact of FHP
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underfunding in the FYDP. However, escalation rates have varied considerably, making
this view moot.
b. Primary Mission Readiness (PMR)
Primary Mission Readiness (PMR) was initially analyzed in Chapter II as
one of the components used to calculate the budgeted cost per hour for each T/M/S in the
TACAIR/ASW Schedule. This section analyzes some of the issues associated with the
concept of PMR.
The relevance of PMR is rather obscure. The term is defined in the
CNAP/CNAL Joint Instruction 3500.67D, Training Readiness Matrices, as "the hours
required to maintain the average crew qualified to perform the Primary Mission Areas
(PMA) of the assigned aircraft, to include all weather/day/night carrier operations." Over
time, PMR has evolved into a surrogate readiness metric and is interpreted as an
exclusive measure of operational readiness, particularly since the word readiness is
reflected in the term. However, PMR has little to do with actual readiness because it is
not integrated in any way with the Status of Training and Readiness System (SORTS).
PMR is simply a tool used in estimating the annual budgeted flying hours and cost for
each T/M/S. Historically, PMR has been as high as 87% in the early 1990s, but has been
reduced, consistent with the trend in decreasing defense budgets and force structure. For
funding purposes, the relevance of this concept is its application in the OP-20 budget
calculation, where it is expressed as a percentage of total monthly flight hours authorized.
As of FY 98, the current CNO PMR goal is 83% (plus 2% contributed via
flight simulators), and is published annually by N-80 in the DoN Consolidated Planning
and Program Guidance (DNCPPG). The relevance of the 2% PMR simulation factor is
another confusing aspect since it is not budgeted directly as a component of the OP-20.
There is further confusion as to how this 2% simulation contribution is quantified and
correlated with existing readiness measures. Nevertheless, 83% PMR guidance drives the
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Air Type Commanders flying hour program and is subsequently misperceived as a valid
measure of success in budget execution and as a Navy readiness indicator. Not achieving
this percentage is perceived as under executing the program and is construed as
justification for cuts in the subsequent execution years as in FY 92. CINCPACFLT
directs CNAP to execute all of the hours to meet the CNO directed flying goal, but CNAP
has experienced difficulties in doing so due to an underfunded budget and a lower
budgeted than actual cost per hour, than funded costs per hour. Hence, to come close to
the attainment of the published PMR goals, CNAP has pursued "creative financing"
methods such as bow-waving and Unfilled Customer Orders (UCOs) to sustain flying
through the end of the year. (UCOs are another cash flow management method used in
FY 97 by CNAP and is explained in Chapter IV). These cost deferment methods have
profound consequences for the subsequent budget year and across the FYDP as explained
earlier. On the other hand, CINCLANTFLT guidance to CNAL is to fly to the budgeted
dollars and as a result this has generated a smaller bow wave than CNAP had in FYs 96-
97. However CNAL generated a larger bow wave in FY 98. N-88F is attempting to
correct this disconnect between SORTS and the FHP to better link readiness to resources
expended. These efforts are explicated in section 6.
In summary, PMR is an inaccurate metric that does not adequately relate
flying hours to readiness. It has evolved into a surrogate measure of readiness and a
relative measure of program funding, i.e. 83 % PMR is construed as a fully funded
•program in the budget arena. During budget formulation, PMR is often manipulated for
some T/M/S aircraft to produce a FHP that fits the budget controls and achieves the
aggregate 83% PMR goal. This budget strategy is a manifestation of budget gaming due
primarily to limited resources.
c. Budget Gaming and Strategy
As analyzed earlier under the topic of Budget Process Dynamics, budget
"gaming" and "gimmicks" emerge when fiscal controls constrain the level of spending
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that is needed or to make budget requirement fit within available funding caps. This
phenomenon also occurs during FHP budget formulation and causes underfunding in Air
Type Commander flying hour programs. Underfunding is not an intended consequence,
but the product of the Resource Sponsor constructing a budget for which the requirements
exceed the available top-line funding amounts. Due to the fiscal constraints levied on the
Resource Sponsor, they do the best they can to properly price the FHP as well as balance
funding for other aviation priorities including procurement, spare parts and depot
maintenance. This annual resource balancing act is further constrained by rising AVDLR
costs, poor spare part reliability, unplanned events that result in higher aircraft utilization,
and Fleet reprogramming decisions, all of which drive up FHP costs. For reference
purposes, this section will briefly describe some of the ways that the FHP budget is
"forced" to fit within the top-line. First we examine how the forecasting methodology is
at times modified to develop more affordable program and then analyze how PMR and
other OP-20 model components are adjusted to produce lower cost outcomes.
(1) Adjustments to the Forecasting Methodology and PMR.
The FHP forecast used for FY 97 is an example where the methodology was modified to
produce a more affordable budget. The forecasting method used for this budget period
was the 3-year moving average. The execution data for this prediction should have used
fiscal years 93, 94 and 95. However, in the interest of "affordability", fiscal years 92, 93
and 94 were used instead. The reason for the adjustment was due to the fact that FY 95
was an expensive year that experienced some high cost anomalies. Therefore, the
forecast was modified to produce a "less expensive" budget for FY 97. The result was an
OP-20 that was underfunded by approximately 350 million dollars for the Fleet [Ref. 30].
It is not possible to delineate the exact amount that CNAP was underfunded from this
aggregate 350 million total. As a result, FY 97 was a very difficult year for the FHP and
CNAP. .CNAP execution costs were considerably higher than budgeted for this year and
resulted in the deferment of AVDLR costs via bow-waving. This disparity is shown in
Table 3.2.
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The manipulation of PMR is another way to produce a budget that
fits within NAVCOMPT controls. Because some aircraft have a higher cost per hour
than others, it is difficult to produce a fully-funded program that provides 83% PMR
across-the-board for all T/M/S aircraft. Therefore, to produce an OP-20 that meets the
CNO requirement of 83% PMR, the lower cost per hour aircraft such as the SH-60
helicopter are funded at a higher PMR percentage and some of the higher cost per hour
aircraft such as the F-14 are funded to a lower level. The following table shows this PMR
modification. This information was extracted from the OP-20 version 1057 (FY99) and
displays the Type aircraft, budgeted cost per hour and the PMR percentage:




E-2C (Prop) $3344.47 89%
SH-60 F (Helo) $1677.60 90%
Table 3.2. Disparity in T/M/S PMR Percentages
It is important to note that PMR is decreased for some T/M/Ss due
to less than full manning. The impact of this PMR manipulation for CNAP results in a
budget that cannot be executed as produced. This requires CNAP's FHP program
manager to redistribute flying hours and associated funding among the different T/M/S to
more accurately match flying hour mission requirements to their Inter-deployment
Training Cycle (IDTR).
Another resourcing strategy is to attempt to fully price the
TACAIR/ASW schedule, which contain most of the high cost "warfighting" aircraft, but
at the expense of the other schedules, namely Fleet Air Support (FAS). However, this
funding strategy causes the Fleet to reprogram funds back into the FAS schedule to
restore the schedule to an adequate and sustainable level. Inadequate resources for the
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FAS schedule prevents these aircraft from performing their critical logistics and support
mission, (i.e. flying parts out to aircraft carriers). What's the solution? Some critics
advocate more Fleet participation in the affordability decisions that result in overall fleet
budget reductions. For example, if there is a requirement to cut $10 million from CNAPs
FHP, then include the customer to optimize the decision as opposed to centrally deciding
where to cut funding. If the Fleet is not included, the FHP program managers must
reprogram funds and conduct "workarounds" to achieve a better fit between resources and
mission. Higher level budget personnel indicate there are attempts to include the
"customer" in these adjustment decisions, but at times this is not possible due to
administrative and time constraints.
Ideally, the Resource Sponsor should look at how the Fleet is
actually executing their requirements, then build a budget model to reflect execution.
However, this gets back to the original dilemma in that historical budgeted costs do not
match execution, and to build an OP-20 that reflects how the Fleet is actually executing
the FHP would result in a budget that exceeds controls. In view of the top-line fiscal
constraints, one alternative is to fully price hours but not buy as many hours. The danger
with this approach is that the budget produced would be less than 83% PMR, and once
you give up something in the budget process it may not be reinstated.
Although the OP-20 can be underpriced in the formulation process
as described above, the Resource Sponsor and FMB frequently look to execution to
fixing the underfunding through contingency dollars or other money that may become
available as other programs under execute allocated funds.
(2) Other Adjusting Methods. Aircrew Manning Factor (AMF).
The Aircrew Manning Factor is another OP-20 variable that can be adjusted to achieve a
lower cost FHP. As explained in Chapter II, the AMF is one of the formula components
used to calculate the forecasted flying hours and cost for the TACAIR/ASW Schedule.
Ideally, the Resource Sponsor and Fleet would budget for 100% manning for all of the
aircrews and maintenance personnel authorized by the Squadron Manning Document.
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However, the actual personnel numbers fluctuate a bit due to training pipeline delays,
attrition and other variables. As a result, some of the data bases that reflect personnel
totals are inconsistent and don't show the same manning percentages that are shown in
budget exhibits. For example, in FY 98, budget analysts discovered a discrepancy in the
AV3M data base that reflected an 85% manning level, which was different from the
personnel figures presented in the personnel budget exhibit [Ref. 43]. This discrepancy
led to a budget mark that resulted in a reduction of 30 million dollars for the Fleet FHP.
From the Fleet perspective they viewed this reduction as a budget gaming strategy to cut
funding, particularly since some of their T/M/Ss are over-manned and have not received
additional funds for an Aircrew Manning Factor that exceeds 1 00%. From the Resource
Sponsors perspective, they need accurate data to properly resource and defend the FHP to
FMB and DoD. Better personnel data obtained for the FY 99 budget helped to negate a
similar mark.
Logistic Engineering Change Proposals (LECP) / Savings
Initiatives. The Logistic Engineering Change Proposal (LECP) program is a Navy
Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) initiative intended to achieve efficiencies for the Fleet
and Supply system by improving the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) for certain
aircraft components (AVDLRs), thus improving the reliability of these components.
Improving the reliability results in fewer repairs so that the Fleet can save money by
purchasing fewer repair components. The Fleet while very receptive to reaping the
benefits of this program, objects to the current method of financing it. Improving the
reliability of the various selected LECP candidates costs money. Therefore, in the budget
process, the anticipated or projected savings associated with the improvement is taken out
of the Air Type Commanders FHP budgets by applying the savings across all or some of
the T/M/S. The problem with this approach is that that these savings are unrealized in the
short-term and to decrement the Type Commander's current year budget for the projected
savings results in underfunding. Further, there is no systematic way to verify the MTBF
has actually been improved. The AMSR is examining this process to identify better ways
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to finance the program. LECPs are further analyzed as a source of CNAP FHP
underfunding in Chapter IV.
Gaming strategies are also used by the Fleet to get the most out of
limited budget dollars. For example, if it is known that the FHP is receiving adequate
attention in the form of re-pricing and funding plus-ups during the POM or PR, the
number one funding priority presented in Fleet POM papers or unfunded requirements
may not be the FHP, but rather ship maintenance or some other base support priority.
5. Planned Contingency Funding
During annual budget formulation, CNAP predicts funding requirements for
flying operations conducted in support of ongoing contingencies such as Bosnia and
Southern Watch (Iraq). With each budget submission, this forecast is submitted by
CNAP to FMB and N-88F. Once these organizations agree to the predicted requirement.
N-88F will build two OP-20s for the execution year. One version contains the
contingency funding and the other doesn't. As noted earlier, the OP-20 version with
contingency funding contains the additional flying hours for the aircraft participating in
those missions and is supposed to enable the Fleet to achieve 87% PMR. The OP-20
version that is built without contingency funding is priced for the Fleet to achieve the
CNO PMR goal of 83%. However, since the OP-20 version without contingency funding
has not incorporated previous bow waves in the budgeted forecast, the Fleet has not been
properly resourced to achieve 83% PMR even with the contingency funding. The amount
of funding that has been allocated and used by CNAP for contingency missions has been
approximately 40-45 million dollars per year. Even with this additional funding CNAP
has only been able to achieve about 81% PMR each year. For CNAP, each PMR
percentage point represents approximately 1 1 million dollars [Ref. 44].
Appropriated funding was formerly held at the FMB level, but is currently-
retained at the DoD Comptrollers Office, OSD-(C). To receive this funding, the Navy
submits justifications reflecting the amount and type of support provided for the
contingency missions. In CNAP's case, they submit a monthly contingency report to
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FMB via CINCPACFLT to request and obtain this funding. The interesting point here is
that there is no guarantee CNAP or CNAL will receive this funding. CNAPs philosophy
is that they will execute their FHP based on the expectation of receiving these funds. To
date CNAP has received their "fair" share of contingency funds.
Aside from chronicling this significant annual budget formulation event, the
additional relevance is that appropriated contingency funding is recognized by some
budget personnel as an execution year "fix" to compensate the Fleet for underpricing
during budget formulation. Currently, there exists some uncertainty regarding the
continuance of the contingency funding plan. During POM 00 negotiations, there was a
mark levied by N-80 to cancel this funding to the Fleet for FY 2000 and beyond. The
justification to cut the funding was based upon the fact that the Fleet has under executed
the 83% PMR during recent years and if properly funded to 83%, the Fleet should be able
to execute the normal FHP and the contingency missions. This new mark is frustrating
from the Fleet perspective because in their view they were never resourced to achieve the
83% goal due to underpricing, not including the cost of previous year's bow wave in the
OP-20 forecasts. However, part of the problem is that the Fleet has not shown the fiscal
"pain" via the readiness reporting system. Traditionally, the overall readiness picture
presented by the Fleet has been inflated and construed by budget personnel as a program
with no ostensible problems. The subject of readiness reporting and its impact is
analyzed briefly in Chapter IV. The final outcome of the mark against the contingency
funding is yet to be determined. In the interim, this issue presents more funding
uncertainty for CNAP.
6. The New Training and Readiness Matrix (T & R Matrix) and Alternative
TACAIR/ASW Budgeting Method
Another FHP variable that has budget formulation implications is the new Joint
TYCOM T&R Matrix. This matrix was designed by the two Air Type Commanders
(CNAP/CNAL) to improve aviation training and readiness reporting. The matrix is a
more comprehensive system of tracking and reporting readiness. It is intended to better
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link training and resource requirements, to measures of effectiveness and measures of
performance for all training events [Ref. 21 :p. 3]. The interesting feature of the new
training matrix is the automation of readiness reporting through a new program called
"SHARP". The significant change relative to SORTS reporting is that the new approach
minimizes the tendency to inflate readiness. The readiness rating generated by SHARP is
expected to be a more accurate measure of training achieved based on the resources
provided. In terms of the amount of flying hours, the new T&R matrix represents an
increase in the number of hours per crew per month (H/C/M) for most T/M/S aircraft
compared to the older T&R matrix. According to the Resource Sponsor, the net increase
in hours equates to a requirement for a $200 million increase in the budget. The other
concern with the new training matrix is the increase in utilization for some aircraft, that
will accelerate the requirement for replacement aircraft for which there is no money
programmed in the POM. From an affordability standpoint, N-88 cannot afford the new
matrix and decided not to include the new hour requirements in the budget until the
matrix can be validated.
During the interim, N-88F has commissioned the Center for Naval Analyses
(CNA) to develop a better methodology for budgeting for the TACAIR/ASW schedule.
The approach assumes that for a given number of flight and simulator hours, a certain
level of readiness will be obtained (i.e. C-l, C-2, etc). This prototype approach is based
on the new T&R matrix as well as historic levels of actual operations and historic levels
of overhead flights. The categories of flying: training, operations and overhead are
defined in accordance with the flight purpose codes used on the Naval Flight Record
Subsystem (NAVFLIRS). The premise behind counting overhead flying is that it results
in some degree of training benefit and attainment of PMA points. Using this approach,
CNA attempted to determine the required number of hours per crew per month to achieve
a C-l / C-2 training readiness rating for three sample T/M/S aircraft: F-18s, E-2s, and S-
3s [Ref. 43].
The initial results were interesting in that the number of hours determined for
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these aircraft were roughly the same hours required to achieve 83% PMR with the old
T&R matrix. This result tends to indicate the OP-20 model has accurately predicted the
proper number of required flying hours. This new approach may mean that the FHP can
be budgeted for roughly the same number of hours and funding but the requirement will
be justified more clearly. This CNA forecasting method eliminates the PMR factor to
create a more defensible and logical way to justify flying hours and funding. The next
step is to validate the approach with other T/M/S aircraft. The final step is to convince
Navy Planners and Programmers to buy off on the new approach and ultimately include it
as part of POM guidance. Instead of issuing 83% PMR as the annual funding and
readiness guidance, the requirement would be stated in terms of hours per crew per month
for each T/MS to meet a given readiness level. One remaining uncertainty with the CNA
approach is to see how their readiness ratings compare with the readiness ratings
generated by the SHARP program.
7. FHP and OP-20 Adequacy
This section has shown some inherent weaknesses in the FHP budget forecasting
methodology. However, the OP-20 model is fairly adequate for projecting the required
hours and costs in the budget year. At the aggregate level, NCCA found the current
methodology for predicting costs tracked fairly closely with the model they developed,
provided the flight hours are constant throughout the POM. Similarly, the initial CNA
analysis to develop a new method for determining the flying hour requirement indicated
that the current methodology is accurate in predicting the proper number of annual flight
hours. However, the historical forecasting approach does not adequately predict the cost
of the FHP in the outyears of the POM and results in understating the costs and the
program. The key weakness in the forecast methodology is its "backwards looking"
nature and inability to account for items that skew the cost of demand outside the norm.
[Ref. 45] The data used to predict the FHP budget are based on 1 to 2 years old execution
costs that are bound to change in the new execution year and the outyears of the POM.
Aside from relying too much on historical data, the most salient problem
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perpetuating FHP underfunding is not recognizing and incorporating the cost of bow-
waves in recent budget forecasts. As noted, this understates the true cost per hour and
underfunds CNAPs FHP. When adequate resources are not provided in the budget,
CNAP is unable to execute all of the budgeted hours provided. There are many other
variables that can skew the FHP forecast and cause underfunding. Some of these
variables were analyzed in sections B and C including budgeting dynamics, constrained
resources and affordability decisions. Other factors not incorporated in the forecast that
can have significant funding consequences include budget gaming, poor component
reliability, changes in maintenance philosophies (O-D/OEM), changes in the market
basket of AVDLRs, changes in prices, escalation rate variability and not properly
integrating validated savings from reliability improvement programs. These and other
execution issues are analyzed in detail in Chapter IV. If some of these aforementioned
factors could be integrated into the budget forecast, the ability of the Resource Sponsor's
ability to predict FHP cost and properly fund the program would improve. To do this,
process improvements must be made and better communication is required among all of
the key players: the Fleet, N-88, NAVAIR, NAVSUP, NAVICP and the Depots. The
Aviation Maintenance and Supply and Readiness (AMSR) group is intended to facilitate
this communication and achieve a better total cost picture for aviation requirements. An
overview of the AMSR is presented next.
E. AVIATION MAINTENACE SUPPLY AND READINESS (AMSR) GROUP
To improve the overall operational and support posture of Naval Aviation in the
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century, the AMSR group was formed in March 1998 as an ongoing, long-term effort
to examine rising AVDLR costs, and recommend specific actions to, "reduce overall
aviation maintenance and supply costs, and improve readiness" [Ref 46:p. iv]. The
group's membership consists of experienced Navy, Marine Corps and Civilian personnel
from various aviation supply, maintenance and FHP agencies and organizations.
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The AMSR is an excellent forum for analysis and modification of the many
interrelated issues contributing to aviation cost growth, readiness degradation and
associated FHP problems. The group has identified five primary aviation areas upon
which to focus improvement efforts: 1) Metrics, 2) Integrated Logistics Support, 3)
Maintenance and Supply, 4) Personnel and 5) Funding and Cost Management. Within
these areas, 1 8 comprehensive issues were identified and targeted for specific short and
long term action and improvement.
The following table lists the eighteen issues that are currently being studied and
acted upon:
# ISSUE/TOPIC # ISSUE/TOPIC # ISSUE/TOPIC










3 ILS Metric Reporting
Improvements




10 Logistic Engineering Change
Proposals (LECP)
16 AVDLR Cost &
Reliability
5 ILS Moving From
Plane-Side




12 Cannibalization 18 Aviation Maintenance
/Supply Funding
Table 3.3. AMSR Issue Items
The first time the AMSR convened, the group recognized the need for immediate
attention to address shortfalls in the Flying Hour Program including the buying down of
the existing bow waves, outfitting account and SDLM backlog. These efforts and the 1
8
issues listed above are continually being worked. The group meets on a regular basis,
and the status and results are briefed to OPNAV. To date, some issues have been
resolved and closed out. Between meetings, NAVAIR maintains an AMSR homepage
that contains the status and progress of the work performed on the 18 issues. It is
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important to recognize that the AMSR is a long-term effort to resolve various aviation
supply, maintenance and budgeting problems. The intrinsic value of this forum is the
ability to communicate with all players that constitute the Naval Aviation system. This
"systems" perspective is important because initiatives to resolve specific maintenance or
supply related problems may have negative consequences in other areas such as
budgeting or personnel.
As noted in Chapter I, the AMSR is used as a guide for the analysis in Chapter IV,
since some of the issues directly or indirectly relate factors that contribute to FHP
underfunding.
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has explained how the DoN Flying Hour Program and CNAP's FHP
budget is subject to underfunding and variability during the budget formulation process.
We examined budget process dynamics to develop greater insight into how political
influences, process deficiencies and funding constraints affect the FHP budget for both
the DoN and CNAP. The current budgeting environment of limited resources and
competing priorities causes the FHP to be formulated in a process that is competitive and
unstable. Specific FHP budget formulation factors and issues were analyzed to explain
how the forecasting methodology and adjustments to the process result in FHP
underfunding. Collectively, these influences degrade the efficiency of the FHP funding
process and have negative budget consequences for the CNAP Flying Hour Program.
Finally, the AMSR effort was summarized to demonstrate the ongoing initiative to
improve Naval Aviation and associated FHP issues. As noted, some of the AMSR issues
are used as a guide to analyze specific causes of CNAP FHP underfunding in the next
chapter.
The next chapter analyzes some of the major historical and current causes of
CNAP FHP underfunding experienced during budget execution. The chapter begins with
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a review of the trend in CNAP's program underfunding by examining budgeted and
actual FHP costs from fiscal vears 1992-1998.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CNAP'S FHP UNDERFUNDING
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter III examined the sources and issues that contribute to underfunding
during the FHP budget formulation process. Chapter IV, will now analyze some of the
historical and current causes of CNAP FHP underfunding that occur during budget
execution. As explained in Chapter III, FHP underfunding and resource variability during
the budget formulation process result from a combination of budget dynamics, unplanned
events and managerial decisions all occurring in an environment of limited resources and
competing priorities. Similarly, in budget execution, these dynamics, managerial
decisions and other variable factors contribute directly to CNAP historical and current
FHP underfunding problems. This chapter explains the most significant problems and
issues that cause FHP underfunding, creating constant and managerial challenges for
CNAP.
B. CNAP FHP: BUDGETED VS. EXECUTION
Before examining the specific issues and causes of FHP underfunding, this
section highlights historical CNAP FHP funding trends to demonstrate the disparity
between how the CNAP FHP was budgeted verses how it was executed. This section
begins with an explanation of these funding trends as illustrated in Figure 4.1. This
historical perspective will help facilitate the subsequent analysis of other underfunding
issues presented in this chapter that are not easily captured in graphic form. Figure 4.1
depicts CNAP flying hour program pricing history, beginning in FY 1992 through FY
1998. Each FY is graphically represented by an individual line that depicts cost per hour
relative to a fully funded FHP (OP-20). A fully funded OP-20 is represented by the 0%
variance goal. This means if the OP-20 provided all T/M/S aircraft with the resources to
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meet the planned PMR goal and flight operations for that year, then that respective FY
line on the graph should approximately match the targeted 0% variance line.
O N D J F M A M JCOEAEAPAUTVCNBRRYN J A SU U EL G P
Figure 4.1. Actual Cost Per Hour vs. Budget Cost Per Hour [Ref. 16]
FHP COST PER HOUR (CPH) FY 92-98 (IN THEN YR. DOLLARS)
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 97UCO 1998
OP-20 $1,621 1,766 1,856 2,316 2,079 1.962 2.686
Actual $1,710 1,896 2,095 2.365 2,186 2,232 2,315 3.518
Table 4.1. CNAP FHP CPH [Ref. 16]
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A quick view of this graph and corresponding Table 4.1, indicates that FY 95 was
the only year of the seven displayed that remained close to the 0% CPH goal. To explain
some factors that caused this disparity between budgeted and actual cost, as well as to
document the CPH trend, an explanation of the critical factors and events for each year
follows: [Ref. 44]
• FY 92. FY 92 was the first year after Desert Storm. The FHP budget was
thought to be fully funded. Note that from October through February for this
year and subsequent years, (with the exception of FY 98 - explained later)
there is a steady increase in the CPH curve. This happens because many of
CNAP's contracts are executed up-front in the beginning of the new fiscal
year while at the same time, the Fleet flies fewer hours during the holiday
months. Many of these contracts are high cost, and when they are distributed
over a smaller flying hour base this results in an increased cost per flight hour
curve displayed in October through February. As more hours are flown
throughout the rest of the year, the CPH typically decreases and stabilizes by
May or June. By this time the CNAP FHP Manager has a "better feel" for
how the program's execution will end in September.
Although FY 92 was considered to be fully funded, a point to note is
the fact that the CPH line constantly stayed above the 0% variance goal. A
primary reason for this was the deficiencies associated with the three-year
moving average forecasting methodology as explained in Chapter III. As
noted earlier, the FHP OP-20 budget exhibits were prepared using this method
until FY 98. CNAP finished FY 92 at approximately 5% higher than the
budgeted OP-20.
• FY 93. FY 93 followed a CPH pattern similar to FY92 and remained fairly
stable until July when costs began to increase toward the end of the fiscal
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year. This rapid year-end cost growth was a caused by two factors: PMR and
the resulting AVDLR "bow wave" explained in Chapter III. The PMR goal
resulted in an increased cost per hour. As the Fleet flew more hours to
achieve the PMR goal, more aircraft AVDLRs components failed, thereby
driving increased AVDLR repair costs. This increased expenditure of AVDLR
funds created a bow wave (a condition resulting from not having enough
(AOM) funds available to repair AVDLRs), which deferred these expenditures
until the next FY. As a result of these two factors, CNAP ended FY 93 at 7%
over the budgeted OP-20.
FY 94. This year signaled the beginning of serious problems for the FHP.
The actual cost per hour in this fiscal year was significantly higher than what
was budgeted in the OP-20. This disparity was the result of deficiencies in the
three-year moving average and the fact that the budgeted forecast did not
include the bow wave costs incurred in FY 93. As a result, the FHP forecast
understated the true cost and produced a budget that was both underfunded
and at much lower CPH than in FY 94. In this fiscal year, CINCPACFLT
direction was to execute the program per the approved OP-20, meaning fly
only the hours that were funded. Hence, in the fourth quarter after all
allocated FHP funds were obligated, CINCPACFLT directed CNAP to, "park
their planes" and to not incur another bow wave. This action resulted in a
great deal of interest and attention focused on the FHP funding process. Even
with this unprecedented action of parking aircraft, CNAP CPH still ended the
year at 12.8% above the OP-20.
FY 95. Parking Fleet aircraft in FY 94 brought tremendous interest and
attention upon the FHP. As a result, action was taken to fully price the
program for FY 95 - at the expense of other aviation programs and
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modernization accounts. By fully pricing the OP-20, CNAP was able to
achieve the stated PMR goal, avoid a bow wave, and execute the FHP just
slightly higher than budgeted (2% above the OP-20.) FY 95 became known
as a "model" year for the FHP managers and helped to support the Fleet claim
that the funding process in earlier years, was not working properly.
FY 96. CNAP experienced significant funding problems in FY 96 due to the
deficiencies noted in the three-year moving average forecasting methodology
and because of an affordability decision made during budget formulation.
Despite the fact that program cost's were increasing, CNO (N-82) failed to
recognize this cost growth and did not re-price the program during the annual
summer review session. As a result, the CPH experienced during execution
was considerably higher than the OP-20 CPH as evidenced by Table 4.1. This
in turn caused CNAP to exhaust the available OP-20 funds and bow wave
AVDLR expenses as a means to continue flying throughout the rest of the
year. The bow wave generated during this period was $32M and is not
depicted in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.1 indicates a 5.1% over the OP-20. If this
bow-wave was included in Figure 4.1, it would show that FY 96 ended the
year at 12.8% over the OP-20.
FY 97. This FY was also a difficult year for the CNAP FHP. This was due in
part to limited resources and decisions made during budget formulation to
build a cheaper OP-20. The methodology used to predict the budget for this
year was still based on the flawed three-year moving average. However, a
modification to the forecasting approach for FY 97 was made that further
impacted the budget. Instead of using FYs 93-95, FY 97's budget was based
upon FYs 92-94 because FY 95 was considered a high cost year and therefore
too expensive to include in budget formulation. This modification caused a
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S350M shortfall for the Fleet and resulted in the need for additional AVDLR
bow waving to continue flying through the end of the year. Further
underfunding occurred due to higher maintenance costs resulting from the
Marine Aviation Campaign Plan (MACP) and unforeseen maintenance costs
associated with reliability problems on the F/A-18 F404 engine, and CH-53
swash-plate. The MACP and reliability issues are further discussed in this
chapter. One final cause of underfunding in FY 97 was due to CINCPACFLT
and CNAP reprogramming decisions to reapply funding for other unbudgeted
and underfunded programs. These reprogramming decisions and unbudgeted
requirements are examined later in the chapter. All these problems
contributed to another underpriced year at 13% and a record $65M bow-wave
for CNAP. Figure 4.1 shows the impact of the bow-wave for FY 97 (see plot
labeled "w/UCO") The term Unfilled Customer Orders (UCO) is explained
later in this chapter.
FY 98. Due to the deficiencies of the three-year moving average, N-88
implemented a new forecasting methodology for FY 98' s budget. The new-
approach was based upon using the most recent year's execution costs. Using
the most current execution cost data helped minimize the problems inherent in
the former technique. However, the most salient deficiency in the FHP budget
formulation process still persisted. This deficiency was the failure to recognize
and include the previous year bow wave cost in the following year forecast.
The reason to not include the previous year's bow wave was due to limited
resources and other competing funding priorities. As a result, the budget
forecasts for FY 98 and out-years were still understated and consequently
underfunded. Another problem contributing to further underfunding in FY 98
was due to the cost of the bow wave being subjected to a higher surcharge
rate. The estimated bow wave cost that was rolled into FY 98 from FY97 was
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$65M. This cost increased considerably due to a higher surcharge rate of
57.5% as compared to 27.4% in FY 97. As a result, CNAP's FHP was
underfunded by 30% at the start of the FY 98. Fortunately, by March, several
factors helped to lower the alarming CPH rate. These factors included,
funding credits received from decommissioning the USS Independence and
the home port change for the USS Nimitz, from San Diego to the East Coast,
and expenditure reporting delays brought on by changing the CVs accounting
system to STARS -FL. By July, the FY 98 CPH variance was below 10%,
but by year's end, FY 98 still executed nearly 1 1% over the budgeted target.
This concludes the overview of the CNAP FHP budgeted versus actual funding
disparities from FY 92-98. In summary, the primary cause of CNAP historical FHP
underfunding was the deficiencies in the three-year moving average approach coupled
with political decisions and the OP-20 budget methodology. These are the principle
factors creating continued FHP underfunding as clearly supported by the CPH curves
seen in Figure 4.1.
Next, this chapter will analyze seven major factors that have directly impacted the
CNAP budget and remain as a significant source of continued FHP underfunding. These
factors are 1) Aviation Readiness and Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Reporting
Metrics, 2) Logistics Engineering Change Proposals (LECPs) 3) Aviation Configuration
Management 4) Aircraft Depot Level Repairables (AVDLR), ILS, Reliability and Pricing
5) the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan (MACP), 6) Effect of AVDLR Underfunding at
CNAP, and 7) Unfunded Requirments.
C. AVIATION READINESS AND INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT (ILS)
REPORTING METRICS
One of the causes of FHP underfunding is the use of multiple ILS readiness
reporting metrics. The metrics used in Naval Aviation do not provide an accurate
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measure of Fleet readiness or Fleet logistics support elements, making it difficult to
support and justify increased FHP funding levels. In this section, an analysis of this
problem is conducted, several supporting examples are shown, and an overview of
current Fleet initiatives to correct this problem is presented.
1. Aviation Readiness Reporting
The ability of Fleet Commanders and Resource Sponsors to measure the
effectiveness of force capabilities is crucial to meeting mission objectives and to ensure
programs are properly funded. In budget formulation, the level of resources requested
must be supported by tangible readiness goals if budget requests are to be approved.
However, there are no common readiness goals used in aviation readiness reporting
metrics. This leads to confusion between operational and supports units, and complicates
the task of identifying and reporting the Fleet resource requirements. Additionally, the
consolidation of fleet readiness reporting data in many cases masks significant problems
experienced in specific Fleet units and aviation communities.
As discussed in Chapter II, the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)
Report is the primary measure of an operational unit's combat readiness. The SORTS
system reports readiness levels under a "C" rating metric. A rating of "C-l" means the
unit is fully combat ready. Ratings of "C-2" through "C-4" indicate lesser degrees of
readiness. A unique feature of SORTS is the ability of "C" ratings to be aggregated, or
"rolled up" from the unit level to an air wing, battle group, or even Fleet level as a means
to provide overall readiness assessments. The problem with this feature is that "rolled
up" summaries can obscure readiness problems experienced by particular communities or
T/M/S. Also, as noted by the AMSR working group, Resource Sponsors and supporting
communities such as NAVSUP and NAVAIR, employ SORTS data to calculate overall
"ratios of system capability" (i.e. aircraft Mission Capable (MC) statistics) to assess
program health and formulate budget inputs. Currently, the SORTS reporting system
records MC rates for assigned aircraft and permits aircraft MC rates as low as 60% to
reflect a SORTS rating of "C-2". While a C-2 rating may be an acceptable posture at the
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CINC level, certainly no squadron CO or Air Wing Commander would accept aircraft
MC percentages that low. Consequently, there is significant pressure at the flight deck
level to achieve much higher Full Mission Capable (FMC) and MC rates. [Ref. 46 :p. 9]
One example is shown in the figure below:
Readiness Goals foi
• SORTS Readiness: 75% MC = C-
• CNO Readiness: 76% MC
• Battle Group CO: 84% MC
Navy F-14D Aircraft
1 (As reported by SCIR data)*
(As reported by AV3M data)*




ubsystem Capability and Impact Reporting
Aviation Maintenance Data Reports
Aviation Maintenance Readiness Report
Figure 4.2. Readiness Goals for Navy F-14D Aircraft [Ref. 46:p. 9]
In addition to the multiple readiness reporting criteria, the support elements for
Naval Aviation use the CNO Readiness Goals (OPNAVINST 5442.4M), (which are
unique for each specific aircraft T/M/S) to make critical resource allocation decisions.
These decisions can affect a host of ILS elements ranging from the level of spares stocked
at the air stations (SHORCAL), or CVNs (AVCAL), to the decision if or when I-Level
maintenance support is implemented for new aircraft components or systems.
Therefore, using multiple readiness reporting metrics results in inaccurate and
inconsistent reported readiness and the inability to identify often whole aircraft type
community problems. Yet, at the same time these communities are also pressured to
achieve higher readiness levels. To achieve higher MC rates, the squadrons must
constantly replace failed AVDLR components placing further demands on the already
underfunded FHP budget. In summary, without a clear system of readiness goals and
metrics, that links funding decisions to readiness and logistics support capability, the
current aviation readiness reporting system will continue to drive uncoordinated support
of aircraft and result in "surprises" regarding Fleet readiness. [Ref 46:p. 10] Next, is an
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explanation of how the various reporting metrics directly affect the overall logistics
support capability ofCNAP aircraft.
2. Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Reporting Metrics
The multitude of various aviation readiness reporting systems undermines the
ability of supporting activities to achieve cost effective life-cycle ILS for Navy and
Marine aircraft. The goal of the ILS system is to ensure all logistics support elements are
developed and deployed in order to provide a completely integrated support structure for
military equipment in an operational environment. To effectively evaluate aircraft ILS,
there must be a means to objectively measure the ILS elements against established
performance standards that can be, "linked through cause and effect relationships to
affordable readiness goals" [Ref. 46:p. 14]. However, the current readiness/ILS reporting
systems do not provide meaningful end-to-end ILS assessment information. This lack of
assessment information is caused by current readiness/ILS reporting systems
disjointedness, inconsistencies and "compartmentalization". Common problems with the
current readiness/ILS reporting systems include [Ref. 46:p. 14]:
• SORTS: Has no capability to assess ILS health or predict ILS shortfalls. "It
does not readily distinguish between a unit's material condition and its
operational capability" [Ref. 46:p. 14].
• Aviation 3M Data (AV3M): Provides a large amount of data for system-wide
ILS troubleshooting, but not rapidly enough to solve near term problems.
Data are disconnected from reporting unit readiness reports and thereby
insight into root causes or problems is reduced. Additionally, intermediate
level maintenance support is not readily available in current reports and real-
time NALCOMIS and SUDAPS reports (which provide daily ILS status at the
user level) are not available to up-line activities.
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• Aviation Maintenance Readiness Report (AMRR): Deployed aviation units
send a daily AMRR. This report provides significant detail of deployed
aircraft readiness and material support deficiencies for item managers and
carrier readiness support staffs, but has no provision to aggregate the data to
provide specific system ILS health evaluation and trends. Additionally, the
data reported on the AMRR do not match any Subsystem Capability and
Impact Reporting (SCIR) documentation reported by the SORTS.
Furthermore, squadron and air wing organization/cultural pressures have led
to the inflation of AMRR readiness figures by the reporting activity, thereby
further obscuring problems within specific aircraft and communities.
• The last problem with ILS reporting metrics pertains to data integrity. For
example, CNAP reported during FY 97 that between 30 and 40% of its
submitted AV3M maintenance data were lost. Additionally, CNAP has noted
significant inconsistencies in different databases designed to report similar and
often matching information. One example illustrated in Figure 4.3 shows
discrepancies between the number of aircraft assigned to CNAP as reported
under the Aircraft Inventory Reporting System (AIRS), the TYCOM
Readiness Management System (TRMS) and Naval Maintenance Support
Office database (NAMSO).
Another data integrity issue cited is the number of flight hours reported. In FY 97
the AV3M system reported over 160,000 flight hours less than were reported by squadron
Budget OPTAR Reports [Ref. 48].
To conclude, while the financial impact of these reporting discrepancies is not
known, it can be said that any inconsistency revealed during budget review is likely to
become a "target of opportunity" and result in a corresponding budget mark, further
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undermining efforts to properly fund the FHP.



















Figure 4.3. Aircraft Inventory Reporting Discrepancies [Ref. 47]
3. Solution
Accurate readiness and ILS reporting is critical to successful FHP budgeting and
Fleet support. A clear and comprehensive reporting system and metrics must link
readiness goals, while accurately documenting and evaluating overall logistics health.
The solution currently in work is to development of a common reporting metrics system
called "NALCOMIS Optimized". When fully developed and implemented, this system
will integrate all current metrics into a single readiness/ILS reporting metric. This will
provide leadership at all levels, real-time, all encompassing, end-to-end insight into both
an operating unit combat readiness, as well as, overall ILS effectiveness. The next factor
that has caused FHP underfunding is the Logistics Engineering Change Proposals
(LECPs).
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D. LOGISTICS ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSAL (LECP)
The purpose of the LECP program is to provide technologically superior Aviation
Depot Level Repairables (AVDLRs) components to the Fleet and reduce total component
life cycle support costs. The ultimate goal is to produce lower overall costs by increasing
the reliability of AVDLRs and thereby reducing failure rates and parts consumption. The
LECP program is managed by the Naval Inventory Control Point Philadelphia (NAVIC-
P) under the "Buy Our Spares Smart" (BOSS III) concept and funded by the O&M, N
appropriation through the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF). The program is
successful and, to date, has resulted in over $230M invested and a savings to the FHP of
$362M [Ref. 46:p. 37]. The way the program works is to systematically screen AVDLR
components with poor reliability and that exhibit potential depot repair costs savings
using the NAVICP Opportunity Index (01) Ranking Concept for aviation platforms. The
01 measures AVDLR reliability by; Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), the number of
failed components repaired at the depot level, and the costs per depot repair. A number
of older AVDLRs have been replaced with newer and more reliable components resulting
in higher Fleet readiness and lower support costs. The problem with the LECP program
is that the initial cost of the new AVDLR is usually more than the AVDLR replaced. To
realize the reliability and savings of new AVDLRs, the FHP must first buy and install the
new higher priced AVDLR. However, the purchase of the new AVDLR is contingent
upon the Fleet having the FHP resources to buy it. Under the current budget process,
adequate resources are not provided to the FHP to finance the buy-out of the higher
priced, improved AVDLRs from the NWCF. Moreover, the budget process takes these
projected LECP dollar savings up-front as a reduction to the AVDLR portion of the FHP
budget. Since the FHP does not have the resources to buy and install the LECP, there are
two outcomes: 1) the AVDLR components are not installed and LECP costs savings and
reliability improvements cannot be actualized and, 2) the Fleet buys the AVDLRs at the
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expense of other FHP costs and consequently is underfunded by that amount [Ref. 46:p.
37].
One example that illustrates this dilemma for CNAP is the Replacement Inertial
Navigation Unit (RINU) for the P-3C and C-130 aircraft. (The RINU was developed
under the LECP program and designed to replace the outdated and unreliable LTN-72, a
top P-3 AVDLR readiness degrader.) The RINU has a projected Mean Time Between
Failure (MTBF) of 4500 hours while the LTN-72 is currently less than 200 hours and
costs the Fleet over $9M in annual repairs [Ref. 49]. This is an important aircraft
upgrade, yet under the current RINU Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), the buy out (to
receive this improved AVDLR) is projected to cost the CNAP FHP approximately
$10.5M between FY00 and FY01, as displayed in Table 4.2:
COMPONENT RINU LTN-72
Technology 1990 Ring Laser 1960s Electro-Mechanical
MTBF 4,500 hrs. - 9,000 hrs. 200 hrs
Annual Repair
Costs




Warranty 15 yrs. 6 mos.
Pricing:
FLEET BUY OUT PRICE CNAP P-3C NO. RINU TOTAL
$70,000 ea. 75 aircraft 2 units per aircraft $10.5M
Table 4.2. RINU LECP [Ref. 50]
The LECP program provides significant reliability improvements to aircraft
AVDLRs, reduces FHP costs and improves aircraft readiness. However, as explained in
Chapter III, since there is no direct funding budgeted for the LECP program and it is
difficult to confirm proposed cost savings from improved component reliability,
underfunding may occur in the current year's FHP.
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The AMSR working group has proposed several steps to correct the LECP
problem. First, that Fleet SORTS reports include an evaluation of all pertinent ILS
elements, such as equipment availability and current support deficiencies. Second,
NAVAIR's Assistant Program Managers for Logistics (APMLs) establish "trigger
mechanisms" to identify top readiness degraders as a means to both evaluate and correct
ILS shortfalls. Lastly, the CNO (N-88) should submit budget inputs for LECPs under the
procurement appropriation submission. The proposed budget would include the funds to
pay the full price of the initial component installation, any required "plane-side" spares
and wholesale system inventory requirements. [Ref. 46:p.37] The authors support the
AMSR group's solution to this problem as a method to realize the improved efficiencies
potentially gained under the LECP program and as a means to minimize CNAP FHP
underfunding. The next topic presented is aircraft configuration management and its
affect on the FHP.
E. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
Aircraft configuration management has also contributed to significant FHP
underfunding in a manner similar to the LECP program. This section, explains how the
aircraft configuration management process works and provides two specific examples of
how it can contribute to underfunding at CNAP.
The purpose of aircraft configuration management is to provide a systematic
means of documenting and controlling the engineering design of weapons systems, so
that readiness, safety, logistics support and life cycle costs are integrated. Configuration
management for all systems including aircraft, is regulated by DoD Regulation 5000.2R.
It is a management process that facilitates the upgrade of aircraft (and other systems) for
improved performance, reliability, maintainability, service life extension, reduced support
and operating costs, as well as, the means to correct system defects. The responsibility
for aircraft configuration management resides with the respective aircraft Naval Aviation
Program Managers (PMs) at Commander Naval Air Systems Command
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(COMNAVAIRSYSCOM or NAVAIR). For Naval Aviation, configuration management
has become increasingly important given the fact that the average life span for Navy
aircraft is 30 years. Therefore, upgrades to aircraft systems are required to continue
operations. These upgrades are controlled by configuration management and
implemented through what is known as the Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) process.
The ECP process is the means by which system upgrades are proposed, contracted
and finally installed within the aircraft. When ECPs are approved (depending on the
scope of the upgrade), they are issued as a directive to the Fleet called a Technical
Directive (TD). A TD is a document authorized and issued by NAVAIR which provides
technical information to properly inspect or alter the configuration of aircraft, engines,
systems, or equipment, subsequent to establishment of each respective aircraft baseline
configuration. TDs provide detailed instructions on how to install the ECP and provide a
record (in the aircraft and/or component logbook) of the upgrade. Incorporating ECPs
into aircraft frequently calls for the installation of new parts. Under the current NAVAIR
policy (NAVAIR Publication 00-25-300), TD parts kits that cost over $1000 per
squadron and take more than eight manhours to install, are funded by NAVAIR. TD kits
costing less than $1000 are ordered at the squadron level and paid for using FHP funds
under the AOM/OFC-50 account. However, in recent years, this policy has not been
closely followed because of limited resources and the PMs perception that ECPs are must
have "safety of flight" improvements. Therefore, numerous TDs costing more than the
$1000 threshold are issued to the Fleet. Since Fleet unit commanders are not responsible
for the expense management of OFC-50 funds and because TDs often do provide
measurable aircraft improvements, the squadrons order and install the TD kits. [Ref. 51]
One example that illustrates the financial impact on the CNAP FHP budget is
demonstrated by a TD issued for the Navy SH-60 helicopter. This TD, AFB 0091:
"Engine White Harness, Inspection & Replacement", is applicable to both the SH-60B
and F series. As shown in Table 4.3, CNAP squadrons ordered 132 TD kits for a total
cost of over $31 IK between FY 96-97:
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SH-60 AFB 0091: "Engine White Harness, Inspection & Replacement"
T/M/S NIIN QTY ORDER UNIT PRICE TOTAL COST
SH-60B 01-367-3066 46 $2,080 $ 95,640
SH-60B 01-367-3067 49 $2,129 $104,103
SH-60F 01-367-3066 37 $3,014 $111,518
$311,261
Table 4.3. SH-60 AFB 0091 [Ref. 52]
The SH-60 TD illustrates one example of this problem. Given that CNAP
operates over 1 600 T/M/S aircraft, the cost to implement TDs for all CNAP aircraft could
easily represent several million dollars in any given FHP execution year and countless
squadron man hours. These are additional costs not provided in the FHP budget or
squadron manning authorizations.
Another problem with aircraft configuration management is the increased logistics
support costs brought on by having multiple groups or lots of aircraft within the same Air
Wing. One example cited by the AMSR was an East Coast Air Wing that deployed with
three different squadrons of F/A-18s; lot 10, lot 16 and lot 18 aircraft. Among these lots
of F/A-18s, are significant avionics (APG-65 vs. APG-73 radar) and engine (F404-GE-
400 vs. F404-GE-402) configuration differences and logistics support requirements.
Consequently, multiple aircraft configurations result in increased AVDLR expenditures,
increased spares requirements, dissimilar support equipment and increased training
particularly at the intermediate maintenance level. While this example notes the problem
for a CNAL activity, similar examples also exist in CNAP Air Wings.
There are two areas in aircraft configuration management that require solutions.
The first, is the length of time it takes to approve ECPs and, the second, is the source of
funding for ECPs. Historically, mixed aircraft configurations have been exacerbated by
the length of time it takes ECPs to be approved by NAVAIR. One recent review revealed
that the average time for complete incorporation of TDs was eight years, and some took
14 years. For many T/M/S aircraft, this results in duplicate and expensive Integrated
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Logistics Support (ILS) elements remaining in place for years to support the variety of
aircraft configurations. The AMSR group has concluded that to solve this problem, a
"closed-loop" configuration control process be established at NAVAIR. Such a system
would implement a comprehensive database to oversee the integration of engineering and
logistics elements and provide program mangers with the ability to quickly assess the
value of ECPs against the logistics support costs. [Ref. 46:p. 31]
The solution to fix aircraft configuration management is to provide a steady and
reliable stream of financial resources. Similar to the solution for LECPs, ECPs should
receive funding through the APN-6 procurement appropriation account. Furthermore,
open communication between NAVAIR, the FHP Resource Sponsor and the Fleet is also
needed to ensure consistent budgeting and sponsorship via the POM process for these
logistics improvement programs. Without a concerted effort to fund aircraft
improvements, lack of funding for ECPs will continue to cause underfunding of Air Type
Commander FHP budgets. The next section covers the most dynamic cost component of
the FHP. AVDLRs.
F. AVIATION DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLE (AVDLR): ILS, RELIABILITY
AND PRICING
Of the three cost categories in the OP-20, AVDLRs are indisputably the most
significant source of ongoing underfunding and budget variability for the FHP and
CNAP. This section analyzes the AVDLR cost component and explains how it
contributes to CNAP FHP underfunding, and highlights ongoing efforts to minimize the
rising cost of AVDLRs. This comprehensive section is divided into seven parts. The first
section begins with an explanation of AVDLRs. Section two highlights the trend of
rising AVDLR costs and discusses the Aviation Maintenance Supply Readiness (AMSR)
group and their efforts related to AVDLRs. Section three explains logistics concepts and
Naval Aviation maintenance/logistics support. Discussions on diminishing "plane-side"
support for AVDLRs, AVDLR ILS deficiencies, component reliability, and AVDLR
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pricing are covered in sections four through six. Finally, section seven examines some of
the effects ofAVDLR underfunding for CNAP.
1. Definition of AVDLRs
AVDLRs are aircraft or aviation related components that can be economically
restored to a useable condition through regular repair procedures when they become
unserviceable. AVDLRs are typically high cost items, which have long procurement
lead-times. The overall management of AVDLRs is the responsibility of the Naval
Inventory Control Point Philadelphia (NAVICP-P). This agency determines and manages
inventory levels for all AVDLRs, coordinates the depot repair and procurement of
AVDLRs, and forecasts the Fleet's demand for AVDLRs use.
Repair of AVDLRs is performed at all three levels of aircraft maintenance -
organizational, intermediate or depot. However, most AVDLR repairs occur at the
intermediate maintenance level (I-level) or at a DoD depot and/or commercial facilities.
To meet operational commitments and maintain readiness levels, squadrons must be able
to replace failed AVDLRs quickly. Failed AVDLRs are removed from the aircraft and
swapped for identical AVDLR components issued from the supporting facilitie's
AVDLR spare allowance pool. The failed AVDLRs are then sent directly to the I-level
where they are repaired and returned to the local supply spare allowance pool. If an
AVDLR cannot be repaired at the I-level, it is declared "Beyond Capability of
Maintenance" (BCM) and shipped to a depot repair facility. A BCM action can occur
when the I-level is not authorized to repair the component or when the I-level is not
capable of accomplishing the repair because of lack of equipment, facilities, technical
skills, parts, or when a backlog precludes repair within established time limits. Once at
the depot, the AVDLR is repaired and returned to the supply system for issue to the Fleet
or it is determined beyond economical repair and disposed.
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a. Rising A VDLR Costs and the Aviation Maintenance & Supply
Readiness (AMSR) Working Group
By early 1998, it became clear to Navy leadership that action had to be
taken to curb the rapidly growing costs of the FHP program. As shown by Figure 4.4, in
seven of the last eight years, AVDLR costs have exceeded the budgeted AVDLR cost per
hour.
AVDLR CPH vs. FHP
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Figure 4.4. AVDLR CPH vs. FHP [Ref. 45]
In FY 98, the Navy spent nearly S3.5B to execute the FHP. Of that total,
over $1.5B was directly attributable to AVDLRs and spare parts needed to support them.
The cost of AVDLRs is growing at an average annual rate of 7.5%. Additionally, the top
50 most expensive AVDLRs (called "cost drivers"), represented less than 5% of the total
demand but more than 20% of the cost for all AVDLRs. Yet, perhaps most alarming was
the feedback from the Fleet regarding the impact of rising AVDLR costs. While the Fleet
complained bitterly about AVDLRs and associated problems including Fleet
cannibalization, extended aircraft down-time and extensive pre-deployment "robbing" of
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shore-based squadrons, none of the Naval Aviation readiness reporting indicators
supported these claims. Therefore, at the direction of the CNO, a study of this
"dichotomy" was ordered and a joint CINCPACTFLT, CINCLANTFLT and
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM "Aviation Maintenance Supply Readiness (Study) Group"
(AMSR) was formed. The group's charter is the following:
• Review squadron reporting Maintenance/Supply readiness shortfalls
• Examine FHP budget methodology
• Examine the migration ofAVDLR support from O-level to D-level
• Assess I-level maintenance readiness to determine if resources are in place to
support AVDLR maintenance
• Examine AVDLR issues and recommend specific actions to reduce aviation
maintenance and supply costs, increase readiness and provide "systemic
improvements" to the Naval Aviation support structure [Ref. 46 :p. iv].
The AMSR work has been substantial during the past year. They have
pinpointed a number of factors which contribute to the increasing costs of AVDLRs. In
the latter half of this chapter, some of these factors are examined to determine the effects
of FHP underfunding. The next section introduces logistics concepts and the Naval
Aviation Maintenance and Supply logistics support methods.
2. Logistics Concepts and Naval Aviation Maintenance & Logistics Support
Many of the allegations and systemic problems that account for the rising costs of
AVDLRs components are embedded in shortcomings of current logistics and support
practices used by the Navy. Therefore, this section begins with an introduction to
logistics concepts and an overview of how logistics support is integrated into the Navy
maintenance and supply support system. This will help to provide an understanding of a
number ofAVDLR issues brought out by the AMSR.
a. Logistics Concepts
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What is logistics? In the broadest sense, logistics provides support to
operate and maintain a system. A system is comprised of elements that include a
combination of materiels, equipment, software, facilities, data services, and personnel.
When these elements are properly integrated, the system performs as a smooth operating
self-sufficient entity in the environment for which it was designed throughout it's planned
life-cycle. A system can range from a fleet of ships to an individual component such as a
Trailing Edge Flap Actuator mounted on an F/A-18 aircraft. Inherent within the context
of a system is the basic function of logistics, that is to provide material distribution and
maintenance and support of the system throughout its entire life-cycle. Thus, logistics is
the means by which a system is supported. The principal "logistics system support




2) Supply support (spare/repair parts)
3) Test and support equipment
4) Personnel training and training support
5) Manpower and personnel
6) Facilities
7) Transportation and materiel handling
8) Computer information systems
9) Data
10) Design interface
Failure to address these system support elements "up front" during design and
development will guarantee disastrous results. As noted by one logistics expert:
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The logistics infrastructure must be initially planned and integrated into
the overall system development process to assure an optimum balance
between the prime equipment and its related support. This balance
considers the performance characteristics of the system, the input
resources required, the effectiveness of the system, and the ultimate life-
cycle cost effectiveness. [Ref. 53:p.2]
The strategy to integrate and balance system effectiveness is best
represented by the Systems Cost Effectiveness Diagram, (see Figure 4.5). Developing a
cost-effective system within the constraints of operational and maintenance requirements
is the objective. This figure represents the separate design and logistics factors and the











• Research and Development
Cost
• Investment Cost
• Operation & Maintenance
Cost










Design Attributes Logistic Support Elements
_i
Functional Design Maintenance Planning
Reliability Test & Support Equipment
Maintainability Supply Support





Figure 4.5. System Cost Effective Diagram [Ref. 53:p. 24]
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These system cost effective logistics principles provide the foundation for
the Naval Aviation maintenance and supply logistics support infrastructure. Therefore,
the ability of the Navy logistics infrastructure to meet aviation systems support goals is
critically dependent upon the following three points:
• Identification and documentation of the system's total life-cycle support
requirements
• Preparation of a comprehensive plan to meet the identified life-cycle
requirements
• Development, acquisition and up-front deployment of reliable and quality
support resources.
In the Navy, the responsibility to achieve these logistics goals belongs to
the Weapon Systems Program Manager (PM), whose job is to oversee the design.
development and acquisition of the weapons system. PMs achieve these goals by a
process of ensuring integration of the logistics system support elements balanced with the
life-cycle cost (as depicted in Figure 4.5). This evaluation process is called "life-cycle
trade-off studies. The objective of trade-off studies is to produce a series of alternative
support solutions for the system life-cycle support requirement. Trade-off studies are
achieved by comparing the costs of on-site repair with a small spares inventory, versus
the cost of off-site repair with a larger on-hand spares inventory. Once an alternative
•support solution is selected, a preferred support package is developed and deployed.
This process of optimizing the total support package of all logistics system support
elements is called "Integrated Logistics Support" (ILS). ILS is a management function
that provides initial planning, funding, and controls to ensure a system will perform as
designed and can be effectively supported throughout its life-cycle [Ref 46:p. 2]. To
achieve the most cost and readiness effective ILS, the Navy employs a three level
maintenance concept of; organizational (O-level), intermediate (I-level) and depot (D-
level) maintenance.
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The functions performed at each maintenance level are based upon support
policies, logistics support requirements and effectiveness factors such as system
reliability, maintainability and the cost of personnel. Perhaps the most significant
effectiveness factors are reliability and maintainability. Therefore a brief explanation is
provided:
1) Reliability is the probability that a system will operate in a given period of
time when used under specified operating conditions. Reliability is
commonly expressed as: - Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF).
2) Maintainability refers to the inherent system design characteristics and the
ability of a system to be maintained. Its elements include ease of use,
accuracy, safety, and economy in performance of maintenance actions.
Maintainability is also defined as a characteristic in design it is expressed by
frequency factors. The most common frequency factors are:
• MTBM: mean time between both corrective and preventative
maintenance.
• MTBR: Mean time between replacement of an item.
• Met: mean corrective (all unscheduled maintenance actions resulting from
a system failure) maintenance time.
• Mpt: mean preventative (all scheduled maintenance actions performed to
retain system performance) maintenance time.
During ILS planning stages. Navy logistics managers working with the
PMs conduct trade-off studies to determine the proper level of maintenance and support
designated by the weapon systems "Source. Maintenance and Recoverability"' (SM&R)
code. The purpose of constructing an SM&R code is to identify the repair location and
establish an appropriate system of support logistics elements at the repair site (i.e.,
spare/repair part types, quantities, test and support equipment, manning levels and skill).
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The primary method to determine the SM&R codes is through a "Logistics Support
Analysis" (LSA). The LSA is an iterative analytical process to identify and evaluate the
support requirements in the system design process. The LSA uses several economic
statistical models. One common model is called a Level of Repair Analysis (LORA).
The LORA identifies and evaluates a system's support requirements and recommends a
least-costs maintenance and supply support structure for the specific system under study.
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Studying logistics concepts, provides a clearer understanding of the
complexities and decisions that must be made in selecting the appropriate level of
logistics support elements for a system. To achieve these optimal levels of a weapon
systems life-cycle support, a number of critical elements must be balanced to meet both
mission readiness requirements while at the same time staying within limited resource
funding. Clearly this is not an easy task. When this process is done properly, a robust
support structure is created and readiness as well as logistics objectives are equally
satisfied.
b. Naval Aviation Maintenance & Logistics Support
After a weapon system is deployed, the ILS resources are integrated in the
field under the guidance of the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP)
OPNAVINST 4790.2G. The NAMP provides an integrated system for performing
aeronautical equipment maintenance and related support functions. It was established by
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the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and implemented by the Chief, Bureau of
Aeronautics, on 26 October 1959. The NAMP objective is, "to meet and exceed aviation
readiness and safety standards established by the CNO" [Ref. 10]. This is accomplished
by optimizing the use of manpower, materiel, facilities and financial resources. The
methodology for meeting the objective is "continuous process improvement". The NAMP
uses a three level maintenance concept. Organizational, Intermediate and Depot. This
maintenance concept is discussed next.
The Organizational Level Maintenance (O-level) is usually performed by
an operating unit (squadron) on a day-to-day basis in support of operations. The O-level
maintenance mission is to maintain assigned aircraft and aeronautical equipment in a full
mission capable status while continually improving the local maintenance process. While
O-level maintenance may be done by I-level or D-level activities, O-level maintenance is
usually accomplished by maintenance personnel assigned to aircraft reporting custodians
(i.e. Squadron). O-level maintenance functions include:
• Aircraft handling, servicing, weapons loading, and materiel condition
inspections
• On-aircraft preventative and corrective maintenance (This includes on-
equipment repair, removal, and replacement of defective components)
• Installing aircraft Technical Directives
• Record keeping and reports preparation
Intermediate Level Maintenance facilities (I-level), called Aircraft
Intermediate Maintenance Departments (AIMDs) or Marine Corp Aviation Logistics
Squadrons (MALs), perform services in direct support of the local O-level activities. I-
level activities are co-located with the squadrons at either an air station or air capable ship
- CV or LPH/LHA. The I-level maintenance mission is to enhance and sustain the
combat readiness and mission capability of supported activities by providing quality and
timely materiel support at the nearest location with the lowest practical resource
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expenditure. I-level maintenance consists of both on-aircraft and off-aircraft support
functions including:
Repair defective AVDLR components and Support Equipment
Calibrate designated equipment
Process components from stricken aircraft
Provide technical assistance to O-level units
Install Technical Directives
Manufacture selected aeronautical components, liquids, and gases
Performance limited on-aircraft maintenance
Annualize aircraft engine and gearbox oil contamination
Depot Level Maintenance (D-level) is performed at naval aviation
industrial establishments to ensure continued flying integrity of airframes and flight
systems. D-level maintenance is also performed on material requiring major overhaul or
rebuilding of parts, assemblies, subassemblies, and end items, which do not require
frequent repair. Much of the depot's repair efforts are batch processed. Since overhead
costs are expensive due to "state-of-the-art" industrial equipment, batch processing helps
the depot achieve greater component repair efficiency. D-level maintenance supports O-
level and I-level maintenance by providing engineering assistance and performing
maintenance beyond O & I Level capabilities. Finally, the D-level maintenance functions
include: [Ref. 10]
• Rework of aircraft
• Rework and repair of engines, components, and Support Equipment
• Calibration of test equipment and aircraft components
• Installation of Technical Directives
• Modification of aircraft, engines, and SE
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• Manufacture or modification of parts or kits
• Technical and engineering assistance by depot field teams
The remaining AVDLR sections will discuss three specific factors that
have directly contributed to the rapid cost growth experienced in AVDLRs. These three
factors are ''Decreasing Plane-side Support of AVDLRs, "AVDLR ILS Deficiencies and
Component Reliability" and "AVDLR Pricing".
3. Decreasing "Plane-side" Support ofAVDLRs
One aviation readiness concern is the decreasing "plane-side" logistics support for
AVLDRs. Decreasing plane-side support is the movement of repair capability from the
air station to the depot, and the absence of readily available spare parts. The result has
been lengthy aircraft "down-times", decreased readiness and a substantial impact on
CNAP's FHP budget. This section will examine this problem and provide an example
that illustrates its magnitude.
Historically, 75% of all AVDLRs have been supported by the I-level maintenance
activity. However, increasingly more AVDLRs are not repaired by the AIMD or MALS
as a new cost-savings maintenance philosophy is being pursued. This trend has been
particularly evident for the F/A-18 C/D and F-14D aircraft. This philosophy is called "O
to D" (Organizational to Depot) or "O to OEM" (Organizational to Original Equipment
Manufacturer). The O to D concept is intended to reduce AVDLR logistics costs by
removing the operating expenses associated with the I-level repair effort yet retain
appropriate levels of "plane-side" support by procuring and stocking additional spare
AVDLRs at the air station or CV. However, there are two critical elements that must
occur for the O-D support philosophy to be successful: 1) additional spare AVDLRs must
be procured, and 2) component reliability must be thoroughly evaluated in order to
accurately forecast AVDLR spares allowance levels. These two critical elements have not
been achieved in recently introduced AVDLR components.
AVDLR spares procurement element. Spare AVDLRs are procured through the
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Aircraft Procurement Navy - 6 (APN-6) outfitting account. Over the past five years, the
APN-6 account has been consistently underfunded. For example, in FY 98 the APN-6
outfitting account was underfunded by $183M. To cope with this shortfall, NAVICP has
had to defer the initial AVDLR spares outfitting for F/A-18 and F-14D shore based
support activities since November 97. [Ref. 46:p. 22]
The A VDLR reliability element. The AVDLR reliability element also impacts the
O-D support concept. As discussed in the previous sections, logistics support requires
thorough trade-off analyses be conducted to determine adequate life-cycle system
support. To achieve this, PMs conduct LORAs to ensure that the appropriate logistics
standards are established and met. During the LORA, effectiveness factors are evaluated
to determine if the component under study is suitable for the O-D support concept. While
it is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine the quality of these LORAs, current
Fleet input anecdotally suggests that significant inadequacies in the LORA process exist
and warrant additional research. One example that illustrates the burden of decreasing
plane-side support for AVDLRs is the ARC-210 Radio.
Officially known as the AN/ARC-210(V) VHF/UHF/ECCM/SATCOM/ DATA
LINK Airborne Communications System, the "ARC-210 radio" is a jam-resistant two-
way voice and data communication link for the tactical aircraft environment. It features
state-of-the-art design, surface-mounted technology, and modular construction. The
ARC-210 system is the current Navy V/UHF standard for airborne communications
systems and is being installed in all Navy, Marine, Air Force and Army tactical aircraft
including, the F/A-18, V-22, AH-1W, MH-53, CH-46, B-1B, B-52, and UH-60.
The maintenance logistics plan for the ARC-210 was developed and initially
fielded using the O, I and D maintenance support concept. O-level maintenance for the
ARC-210 involves replacement of the entire radio, often called a Line Replaceable Unit
(LRU) or more commonly referred to as Weapons Replaceable Assembly (WRA). Radio
failures at the O-level are determined onboard the aircraft by using built-in test (BIT)
software contained within the receiver transmitter. No external test equipment is used.
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The BIT provides a "Go/No-Go" operational test of the ARC-210 and fault isolates to
both the radio (WRA) and circuit card assembly, called a Shop Repairable Assembly
(SRA). The I-level maintenance performs testing and diagnosis of failed radios using
both the TS-4340 Radio Set Test Set, SG-1330 1553 Signal Generator Special Purpose
Test Set and common general purpose test equipment. Finally, the Depot maintenance
effort performs "piece-part" repair of WRAs and SRAs that are beyond the maintenance
capabilities of the O-level and/or I-level activities. The Depot piece-part repair is done at
the primary contractor's (Rockwell-Collins) facility. [Ref. 54]
The current depot repair cost for the ARC-210 is $640 per radio. This is the price
paid under the current manufacture's warranty period for the radio. This warranty period
expires in FY 2000. Post-warranty depot repair prices are being negotiated and,
according to one source, it is estimated that the new depot repair price will be
approximately $2000 per unit. [Ref. 55]
One of the first Navy aircraft to receive the ARC-210 was the F/A-18C (lot 16).
To support these aircraft, ARC-210 radio I-level test equipment was procured and
installed at a number of Navy and Marine I-level facilities. Shortly after procuring and
installing this I-level test equipment, ARC-210 logistics managers decided to drop the I-
level support. Instead, a direct O to D maintenance support policy for the radio was
chosen. This policy was adopted as a cost-savings measure to reduce logistics support
costs and because high reliability (MTBF) estimates for the radio suggested little need for
I-level support. However, I-level activities that had received ARC-210 test equipment
before the maintenance policy change were authorized to continue ARC-2 1 repair.
Failures for the ARC-210 have been higher than expected and a number of radios
(where I-level was not available) have been sent to the depot (Rockwell-Collins) for
repair. Feedback from the depot activities has indicated that many of the "failures" were
a result of easily fixed aircrew operating errors and not actual radio component failures.
Nevertheless, each time the radio is sent to the depot activity the funds to repair it are
paid from the respective Air Type Commander's FHP budget. In an effort to curb
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expenses and minimize the readiness impact of the radios, CNAP logistics managers
conducted a study of the radio ILS. In this study they discovered that many of the I-level
activities, which had the test equipment, were able to correct these operator problems and
return the ARC-210 to the squadrons thereby avoiding the $640 AVDLR depot level
repair charge. To quantify the impact of this repair charge (as a result of not having
sufficient I-level repair capability), the authors researched the number of repair actions
for FY 97-98 performed by CNAP I-level (Navy and Marine) activities. The results of
this research (see Table 4.4) show that of the 259 radios processed by CNAP I-level
activities, 47% were either repaired or found to have "no defect". Therefore, by having I-
level support for these radios, CNAP was able to save $78K in AVDLR repair costs.
NO. RADIOS
PROCESSED
NO. REPAIRED OR "NO
DEFECT" DISCOVERED
NO. NOT REPAIRED
USN 115 ea. 78 37
USMC 144 ea. 44 100
Total 259 ea. 122 Cost savings to FHP $78,080 137 Cost $87,680
Table 4.4. ARC-210 Radio Repair Actions (CNAP) [Ref. 52]
While the AVDLR savings shown above are relatively small when compared to
CNAP's overall FHP budget, the point worth noting is that the shifting AVDRL repair
from the I-level to the depot in fact imposes an unplanned financial cost to the FHP
budget and a decrease in Fleet readiness. Moreover, with increasingly more aircraft being
supported by an O to D maintenance philosophy, these costs are becoming significantly
more substantial and will continue to impact CNAP's FHP budget. In summary, when the
appropriate plane-side maintenance and spares support are not provided, decreased
readiness, aircraft cannibalization and increased AVDLR BCM costs will result. If this
problem is to be solved, the APN-6 spares funding account must be sufficiently resourced
and comprehensive LORAs must be conducted. Otherwise, affordable and optimal
readiness repair and logistics support objectives will not be realized.
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4. AVDLR ILS Deficiencies and Component Reliability
Another AVDLR factor that causes FHP underfunding for CNAP is inadequate
AVDLR ILS support and AVDLR parts reliability. This section explains how ILS
deficiencies occur and provides examples of how this impacts the FHP budget.
Much of the AMSR working group research has been focused on the decreasing
logistics support for AVDLRs and the increasing rate in which AVDLRs are "BCM'd"
from the Fleet to the depots. The AMSR group has noted that in many cases the ILS for
AVDLRs is "lost" once the systems are fielded or that the ILS for some AVDLRs is
missing or "imbalanced" when aircraft systems are initially deployed. This inadequate
ILS results in materiel shortages, fewer mission capable aircraft and increased AVDLR
expenditures. The AMSR found numerous examples of newly fielded systems that
reached "Initial Operating Capability" (IOC) without adequate ILS. The consequences
were, extended system down-time, and low operational availability that resulted in
cannibalization and increased AVDLR repair costs to the Fleet. One continued source
driving AVDLR ILS deficiencies has been the problem of not achieving initial
engineering estimates for system reliability (MTBF). As explained earlier, the logistics
support plan is based upon reliability estimates for each component. When these
reliability estimates are not achieved, inadequate logistics support results. Furthermore,
these lower reliability figures are not updated into the AVDLR ILS elements as a means
to provide additional support in lieu of decreased reliability. To demonstrate the cost
impact of poor AVDLR reliability, and MTBF rates; three top CNAP Fleet readiness
degraders were researched: the AV-8B main landing gear (MLG), the F/A-18 MLG, and
the P-3 propeller. As shown in Table 4.5, the actual MTBF for these components is far
less than planned. As a result, CNAP I-level activities have had to BCM the number of
















AV-8B MLG 640 hrs 265 hrs 41.4% 36 FY97-98 $954,030
F/A-18MLG 1650 hrs 456 hrs 27.6% 110FY96-98 $1,380,760
P-3 Propeller 1075 hrs 669 hrs 62.2% 122FY96-98 $7,471,380
$9,809,170
Table 4.5. Planned vs. Actual MTBF [Ref. 46, 52, 56)
To further illustrate the finacial impact of poor AVDLR component reliability,
two additional examples are provided, the F/A-18 engine and the F/A-18 radar. Since the
initial deployment of the F/A-18, many of aircraft's F-404 engine components have
experienced a significantly shorter operating service life (MTBF) than was engineered
and implemented into the ILS package. Four of the engine's six modules have
experienced reliability reductions of 40% [Ref. 46:p.25]. As a result of low F-404 engine
MTBF, F/A-18 aircraft readiness has decreased significantly, and at times, the F/A-18
engine bare-firewall count has totaled over 120 engines within CNAP's assigned F/A-
18's. Furthermore, this decrease in reliability has imparted large financial costs to
CNAP's FHP. One recent example that illustrates the magnitude of this cost to the FHP,
has been the F404-GE-400 Power Plants Bulletin 90. PPB 90 is being implemented to
repair premature engine failures caused by the High Pressure Turbine (HPT) Forward
Cooling Plates (FCP). Initial NAVAIR estimates have projected 155 engines will require
this repair at the I-level. Of these 155 engines, 54 belong to CNAP activities. The cost to
repair each engine will be $163,000. Hence, the total impact of this repair cost to
CNAP's FHP is $8,802,000 ($163,000 per engine * 54 engines). Moreover, the recovery
period to repair the defective engines is estimated at 15 months [Ref. 57]. Clearly,
unplanned failures of this magnitude result in decreased F/A-18 aircraft readiness and
degradation to the FHP budget.
The last example to illustrate ILS deficiencies is the F/A-18 APG-73 radar. The
APG-73 radar replaced the APG-65 radar beginning with delivery of F/A-18C lot 16
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aircraft in 1996. Sufficient ILS for this radar was not put in place prior to the initial
delivery' and has continued to lag behind the repair requirements needed to support the
radar system in the Fleet. The radar ILS has been particularly deficient at the I-level
supporting activities. The primary I-level test bench designed to repair the radar is the
Consolidated Automatic Support System (CASS). Upon initial delivery of new F/A-18s
with the APG-73 radar, the CASS test bench and supporting Test Program Sets (TPS) to
troubleshoot and repair the radar WRAs and circuit card SRAs was still under
development and not available to the I-level. While spare APG-73 SRAs were purchased
to support I-level repair of the WRAs, they were effectively useless since the CASS test
bench and associated TPS needed to trouble-shoot the WRAs were still under
development. As a result, stopgap repair measures were put in place. These measures
consisted of contract repair efforts provided by the Aviation Repair Facility (ARF), a
NAVAIR funded activity, at the two primary F/A-18 air stations, NAS Lemoore, and
NAS Cecil Field. While the total cost of the ARF's operations to repair the APG-73 is
unknown, this begs the question as to what other Naval Aviation Program(s) received
funding offsets to pay for the ARF's operations and the principle ILS deficiencies of the
radar. It also stands to reason that the lack of sufficient ILS for the APG-73 radar
continues to drive extensive BCM actions and places further burdens upon CNAP's FHP.
ILS and component reliability shortcomings for both mature and new AVDLR
systems have been a principal underlying cause of poor aircraft readiness and FHP
underfunding. The ILS system must be "kept in balance" by conducting periodic
reliability updates and assessments that include Fleet feedback of ILS effectiveness. One
proposal by the AMSR is to implement an AVDLR component serial number tracking
system. Under this concept all AVDLRs, not just life limited components, would be
tracked for their MTBF to provide a quantitative measure of reliability and as a means to
identify likely candidates for reliability improvements [Ref 46:p. 54]. To conclude,
component reliability improvement processes and a continued emphasis placed on quality
ILS development and effectiveness once the system is fielded, will result in higher
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weapon system operational availability, provide for better use of maintenance resources
and minimize FHP budget shortages.
5. AVDLR Pricing Factors
As noted earlier. AVDLRs make up over half the total FHP costs and they have
been increasing since 1991. Furthermore, according to the AMSR's research, the Top 50
AVDLR cost drivers make up a disproportionate amount of the total AVDLR costs
charged to the Fleet [ref. 46 :p. 54]. Studies support this trend and show that AVDLR
costs, as a percent of the FHP, have risen 44.29% in FY 92 to 51 .38% in FY 97, despite a
decreasing number of flight hours flown. Although part of the increase in cost is due to
poor reliability and deficient AVDLR ILS, the complete explanation for this trend is not
well understood. In an effort to understand the rising costs of AVDLRs, a number of
extensive studies have been conducted by the AMSR, and the Naval Center for Cost
Analysis (NCCA). There is an ongoing effort by the Navy Audit Service as well.
Despite these research efforts, the most fundamental unanswered question remains: Why
are the prices ofAVDLRs going up?
Therefore, the purpose of this section is twofold. First, to provide an explanation
of how AVDLR prices are formulated and second, to focus on some of the principle
factors that cause AVDLR price variability and price increases. This section begins with
AVDLR pricing methodology.
a. A VDLR Price Formulation
The manner in which AVDLR prices are calculated is perhaps one of most
complex processes in Navy logistics and supply management. Pricing AVDLRs involves
the work of dozens of DoD and DoN activities, countless inputs and variables, and is
subjected to many of the same budget complexities and perturbations described in
Chapter III. With this in mind, it is not surprising that AVDLR pricing methodology is
neither well understood nor clearly articulated by any one person within "the business".
Furthermore, there is no single element or function resident in the AVDLR pricing
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process that can readily account for the increasing trend in AVDLR prices. The fact
remains that there is no simple answer. In reality, the increasing prices for AVDLRs are
the result of combining many interrelated processes and elements that stem from policy
decisions used throughout DoD. Before explaining some of these processes and how they
affect AVDLR pricing, we first begin with a simple explanation of how AVDLR prices
are formulated.




















Figure 4.6. Navy Working Capital Fund [Ref. 4:p. N-23]
AVDLRs are financed under the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF).
(see Figure 4.6). The NWCF is a revolving fund with two primary assets - cash and
material. The goal of the fund is to operate very much like a commercial business. That
is. to procure materials which customers need, stock these materials until required and
use the cash received from the sales to pay for all operating costs and the replacement of
materials. The primary difference between a commercial business and the NWCF is that
the NWCF is not intended to make a profit, but rather to operate with the long-term
objective of "breaking-even". Under the NWCF concept, the fund is reimbursed by the
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prices the users are charged to obtain services and materials. Users pay for these services
and materials from their operating budget - the O&M N account. There are two prices
charged to the users, Net and Standard. The price the customer (Fleet) pays for each
AVDLR it uses is contingent on whether or not the using activity returns an
unserviceable AVDLR component, called a "carcass", in exchange for each AVDLR
issued. Net price is the charge for an AVDLR when a carcass "turn-in" is made.
Standard price is the cost if no carcass turn-in is made. Standard prices are typically
higher than net prices because they include the cost of procuring a new AVDLR vice
repairing the defective "turn-in".
Since the NWCF operates on a break-even concept, prices set for
AVDLRs are subject to adjustments from year to year in order to recover the cost of
operating gains and losses the NWCF may incur. This break-even concept is called "full
cost recovery". Full cost recovery is obtained through the use of a "surcharge". The
purpose of the surcharge is to simply recover the costs of operations that are experienced
by the NWCF. All costs related to the delivery of the material or repair of AVDLRs
performed by the NWCF are recovered in the surcharge pricing for that material or
service. Hence, the surcharge is applied to every good or service the customer purchases
from the NWCF. The surcharge is calculated by dividing the costs of operations over the
cost of goods sold as depicted in Figure 4.7.
Cost of Operations Surcharge %
Costs of Goods Sold
For FY 98: $1,299.8M = 57.5%
$ 2,258.8M
Figure 4.7. FY 98 Surcharge Rate [Ref. 58]
As the NWCF cost of operations or cost of goods sold varies from year to
year, the surcharge rate will also vary to reflect these losses or gains in order to achieve a
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Net Operating Result (NOR) of zero. A point to note is that there is a surcharge rate
calculated for each Budget Project. The 57.5% rate shown above is actually the
""composite" surcharge rate. In other words, it is the average surcharge rate for all Budget
Projects. AVLDRs fall under two budget projects, BP-85P (procurement) and BP-85R
(repairable).
One common question that comes up while studying the surcharge
component of AVDLRs is: What is included in the surcharge? Since the NWCF is
comprised of a number of DoD activities, there are an equal number of surcharge
elements to represent those activities' operations and Cost of Goods Sold (COGS).
While a complete list of all elements is beyond the scope of this thesis, the primary
components that make up the NWCF surcharge are as follows [Ref. 58]:
Material Maintenance covers inventory and carcass losses, obsolescence and
depot washout.
Supply Operating Cost pays for operating costs at the NAVICP and Fleet
and Industrial Supply Center (FISCs).
Payments to Others goes to Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense
Activity Addressing System Office (DAASO), Defense Finance and
Accounting Service (DFAS), JLFSC and Defense Reutilization and Marketing
Service (DRMS) for services.
Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) Savings are surcharge
offsets that allow the customer to benefit from savings through reduced
material costs; i.e. purchases from one year to the next.
Navy Cash Requirement recoups cash to maintain financial solvency for the
fund.
In addition to the NWCF break-even objective, the NWCF also has an
objective to maintain stabilized surcharge rates. The surcharge rates the customers pay
are established at the beginning of the year and remain "fixed". The rates charged for the
services are based upon the NWCF portion of the President's Budget. The primary
objective of stabilizing rates is to "shelter DoD customers from wide price variances due
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to cost escalation (inflation) as compared to budgeted prices'" [Ref 4:p. N-17]. In other
words, this is done to help formulate budgets and compensate for the differences between
pricing assumptions made in the previous year's budget and the actual costs incurred
during the year. This stabilization element is referred to as the Value of Annual Demand
("VAD") but also commonly known as the "Annual Price Change" (APC) or "Rate
Change".
The purpose of the VAD/APC is in essence an escalation rate to adjust the
OP-20 budget for net changes in anticipated individual AVDLR component demand and
prices. In simplest terms, the VAD/APC is the difference of surcharge for AVDLRs from
one year to the next and represents total forecasted customer cost change for the coming
year. The use of VAD/APC is to "balance" or "adjust" the OP-20 in response to the
VAD/APC rate (total cost impact), in the customers account. The VAD/APC is
calculated as follows:
VAD I APC = £ PXD X
Where
k = Individual Supply System Items
n = Total Number of Supply System Items
P = Price of Item to Fleet Customer
D - Demand Forecasted by NAVICP for That Item
VAD/APC Escaltion Rate = VAD Comming YearVAD Current Year
Figure 4.8. VAD/APC Calculations [Ref. 59]
The way in which the VAD/APC "balances" the OP-20 budget account is
best explained by the procedures used to develop it. During budget formation, the
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NWCF entities, such as NAVICP, construct their budget submissions during early spring
and submit these budgets to their Management Commands (similar to a Major Claimant).
These budget submissions contain NAVICP' s projected sales requirements for the
wholesale/retail level of materials and services that they plan to buy in support of Fleet
operations for the upcoming year. These budgets also contain the proposed surcharge
rates. During May/June these budgets are reviewed and adjusted, and finally submitted to
FMB and OSD in September. OSD reviews the NWCF budgets and makes adjustments
to the surcharge up until December, at which point they are incorporated into the
President's Budget for submission to Congress. At the same time the NWCF budgets are
submitted, so too are the Navy "customer" budgets, i.e. OP-20. For example, the OP-20,
developed during budget formulation is adjusted by the standard OSD(C) published
inflation guidance. However, the OP-20 budget does not factor in the NWCF surcharge
rate into their budget, because the rates are not yet approved or available. Since the
NWCF surcharge rates are not available to the customer, a procedure to "balance" the
customer budget is made. This is the purpose of the VAD/APC. When the final
surcharge rates are approved, the VAD/APC escalation rate is calculated. After the
VAD/APC escalation rate is calculated it is compared to the customer's submitted budget
and FMB makes an adjustment or "balance" to the customer account to reflect the new
NWCF surcharge rate that the customer will be charged. In recent years, this has meant
that additional funding was added to customer accounts. To provide a historical
perspective of the surcharge and VAD rates, and demonstrate the variability from year to
year, a display of AVDLR rates for procurement (standard price) and repair (net price)
are shown in Table 4.6.
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FY RATE 85P AVIATION PROCURMENT 85R AVIATION REPAIR
FY 95 Surcharge 56.6% 36.2%o
VAD/APC 5.7% 28.3%
FY 96 Surcharge 23.8% 14.5%
VAD/APC -21.6% -21.6%
FY 97 Surcharge 27.6% 27.9%
VAD/APC 5.7% 5.7%
FY 98 Surcharge 55.7% 56.2%
VAD/APC 24.7% 24.7%)
FY 99 Surcharge 47.8% -3.6%o
VAD/APC 42.8% -3.6%)
Table 4.6. AVDLR Surcharge & VAD/APC Rates [Ref. 60]
One point to note, is that for FY 99 the AVDLR VAD rate was -3.6%.
This means that prices for the FY 99 market basket ofAVDLRs were slightly less (96.4%
[or 3.6%o less]) than the prices represented in the FY 98 market basket.
The last step of the AVDLR pricing process is called "The Annual Price
Update" that occurs in late spring when NAVICP updates the prices for AVDLRs. The
details of the process are complex, though essentially, the goal of this process is to set the
prices for the entire market basket of AVDLRs, which was projected during the earlier
budget process. This is achieved by making minor surcharge increases or decreases
within the market basket of AVDLRs in such a way that the overall price is inline with
the approved VAD/APC that is "locked" into the customer and President's Budget.
Using the locked VAD/APC ensures the prices of AVDLRs match the funds budgeted in
the customer account.
b. Factors That Cause A VDLR Price Fluctuation (Variability)
Many of the problems that account for AVDLR cost increases are a direct
result of the "backwards looking" process in which Navy budgets are formulated. As
explained in Chapter III, one major limitation during the formulation process is the use of
historical data to build and project future budget requirements. In a dynamic and unstable
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environment such as Naval Aviation, this type of process will not accurately capture the
changes (in customer requirements) that take place from year to year. The purpose,
therefore, in this section is to show some of the specific factors and variables that bring
about an unstable environment and the resulting AVDLR price fluctuation and FHP
underfunding. These factors are "AVDLR Demand Forecasting" and the "NWCF
Surcharge".
(1) AVDLR Demand Forecasting. Determining customer annual
demand for AVDLRs is extremely complex and problematic in that the forecasts for
"projected sales" are made as much as two years in advance of execution. NAVICP uses
a number of inputs to determine the projected sales for the represented market basket of
AVDLRs. Inputs include quarterly historical usage of AVDLRs based upon both filled
and unfilled supply requisitions, NADEP forecast inputs, which include expected repair
prices, called the Component Unit Price (CUP), commercial depot repair costs, and
AV3M AVDLR utilization data. These inputs are combined in a computer-modeling
program to annually forecast the prices for all 70,000 AVDLR line items. Since demand-
forecasting for AVDLRs is a "scientific guess" based upon historical data and
programmatic changes, the quality and accuracy in which these inputs to capture Fleet
demand is paramount. As noted in the VAD/APC analysis, when demand is forecasted
for the next year, the expected money value of the anticipated demand is compared with
the previous year resulting in a delta to the existing funding stream which will produce
either a bill or savings. Since the prices for AVDLRs are "fixed" for the execution year
the only variable is demand. This presents three possible demand-forecasting outcomes:
Perfect Forecasted Demand. When the demand forecast is perfect, the Fleet's
account is adjusted perfectly and they purchase exactly what was predicted
and the system is in equilibrium.
Forecasted Demand is Less Than Actual. If the demand forecast is less than
actual demand, the Fleet's account is underfunded and they seek mid-year
relief. Additionally, the NWCF's sales base is decreased resulting in a higher
surcharge and higher AVDLR prices the following year.
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• Forecasted Demand is Greater Than Actual. When the demand forecast is
greater than actual demand, the Fleet's account is overfunded and capital
investment opportunities such as, fleet modernization, are lost. OPTAR
holders spend the excess funding (perhaps wastefully) and the NWCF is left
with surplus materials or services. For the NWCF, this results in a lower
surcharge (spread over the larger sales base) and lower AVDLR costs, but also
an increased debt due to insufficient sales. Therefore, the impact in the
following year, is a higher surcharge rate and an increase in AVDLR prices.
[Ref. 61]
Perhaps the biggest problem with current AVDLR forecasting
stems from the fact that demand requirements for AVDLRs are understated in budget
formulation. Critics would perhaps argue that the demand is "perfect" since it matches the
funds budgeted. Yet, the fallacy with this argument is that the Fleet spends every penny
provided. So the real question in measuring demand-forecast accuracy is, "Did the Fleet
get enough money to buy what was needed?" The answer is "No", since every year from
FY 95 there has been a multi-million dollar AVDLR bow-wave. [Ref. 62] Thus the Fleet
buys the budgeted forecast but the demand is understated. Furthermore, the problem is
compounded and perpetuated every year because the forecast methodology is backwards-
looking in that the requirement is stated based upon what was spent in the previous year
rather than what will be executed in the new year.
Another fallacy in the AVDLR forecasting method is the notion
that the AVDLR market basket accurately captures (represents) Fleet demand.
Proponents of this theory suggest that the small changes in the VAD/APC (as seen in FY
97 and FY 99 AVDLR Repair account) support their assumption that the AVDLR
forecasting method currently used is effective. However, enormous AVDLR price
variability seen in individual NSNs from one year to the next shows otherwise. This
variability is not readily apparent to the casual observer. The reason being is that the
variability of individual components becomes lost during the AVDLR pricing process. In
the pricing process, nearly all 70,000 AVDLR line items are averaged together in order to
apply an aggregate surcharge rate to the entire AVDLR market basket. This process
however, obscures individual AVDLR line item price increases and/or decreases. In
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statistics, this phenomena is known as the law of large numbers. This theorem states that
within a given population, individual outcomes may have a wide range of values from
extremely large to small. "Statistics for Business Managers" explains this theorem as
follows:
If an extreme value falls into the sample, although it will have an effect on
the mean, the effect will be reduced since it is averaged in with the other
values in the sample. As the sample size increases, the effect of a single
extreme value gets even smaller, since it is being arranged with more
observations. [Ref. 63 :p. 263]
Hence, while on the surface AVDLR prices may seem reasonable,
within any given sample there may be large price swings from one year to the next. See
Appendix B for an illustration of individual AVLDR price variations.
Additional factors that can affect the accuracy of demand-
forecasting and price variance include budget lag-time, Fleet modernization, data and
information quality, AVDLR reliability, an unstable operating environment, and
insufficient accounting systems.
Budget lag-time is perhaps the most significant problem in
accurately forecasting AVDLR demand and pricing. In the case of AVDLRs, NAVICP
has to develop the Fleet's demand as early as two years ahead of the execution year.
Furthermore, AVDLR budget inputs are based upon 1-2 year old AVDLR execution data.
Given that there is no method in budget formulation to account for dramatic yearly-
changes due to variances in AVDLR reliability, shifting maintenance philosophies, Fleet
modernization efforts, bow-waving and changing mission requirements, it is not
surprising that AVDLR prices fluctuate greatly from year to year.
Efforts to modernize the Fleet are another source of AVDLR
demand-forecasting instability. Throughout the year, the procurement and logistics
support chain seeks to introduce new T/M/S aircraft, ECPs, LECPs. and other
modifications which affect the market basket of AVDLRs. The problem, is that there is
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no method to systematically incorporate and synchronize these changes and associated
costs (to the Fleet) into the OP-20. For example, an Operational Safety Improvement
Program (OSIP) often puts a more expensive part into the logistics system and takes a
less expensive part out. By looking backwards, the FHP is based upon the cheaper part,
which incorrectly reflects the requirement and Fleet demand.
One possible solution to account for modernization would be to
add a mechanism in the FHP OP-20 development to incorporate all known modernization
issues such as OSIPs and LECPs. Such a mechanism would require a consistent and
accurate centralized database that will consolidate all investment costs and provide a
process to integrate them. Such a database must link together all ongoing and future
modernization initiatives between NAVICP, NAVAIR Program Offices, NAVSUP,
NADEPs, and Fleet, and construct a more accurate AVDLR market basket.
Unfortunately, there is currently no such database system.
Critics might suggest that the AV3M system is capable of linking
together all modernization initiatives, but as noted earlier, there are far too many
inconsistencies within the AV3M system to accomplish this. Specific AV3M problems
relative to forecasting AVDLRs include; a 90 day-lag period to receive reported data,
limited reporting of Fleet cannibalization actions, lost or incomplete data, no capability to
track AVDLR failure rates (MTBF) by serial numbers and a general inability to assess
deficient AVDLR ILS. One solution to overcome these AV3M problems is
implementation of the new "Optimized NALCOMIS" database. This system is currently
under development and is specifically tailored to address these problems. When online, it
will successfully integrate and link together all key AVDLR pricing, ILS, and
modernization programs and their respective management activities.
The next factor that causes poor AVDLR demand forecasting is
AVDLR reliability and failure rates (MTBF). AVDLR reliability was discussed earlier as
a primary cause of ILS deficiencies. Equally important is the significant affect that
AVDLR reliability has on demand-forecasting. The current AVDLR demand-forecasting
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approach utilizes algorithms, allowance models, and maintenance philosophies based
upon failure mode analysis data an advertised MTBF of "X hrs". However, empirical
data indicate a much lower MTBFs for certain components. Table 4.7 demonstrates this
disparity between advertized and actual MTBFs for two AVDLR items. Lower MTBFs
subsequently drive higher than anticipated number of failures, which in turn drives a
higher than projected number ofBCM actions, which contrinbute to increased FHP costs.
Component Provisioning MTBF Current MTBF Data Source






6,000 hrs 500-550 hrs NAVICP
Table 4.7. Component MTBF [Ref. 46:p. 56]
Another factor that causes variability in AVDLR pricing and FHP
budgeting is the unstable aviation operating environment. As much as NAVICP tries to
accurately determine Fleet AVDLR needs for the upcoming year, their demand-
forecasting process is done two years before execution. This is far too much in advance
to capture all the ongoing changes in the DoD's operating environment. On one hand, if
the Fleet operating environment were in fact stable, the current demand forecasting
process would provide consistent results. However, consistent demand-forecasting for
AVDLRs is extremely difficult to obtain given the magnitude of changes that occur from
year to year in the Navy Flying Program. As a result, of these changes and the inability
to forecast them, the Fleet may need more parts or different parts than predicted. Some of
the changes in the operating environment that produce instability and variability in
demand-forecasting include:
Depot closures and work force consolidation - loss of expertise




New equipment and new items not reflected into FHP price methodology (lag
effect)
Changes in maintenance philosophy not readily incorporated into budget
process
Budget reprogramming decisions made before and during execution
Higher airecraft utilization due to mission changes
Decreased O to I repair - shifting "plane-side" ILS
Not incorporating the AVDLR bow-wave costs in the budget forecast
A limited number ofAVDLR repair observations at the depot in which to base
the repair prices on
One final factor that contributes to the inaccuracy of demand-
forecasting and price variability is the ineffective accounting system used in DoN.
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, current DoD accounting systems do not
accurately measure and/or link funds spent to the level of readiness achieved. Under the
present system it is very difficult to determine what the actual costs of components are,
and what is included in those costs. Moreover, it is nearly impossible to assess those cost
to any measure of achieved readiness for a T/M/S aircraft. Ideally, the repair costs of
AVDLRs should be passed on to the user, though this is not the current practice. Instead,
much of costs associated in repair, are lumped together (by use of a surcharge) making it
extremely difficult to determine who used the component, what it cost, and how did it
impact mission capability.
In conclusion, accurate AVDLR demand-forecasting is contingent
on an accurate market basket of AVDLRs, as well as procedures that will identify all
inputs that affect current and future AVDLR demand. If not, AVDLR forecasting will
continue to fall short of the Fleet's needs and cause further FHP underfunding.
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(2) NWCF and Surcharge Rate. The fact that the surcharge rate
changes are "balanced" for the customer's account suggests that the surcharge itself is not
problematic. However, increases in the surcharge rate (Figure 4.9) represent
inefficiencies in the operations of the NWCF and contribute to the overall cost increases
experienced for AVDLRs. The three principle problems with the surcharge and the
NWCF that create AVDLR price variability are; 1) Decreasing Customer Base, 2)
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Figure 4.9. Composite Surcharge Trends [Ref. 58]
Decreasing Customer Base. Under the NWCF unit cost system,
budgets and costs projections are based upon the estimated outputs or work units. If the
projection is not realized, then NWCF expenses could exceed its revenue and result in an
operating loss. As the surcharge rate increases to recover these operating losses, the
customers seek cheaper alternative sources for services and thereby, cause the prices to
climb higher, because the WCF has to spread their fixed costs and overhead over a
smaller revenue base. This process continues until the activity eventually goes out of
business. This effect is called the "Death Spiral*" of Demand. [Ref. 4:p. N-4] The "Death
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Spiral" concept is becoming a big iussue, particularly as the Navy re-engineers it's
logistics supply chain to become more efficient. As the Navy increases the use of
programs such as LECPs, Direct Vendor Deliveries (DVDs), and Contractor Logistics
Support (CLS), the impact on the NWCF is lost revenue, which may result in a higher
surcharge for AVDLRs. Figure 4.10 depicts this revenue reduction effect.
Cost of Operations =





















Figure 4.10. NWCF Revenue Base Reduction [Ref. 58]
Conflicting Priorities. Another problem with the NWCF that has
an impact on the price of AVDLRs is the effect of conflicting priorities imposed upon the
NWCF. Conflicting priorities often result in an increase in the surcharge rate to the
customers. These conflicting priorities include:
Generating enough cash to maintain the required 7-10 day "cash balance" in
the NWCF corpus.
Improving NWCF operation efficiency as ILS moves toward CLS, DVD
support concepts (7% decline in Sales base experienced FY 97).
Implementing DoD policy decisions not associated with Navy Supply
Management costs ($300M in unrelated Supply Management costs affected
the rate in FY 98).
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Supporting LECP buy-in decisions despite eroding customer APN-6 buy-out
account funding and increasing surcharge. The NWCF is "left holding the
bag" because the customer can't pay for the LECPs. Therefore, the NWCF
has to recover these disbursements through a higher surcharge, because they
didn't "make the sale". Fewer sales result in an increased surcharge the
following year.
Surcharge Offsets. Perhaps the most significant factor in why the
surcharge causes AVDLR price variability and underfunding, is that the funds used to
"balance" the customer's budget for any surcharge rate increases must be offset at the
expense of other programs in the budget. In the case of AVDLRs, offsets can result in
hundreds of millions of dollars shifted from other programs that effect FHP underfunding
especially when offsets are taken from AVDLR cost-saving programs such as LECPs or
ECPs. [Ref. 64]
Finally, the effect of the surcharge and the policies of the NWCF,
result in unintended consequences which contribute to the "Death Spiral". Specifically,
the Fleet will continue to explore all possible avenues to maximize their budgets and
minimize the high costs associated with doing business with the NWCF. The key to
minimizing this effect, is to stabilize the surcharge rates from year to year, which then
allows the Resource Sponsor to budget with a higher confidence without sub-optimizing
the Navy supply system. This can be achieved through better accounting of expenditures,
accurate overhead pricing and allocation to the customer, and the removal of conflicting
priorities that currently burden the NWCF system.
In summary, a great deal of confusion in AVDLR pricing stems
from the complexities of AVDLR demand-forecasting, the NWCF surcharge, and the
process of pricing and balancing the Fleet's AVDLR FHP account. Moreover, when these
complex factors come together, they create a synergy, which tends to contribute to a less
than precise method of properly matching costs to requirements and ultimately
compromises Fleet readiness. With further study, a clearer understanding of terms,
processes, and the use of a common strategy among all key players, may help avoid the
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confusion and minimize the conflicting interest and thereby enhance the ability to
understand and manage the process with more precision and effectiveness.
6. Effects ofAVDLR Underfunding at CNAP
Throughout this chapter a number of topics such as LECPs, aircraft configuration
management, ILS changes and AVDLR component reliability were analyzed to assess
their impact upon CNAP FHP underfunding. This section highlights some additional
impacts on CNAP and the Fleet caused by AVDLR underfunding and insufficient ILS.
The most visible effect of FHP underfunding during execution at the TYCOM level is
manifested by AVDLR bow-waving, aircraft cannibalizations and Unfilled Customer
Orders (UCOs).
a. A VDLR Bow waves
The AVDLR bow wave is the most apparent symptom of recent FHP
underfunding. As discussed earlier, the practice of bow-waving AVDLRs has been used
since FY 93 as an all-to-frequent strategy for the Fleet to execute the FHP due to
insufficient funding. Bow-waving has a tremendous effect on Fleet readiness and creates
several serious problems. The first problem is that bow-waving represents an inefficient
use of funds. Once the new fiscal year begins, all AVDLR requisitions that were deferred
pending new TOA, are often subjected to an increased surcharge rate. The effect of an
increased surcharge rate results in millions of dollars wasted that should have been used
to execute the current year's FHP. Additionally, bow-waving puts the war fighting
capability decisions into the hands of the logistics support chain instead of the operational
commanders. This happens because bow-waving decisions are driven by the funds
available to the individual supply departments and CNAP logisticians. Hence, the
logistics support chain is forced to make critical funding and prioritization decisions as to
which AVDLR components will be repaired and thereby, drive and ultimately determine
the war-fighting capabilities of a unit, ship or air wing. Lastly, bow-waving creates
excessive management oversight and, although difficult to measure, has a direct effect on
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unit moral, pilot/aircrew training, aircraft maintenance expertise, and a potential affect on
aircraft operational safety.
b. Aircraft cannibalization.
Another effect of underfunding AVDLRs is aircraft cannibalization. In
the face of underfunding and lack of readily available AVDLRs, squadrons and I-level
activities have little choice but to cannibalize engines, avionics and airframe components
as the only means to repair aircraft and achieve unit and air wing operational training
goals. Cannibalization creates several problems including; increased maintenance
workload, increased risk of damage to aircraft components, and the potential increase of
aircraft mishaps. Moreover, cannibalization actions are viewed as culturally unacceptable
practices within the maintenance ranks despite the frequency of occurrence.
Throughout the AMSR study, the Fleet has maintained that they have to
increasingly cannibalize aircraft components to meet operational goals. Table 4.9 in fact
shows an upward trend in cannibalizations and supports the Fleet's assertion that
cannibalization has increased. This table shows that the 2nd Marine Air Wing (MAW)
experienced an increased cannibalization rate (per hundred flight hours) for all operated
T/M/S aircraft from FY 93 through FY 97.
T TC\/f /"< orrr^/^XTT-\ \ A \ DTXTT? A vTTWnUoJVlv^ — ODV/UINU JLVJLttJVJLiNC .tt.lIV^IVtt.r 1 V
FY 93 - FY 97 CANN/100 FLIGHT HOU
vllNLr
RS
Aircraft EA-6B F/A-18C AV-8B CH-53E AH-1W CH-46E
FY 93 10.9 3.8 3.8 5.3 2.8
FY 94 3.5 6.4 8.7 3.5 8.6 3.1
FY 95 7.3 4.5 6.9 3.3 8.4 4.3
FY 96 13.1 7.6 8.4 3.6 10.4 6.3
FY 97 13.8 10.1 11.8 6.6 9.9 6.1
Table 4.8. 2 nd MAW Cannibalization (Data Source: AV3M) [Ref. 46:p. 41]
Though Table 4.9 shows increased cannibalization rates for the 2 MAW
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the author's research indicated that CNAP's Fleet-wide ""documented" cannibalization
rates do not show as dramatic an increase. One-reason that cannibalization rates for
CNAP have not increased as significantly as the Fleet suggests is due to the
aforementioned cultural pressures to not cannibalize aircraft components. Therefore,
when cannibalizations take place, there is often a conscience decision made not to
document them. In addition to the cultural problems, the cumbersome and time
consuming paperwork to document cannibalizations combined with input limitations of
the legacy NALCOMIS database system, further skew the actual number of
cannibalizations the Fleet performs. Although it is difficult to measure the actual number
of cannibalizations performed in the Fleet, all cannibalizations result in added work, man-
hours and increased use of consumable materials, "wasted" in the component removal
and installation process. One example that illustrates man-hours associated with
cannibalizations was shown in MAG- 16. AMSR research showed that MAG- 16 reported
1,544 cannibalization actions, which used 7,508 man-hours in FY-97. This equates to
750 unfunded man-days to perform this additional maintenance [Ref. 46:p. 41]. While
total dollar costs of cannibalizations are impossible to quantify, clearly, in an
environment of limited funds and personnel shortages, cannibalization actions will have a
large impact on a unit's mission readiness, and war fighting capability. The last impact on
CNAP and the Fleet caused by AVDLR underfunding are Unfilled Customer Orders
(UCOs).
c. Unfilled Customer Orders (UCOs)
Due to budget shortfalls, CNAP has frequently engaged in "cash flow"
transactions to sustain flying operations through the fiscal year. Bow-waving was one of
these activities, the other is Unfilled Customer Orders (UCOs).
As noted above, the UCOs are a cash flow generating strategy in which the
Fleet administratively cancels (de-obligates) outstanding requisitions for AVDLRs to
recover the cash as a means to pay for more urgent requirements. This strategy is a
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mechanism used by CNAP to achieve the 83% PMR goal and prevent over-obligation of
budgeted FHP funds. The catch is that under the agreement between CNAP and
NAVICP, all requisitions cancelled must be re-ordered within 45 days after the new fiscal
year. This caused additional underfunding for CNAP when they used the strategy in FY
97. During FY 97, select CNAP activities were directed to administratively cancel all
outstanding requisitions and provide the recouped funds to CNAP, so that these funds
could be reprogrammed to meet higher FHP execution priorities. Table 4.10 shows the
total amount of these UCO cancellations by activity for FY 97:
ACTIVITY AMOUNT






Table 4.9. CNAP UCO FY 98 [Ref. 65]
The risk associated with this strategy is the potential impact of incurring
higher costs in the next FY because of an increase in the surcharge. This happened to
CNAP in FY 98 when they were required to purchase the cancelled requisitions at a
significantly higher surcharge rate of 57.5% vs. 27.4% from FY 97. As a result of this
higher surcharge, the CNAP FHP budget for FY 98 incurred a net loss (and additional
underfunding) of $8M. In summary, the UCO strategy is another example where CNAP
was forced to conduct creative financing to execute the underfunded FHP budget in FY
97.
This completes the discussion of the FHP AVDLR cost component. The
purpose of analyzing AVDLRs and their associated problems was to chronicle and
illustrate the impact of this highly variable and poorly understood cost component upon
the rising FHP costs and CNAP FHP underfunding. Furthermore, it was pointed out there
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are many visible symptoms and causes of increasing AVDLR prices that directly effect
FHP underfunding. The principle factors that cause increasing AVDLR cost growth and
prices increase are principally, poor component reliability, ILS deficiencies, insufficient
readiness reporting metrics, the NWCF surcharge and demand-forecasting shortcomings.
The next section of this chapter analyzes the affect of the Marine Aviation Campaign
Plan on the CNAP FHP and the affects of reprogramming decisions and unfunded
requirments.
G. MARINE AVIATION CAMPAIGN PLAN
1. Background
Another unplanned event in budget execution that resulted in CNAP FHP
underfunding was the result of the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan (MACP),
implemented in FY 97. In FY 97, the Marine Corps adopted a new approach for
managing their allocation of FHP funds. Due to increased OPTEMPO, manning issues
and aviation safety concerns a balance between maintaining operational and material
readiness had become increasingly difficult to achieve. Further, the pursuit and
attainment of Primary Mission Readiness (PMR) goals was causing increased costs
associated with higher aircraft utilization rates. Hence, the Marine Corps Aviation
Campaign Plan (MACP) was developed to achieve a better balance between resources
and requirements. What follows is a brief overview of the MACP elements, which is
necessary to understand how the plan contributed to CNAP FHP underfunding in FY 97.
The MACP was designed to "maximize" combat readiness, and improve the
"health and strength" of Marine aviation [Ref. 66 :p. A-l]. Since its inception, the MACP
has been refined to focus on six core areas to achieve a better fit between resources and
requirements. These six areas are 1) Aviation Manning, 2) Naval Aviation Time-To-
Train, 3) Flying Hour Program (FHP), 4) Simulation, 5) Operations, Training and
Readiness, and 6) Aircraft Material Condition. The most important element of the
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MACP is the Flying Hour Program, which initiated a new sortie-based training approach
for executing the FHP. The Marines believe that the sortie-based approach provides a
better correlation to flying hour costs and is a better predictor of aviation readiness. The
sortie-based philosophy focuses on the premise that the interval of flying is more
important than the frequency of flying, with the overarching goals of ensuring that pilots
and crews receive between 12-15 sorties per month, and that the FHP is executed within
2% of the sortie based projections.
Another key difference with the sortie-based approach is the emphasis on unit
combat capabilities vice individual training goals. The previous focus of the USMC
individual pilot capabilities that drove higher aircraft utilization, training OPTEMPO and
flying hour support costs. In terms of readiness, the philosophy of focusing on unit
combat capabilities is consistent with the argument presented by Stockfisch (1973) and
Bassford (1988) that in, "peacetime, evaluation of unit performance should focus entirely
on the unit's readiness to perform its wartime mission" [Ref. 34:p. 236]. Additionally, the
focus on unit core competencies is intended to achieve cost efficiencies associated with
flying fewer hours while still producing combat ready squadrons capable of achieving the
"units" mission. The savings achieved by flying less (resulting from decreased fuel and
maintenance consumption) is intended to facilitate investment in safety enhancements,
maintenance improvements and simulation suites to augment pilot/crew training
proficiency as a result of flying less hours. There is considerable debate within aviation
communities whether flight simulation is an adequate substitute for actual flying time.
This debate is beyond the scope of this thesis.
2. Source of CNAP FHP Underfunding
The Marine aviation organizations that fall under CNAP purview for budgeting
and funding purposes are the I s ' and 3rd Marine Air Wings (MAWS). Operationally
these two MAWS report to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces Pacific
(FMFPAC). As noted above, the MACP resulted in unintended budgetary consequences
for CNAP's FHP budget in FY 97. During this FY the Marines flew 29,089 hours less
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than what was budgeted for in the OP-20 (version 925). Flying fewer hours was
consistent with the MACP strategy to achieve savings associated with flying less and to
minimize the effects of excessive aircraft utilization. However, even with fewer hours
being flown there was an increased cost to CNAP of approximately $13,296,973. This
cost figure is derived by comparing the FY 97 budgeted funding level versus what the
Marines executed for the year. The average aircraft cost per hour (CPH) also increased
for the Marines by $391.65. The increased total cost and the increased CPH was
attributed to two factors. The first component that contributed to the cost increase was
increased maintenance spending to improve the safety and material readiness of the 1 st
and 3 rd MAW aircraft. The second factor that contributed to the higher total cost was the
fact that not all costs that constitute the aircraft CPH are variable. As explained in the
NCCA analysis in Chapter III, the presence of fixed cost components within the CPH
means that significant maintenance costs are incurred regardless of the number of hours
flown. In other words, the savings associated with a decrease in flight hours do not occur
at the same marginal rate. Recent FMFPAC statistical studies have confirmed this fixed
cost phenomena. The FMFPAC analysis further concluded that the variable and fixed
cost components are different for different T/M/S aircraft. One study of the AV-8B
Harrier concluded that the fixed cost components were approximately 40% of the total
CPH [Ref. 67]. The interesting result from the FMFPAC study indicated the fixed cost
component was less than what the NCCA study concluded which was approximately
50% at the aggregate level. Other T/M/S aircraft analyzed such as the F/A-18 and CH-
53, demonstrated a fixed cost component of approximately 20% [Ref. 67]. Both the
NCCA and FMFPAC analyses will show the impact on the CPH when fewer hours are
flown. When fixed costs are embedded into total costs, the resulting CPH is higher
because there are fewer hours to spread the total cost over, (CPH= Total Costs + Total
Hours Flown).
The relevant data extracted from the CNAP FY 97 OP-20 and FHCR to show the
cost impact are summarized below:
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Difference 29,089 I $391.65? $13,284,000
Table 4.10. Effect of MACP Budgeted vs. Actual FHP Figures
In summary, the MACP contributed to the overall underfunding that CNAP
experienced in FY 97 that was reflected in the $65 million bow wave generated in this
year. While there is some debate over the full cost impact of the MACP, the relevant
point for this analysis is that the MACP serves as an example of an unplanned or variable
event that contributed to funding uncertainty for CNAP. The effect of the MACP is also
manifested in subsequent year FHP underfunding. This effect was a product of the OP-
20 forecasting methodology for the FY 98 and 99 budgets, in that the FY 96 execution
data used as the basis, did not contain the increased cost per hour of $391.65. However,
to correct this funding deficiency, the FYDP has been re-priced with FY 97 actual cost
data, which captures the MACP cost increases [Ref. 44].
Some additional comments are needed to understand the future status of the
MCAP. In the POM process the USMC has been able to reprogram money into the
Aviation Procurement (APN-7) account to purchase additional simulators in accordance
with MACP objectives and the "Simulation Master Plan'\ Additionally, the Marines
FHP in the outyears has been plussed up to account for the higher CPH and flying hour
requirements. Further analysis on the MACP sortie-based methodology and aviation
simulation training is recommended in Chapter V. The next section analyzes some of the
causes of CNAP underfunding related to reprogramming decisions and unfunded
requirements.
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H. REPROGRAMMING DECISIONS AND UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS
1. Introduction
Frequently during budget execution there are investment opportunities and
unbudgeted requirements that emerge from changing environmental conditions, such as
modifications to missions and changes in technology. To respond to and take advantage
of these changes and opportunities, Fleet Commanders may reprogram money between
accounts. Reprogramming refers to moving money within an appropriation for purposes
other than those for which it was originally appropriated by Congress. However, due to
limited resource availability and a centralized DoD resource allocation process, it is often
difficult for the military departments and Services to maximize emergent investment
opportunities without contravening previous resource commitments. In the case of
CNAP, resources budgeted for the FHP have been used to fund other emerging
requirements and priorities. CNAP fiscal managers have reprogrammed FHP funds to
properly resource other underfunded programs. The purpose of this section is to
chronicle how recent reprogramming decisions and unfunded requirements have
contributed to CNAP FHP underfunding. The section will conclude with an assessment
of the impact of reprogramming on the budget and budget process.
2. Information Technology for the 21 st Century (IT-21)
The Information Technology for the 21 st Century initiative (IT-21) is a good
example of how unfunded requirements and changing priorities can impact FHP funding
for CNAP, in any execution year. First a brief overview of IT-21 is presented followed
by a description of how the CNAP FHP was affected.
To expedite the implementation of IT-21 in fiscal year 1997, the Commander in
Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) decided to reprogram money from existing
funding accounts into IT-21. IT-21 is an initiative originally developed by
CINCPACFLT to leverage information technology to maximize Fleet warfighting
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capabilities. The IT-21 initiative is embraced by all Fleet Commanders and Navy
Leadership. The concept essentially is a force multiplier intended to provide
commanders with greater situational awareness, increased agility of command and
improved information support. The following description of IT-21 is from the Navy
Information Technology Home page:
IT-21 is a customer-driven demand to modernize the Navy's C4I
infrastructure... [and] is one of the Fleet's responses to adapt and develop
new operational concepts in an ever-changing environment. The goal of
IT-21 is to link all U.S. forces and eventually even our allies together in a
network that enables voice, video and data transmissions from a single
desktop PC, allowing war-fighters to exchange information that is
classified or unclassified, and tactical or non-tactical. To do this we must
build a system to industry standards, using commercial-off-the-shelf
technology (or COTS), devoid of stovepipes, in a client-server
environment that allows the pull of just what information is needed in a
way that is seamless to the user in the field. . .The principle elements of IT-
21 are Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) local area networks (LANs)
afloat and LANs/ wide area networks (WANs) ashore populated by state-
of-the-art personal computers (PC). These networks integrate tactical and
tactical support applications with connections to enhanced satellite
systems and ashore networks. It will be supported by regional network
operating centers and all elements will be Defense Information
Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating Environment (COE) compliant
[Ref. 68].
The IT-21 concept is clearly a superior warfighting initiative and wholly
consistent with the information technology tenets articulated in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Joint Vision 2010. However, as noted in Chapter III, the current programming and
budgeting process is not capable of resourcing new and / or emerging requirements in the
execution year. Therefore, an executive decision was made to reprogram $41 million
from various CINPACFLT accounts to accelerate the implementation of IT-21. The
amount reprogrammed from the CNAP Flying Hour Program was $27 million [Ref. 25].
The impact on the CNAP FHP was severe, since the FY 97 program was already
underfunded due to not incorporating the bow-wave from FY 96 into the FY 97 budget
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forecasts, as noted earlier. The additional $27 million deficit contributed to further
underfunding and a portion of the $65 million "bow-wave" generated in the same FY to
achieve the targeted FHP readiness goals.
3. Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC)
Resourcing aviation training associated with the Naval Strike Warfare Center
(NSAWC) in FY 96 and 97 is another example where flying hour program funds were
used to pay for unfunded requirements that emerged during the execution year.
Background information is provided on reprogramming decisions and the fiscal impact
on CNAP is explained.
The decision to fund the NSAWC requirement was the product of a CNO Air
Board decision in FY96 and 97. The Air Board consists of senior Naval aviation leaders
from N-88, NAVAIR, the Safety Center and the TYCOMs. The Air Board generally
meets quarterly to make decisions regarding Naval Aviation issues and priorities [Ref
30]. Sometimes the resulting decisions have budgetary consequences that affect current
execution year budgets, as in the case ofNSAWC.
Prior to FY 96 there were two organizations located at Miramar Naval Air Station
that conducted integrated air warfare training: 1) "Top Gun" squadron, and 2) an
adversary squadron. Due to stipulations of the Base Realignment and Closure Act
(BRAC) and DoD downsizing, the adversary squadron was deactivated and Top Gun
(with its supporting budget) migrated to the new Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center
located at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada. The mission of the adversary squadron was
intended to be absorbed by reserve squadrons and NSAWC units and integrated under the
existing "STRIKE U" command at Fallon. The mission of NSAWC is to train pilots to
become tactics instructors at the Fleet Air Training squadrons.
When NSAWC initiated operations during FY 96, some of the adversary training
support costs were not previously factored into the budget process. As a result, there was
a $10 million maintenance contract and some Temporary Additional Duty (TAD)
requirements that had to be funded in order to sustain the training [Ref. 44]. A decision
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was made by the Air Board to reprogram funding from existing CNAP FHP funds that
contributed directly to additional FHP underfunding by approximately $13 million.
In FY 97 there also were shortfalls in the NSAWC budget that CNAP was
required to resource directly from their FHP budget. Table 4.11 below summarizes the
relevant data extracted from the OP-20s and FHCRs for Fiscal Years 96 and 97. This
table reflects the budgeted versus executed amounts for the combined Top Gun and Strike
squadron requirement. The last row shows the total cost difference that CNAP was
required to reprogram from the FHP:




Table 4.11. Budgeted vs. Actual Cost Difference for NSAWC (FY 96 & FY 97)
In Fiscal Year 1998, the budget process caught up with Fleet needs, and sufficient
funds were programmed for NSAWC to execute its training requirements. In fact,
NSAWC under executed budgeted dollars in FY 98 due to lower than expected student
through-put. Sufficient resources are currently programmed for NSAWC in the budget
outyears and it appears CNAP will no longer have to subsidize the requirement from the
FHP.
In summary, this analysis illustrated the impact of selected unplanned / variable
requirements on the flying hour program. The requirement to reprogram FHP funds
further compounded an underfunded FHP budget and contributed to the overall "bow
waves" created in both FY 96 and 97. The following section analyzes reprogramming
decisions initiated as a means to properly resource other CNAP underfunded accounts.
4. Special Interest Category "Funding Other" (FO)
An area that is a constant fiscal burden on the CNAP FHP is the Special Interest
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Category, "Funding Other" (FO) program. This budget area has been chronically
underfunded in the budget process and subsequently FHP funds have been reprogrammed
to bring this account up to a minimum executable level for the past several years. As
described in Chapter II (II-F 3 b.), the FO account consists of several different non-flying
hour program areas such as TAD, simulator maintenance support, and aircraft training
ranges to name a few. Appendix C contains a detailed description of the programs within
the FO account. Although the FO programs are not direct FHP costs, they are an integral
part of the overall support cost for naval aviation each year. For example, the simulation
support category helps to fund the overall attainment of PMR. As a component of the
CNO PMR goal, simulator training contributes to 2% of the 85% annual goal.
Additionally, the FO program funds the use of training ranges which are essential in
honing aircrew warfighting skills associated with dropping ordnance and attacking
targets. These are only two of the FO categories but they illustrate the importance of
properly resourcing the account since it contributes to the attainment of aviation
readiness.
The FO budget suffers from a lack of resource sponsorship in the POM process.
As explained in Chapter II, the FO costs are not captured in the Flying Hour Costs
Reports nor are they factored into the OP-20 budget produced by N-88F. Hence, when
there is no sponsor advocating and justifying this requirement, it becomes the asset of
choice for budget cuts. As a result, the funding levels for these non-flying hour programs
have been on a downward slope for the past few years. In the CNAP case, the lack of
proper resources budgeted for the FO became so severe in FY 98 that they received
permission from CINCPACFLT to fund the FO programs directly from the FHP
TACAIR/ASW schedule. Table 4.12 illustrates the FO resourcing and reprogramming
trend from FY 95 through FY 98. The "Requirement" row refers to the amount CNAP
requested. The "Reprogrammed" row reflects the total amount of funding re-applied
from the FHP to the FO budget:
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FY-95 FY-96 FY-97 FY-98
Requirement $125,714,000 $101,181,000 $128,914,000 $128,785,000
Received $77,501,000 $87,633,000 $83,600,000 $81,065,000
Executed $80,441,000 $98,380,000 $97,458,000 $118,044,000
Reprogrammed
from FHP
$2,940 $10,747 $13,858,000 $36,979,000
Table 4.12. F.O. Reprogramming Totals from Flying Hour Program
In fiscal years 95-96, the CNAP Base Operating Support (BOS) budget shared the
reprogramming burden with the FHP. The BOS was consolidated at CINCPACFLT in
FY 96, so the amounts reprogrammed for FY 97-98 were exclusively taken from the
FHP. The total amount reprogrammed from the FHP in FY 98 was considerable, but
necessary for CNAP to successfully operate. Ten million dollars of the total amount
reprogrammed in FY 98 was for an unfunded requirement that resulted from CNO
direction to provide funding for a higher meal rate for sailors executing Squadron and Air
Wing group travel orders. Additionally, funding was provided for the FMFPAC Marines
Individual Material Readiness List (IMRL) (See Appendix C). The Marine IMRL has
been an unfunded requirement in the POM/PR for several years, and CNAP finally
decided to "fix it out of hide".
Figure 4.11 provides a perspective of the FO budget for FY 98 through 01.
Although this figure only depicts the FO amounts programmed to support the
TACAIR/ASW and FAS schedules, it shows the continuing trend of deficient resources
to support the program. This figure depicts the budgeted funding amounts versus the
CNAP stated requirement. The horizontal line reflects the minimum sustainment level
for FO funding (1997 dollars). This minimum sustainment level has been thoroughly
validated and "scrubbed" by CNAP to insure that only the most important funding
requirements were included. What this figure portends for the FHP is more
reprogramming and continued underfunding.
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CNAP TACAIR/ASW & FAS "FO" Funding
U Budget
Requirements
FY 98 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01
Figure 4.11. CNAP "FO" Funding Levels for TACARI/ASW & FAS "FO"
Schedules [Ref. 69]
To seek funding relief, CNAP routinely addresses these shortfalls via the POM
process, OM-6 exhibit (unfunded requirements), the FHP conference and the FMB Mid-
Year OPTEMPO meeting held at CINPACFLT. FMB and the CNO have recognized the
FO budget shortfalls and the drain on the FHP. In the 1 st quarter ofFY 99, a meeting was
held by FMB, N-88 and Fleet representatives to discuss the problem and attempt to
analyze possible solutions. The meeting concluded with an agreement by N-88 budget
personnel to identify requirement officers that will in fact represent the FO program for
the Fleet in the POM process. From the Fleet's perspective, this appears to be a positive
outcome and may alleviate future budget cuts. However, during the interim they must
contend with current year underfunding.
Aside from receiving increased budget authority for the FO accounts, one way to
improve efficiency in stating the FO requirement is to develop a systematic forecasting
method or to better predict Fleet FO needs. The current method for forecasting the
requirements is based on historical data and professional judgement. Creating some type
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of formula or method to determine requirements may also help the new FO Requirements
Officers to better defend the resources needed by the Fleet during the POM and budget
reviews. Improving the FO forecasting methodology is recommended for follow-on
research.
5. Unplanned Contingencies
Another variable factor that has caused flying hour program underfunding for
CNAP has been unplanned contingencies, which is analyzed next. Unplanned
operational contingencies are variable events that continue to result in CNAP FHP
underfunding. These unpredictable missions cannot be forecasted and therefore are not
resourced in the annual budget process. During the interim, the Fleet is expected to
reprogram and finance the cost of these variable events with current year funds. Although
most of the associated cost for supporting contingencies is remunerated through
congressional emergency supplemental appropriations, the fiscal and operational impact
on the Fleet is significant. In the case of CNAP, when a contingency does occur, existing
FHP funds are decremented and reprogrammed to fund the new requirements. This
entails quite a bit of work to modify training and support schedules for all squadrons,
alter overall flying hours, cancel TAD, and reduce or delay maintenance. Contingency
requirements in FY 98 provide a good example to demonstrate the fiscal impact on
CNAP. During the 3d quarter of FY 98, CINCPACFLT was required to deploy a second
aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf to assist in resolving the U.N. Weapons Inspection
crisis with Iraq. The cost associated with accelerating the pre-deployment training, TAD
and actual deployment of this second aircraft carrier required CNAP to reprogram $43.7
million dollars from the FHP. In the 4 ,h quarter of FY 98, CNAP received supplemental
appropriation funds to recoup the cost of deploying the second carrier. The supplemental
funding covered the contingency deployment costs and also helped to buy down the
existing AVDLR bow wave that was generated from current year underfunding and the
portion carried over from FY 97.
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6. Section Summary
This section demonstrated how reprogramming decisions have contributed to
CNAP FHP underfunding and have further compounded an already constrained and
underpriced budget. The decision to reprogram funds in the cases of IT-21 and NSAWC
are examples where Fleet Commanders chose to modify their annual spending plans to
take advantage of investment opportunities that emerged during the execution period. As
noted, these decisions adversely impacted the CNAP FHP in FY 97 and 98, particularly
since the FHP already suffered from underpricing and underfunding. In the case of the
FO accounts, reprogramming has been a necessity and a means for the CNAP comptroller
and FHP manager to balance their programs to sustainable and executable levels.
Unfortunately, higher-level budget reviewers tend to view "discretionary"
decisions as sources of self-generated FHP underfunding. Such decisions can impact
future year funding levels in that these same budget critics perceive the reprogrammed
amounts as surplus FHP funds. Further restrictions on reprogramming are increasing and
represent another way that Congress uses nonstatutory control measures to micromanage
the DoD budget [Jones and Bixler, pp. 55-60]. From the Fleet perspective, tighter
congressional control on reprogramming makes it even more difficult to execute
constrained budgets. For CNAP, tighter congressional control would not necessarily be a
problem, provided the FHP budget appropriated is executable. However, as explained in
Chapter III and throughout this chapter, this is not the case. In fact, the CNAP
Comptroller and FHP manager must consistently reprogram OP-20 funds between the
different flying categories and accounts to balance overall program goals and CNAP
training requirements. The annual effort expended in reprogramming is a manifestation
of another problem from the Fleet perspective, in that the CINC really has no control or
leverage over the construction of the OP-20.
What is the solution to this dilemma? One answer is for CNAP and the Fleet to
receive increased spending authority to properly execute mission requirements without
having to use creative accounting and financing to make it through the budget execution
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year. However, in an era of limited fiscal resources, additional spending authority is not
likely to be provided by Congress. A more practical solution is to include the Fleet in the
decisions that result in budget cuts and underfunding. For example, if it is determined in
the programming process that the Navy FHP is required to absorb a $30 million cut, the
Air Type Commanders should be consulted to recommend where they can best absorb
funding cuts, vice having to go through the labor intensive and bureaucratic effort of
reprogramming after the budget is received. If including the Air TYCOMS is not feasible
due to administrative budget process constraints or time limitations, the Fleet and CNAP
need to retain the flexibility to reprogram their budgets to create balanced and executable
spending plans.
Alternative budget reform concepts that might lead to greater DoD budget
efficiency and flexibility for Fleet commanders to respond to changing environmental
conditions and mission needs during budget execution are presented in Chapter V.
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has chronicled and analyzed some of the major causes of CNAP FHP
underfunding and variability experienced during budget execution. The purpose of this
chapter is to create a reference document for CNAP FHP personnel that provides insight
to the historical and current causes of FHP underfunding. Most of the problems stem
from: 1) unplanned/unfunded requirements, 2) poor AVDLR component reliability, 3)
deficiencies with Integrated Logistic Support, 4) variability in the AVDLR pricing
methodology and NWCF surcharges and 5) deficiencies in the FHP and AVDLR
forecasting methodology and not incorporating the cost of previous year bow-waves in
the budget forecast.
The optimistic solution to these problems is to increase budget appropriations to
adequately fund all current requirements for aviation readiness and Fleet modernization.
However, this solution is unlikely. In fact, defense spending restrictions and downsizing
will likely continue in the Post-Cold War environment. If this is the case. DoD may need
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to make fundamental changes in its organizational structure and its budgeting methods to
increase efficiency and minimize funding uncertainty. These alternatives would tend to
minimize congressional line item review of the DoD and DoN annual budget, and to
better align DoD strategy with its structure through "mission-driven, results-oriented
budgeting" [Ref. 34]]. The final chapter of this thesis will discuss budget reforms,





The purpose of this thesis was to examine the FHP budget process and analyze the
issues causing underfunding in the Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP) Flying
Hour Program. The objectives of the thesis were as follows:
Create a reference document that new CNAP FHP personnel may use to
obtain an overview of the FHP and understand how the FHP budgeting and
funding process works.
Provide insight to some of the perennial factors contributing to program
underfunding and variability that occur during both budget formulation and
execution.
Present alternative budget reform concepts that may attenuate defense
resource variability and increase budgeting efficiency.
This chapter summarizes the answers to the primary and secondary research
questions, presents final conclusions and describes alternative budget reform concepts
that may minimize defense resource variability and improve budget process deficiencies.
This chapter concludes with recommendations for follow-on thesis research.
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION
What variable factors and decisions occur during FHP budget formulation
and execution that explain the historical and current underfunding of the
Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific Flying Hour Program (FHP)?
As demonstrated in Chapters III and IV, there are many factors that contribute to
FHP underfunding and resource variability for CNAP. During FHP budget formulation,
budget process dynamics contribute significantly to FHP resource variability. Although
these dynamics are difficult to trace to FHP underfunding, the influence of congressional
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micromanagement, special interest politics, changing public attitudes and budget process
deficiencies can cause considerable budget instability for all Navy programs and often
result in sub-optimal resource allocation decisions.
The annualarity of the budget process and deficiencies in PPBS also contribute to
resource instability and the production of budgets that typically "lag" behind execution
year requirements. As much as PPBS attempts to be "forward-looking" in coordinating
funding for future requirements, the budgets developed in this framework amount to an
annual spending plan that offers little flexibility for military commanders to respond to
unplanned events and changing requirements. When unplanned events do emerge and
requirements change, current funding is reprogrammed and or obligated sooner than
anticipated, often leading to underfunding in the FHP.
The environment of limited resources and competing priorities are other variables
that cause funding instability for the FHP. There simply are not enough resources to
adequately fund all DoD/DoN programs and priorities. In this constrained environment,
the incentives to cut budgets and make funding adjustments in the interest of affordability
increase, which further compounds funding instability.
Finally, the most significant factor that contributes to FHP underfunding during
budget formulation is the FHP forecasting methodology. As noted in Chapters III and
IV, the former three-year rolling average technique was deficient and continually lagged
behind current year execution cost. Hence, the budgeted OP-20 understated the true cost
per hour experienced by CNAP during execution. The higher actual CPH would obligate
available funds sooner than expected, forcing CNAP to "bow-wave" to continue flying
and to attain annual PMR goals. Since the deferred cost of the bow-wave was not
included in subsequent year forecasts, the FHP underfunding would perpetuate into the
next execution year and across the FYDP. Coupled with deficiencies in the forecasting
methodology, not recognizing and incorporating the cost of the bow-wave in the FHP
forecast has been the biggest driver of recent budget underfunding.
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During FHP budget execution, the primary causes of CNAP FHP underfunding
are as follows:
• Unplanned / Unfunded requirements. Unplanned and unfunded
requirements result in the obligation of FHP funds sooner than anticipated or
require the reapplication of FHP funds through reprogramming. Specific
examples include:
-Changes in mission and aircraft utilization rates, resulting in a higher
CPH
-Contingency missions requirements
-Deficient forecasting methodology, which produced a cost per hour that,
was lower than actual execution
-MACP, IT-21 andNSAWC
-The need to cross-subsidize underfunded programs such as the Special
Interest Flying Other (F.O.) program
-Using FHP funds to finance modifications (ECPs) and reliability
improvements (LECPs)
• Deficient repair part (AVDLR) reliability. Poor reliability and increased
component failures result in an increase in demand and hence increase
execution year costs. Poor reliability and underfunding also increases the trend
in aircraft cannibalization.
• Deficient Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) planning and practices.
Inadequate spare parts determination and improper O and I level support can
result in an increase in execution years costs. Changes in maintenance
philosophies (i.e. increased focus on O to OEM/Depot Level vice O to I
Level) has budgetary consequences that are currently not integrated into
budget forecasts. Deficient maintenance manning and training can also cause
underfunding through increased execution costs.
• Excessive variability in AVDLR pricing and NWCF surcharge rates.
• Deficiencies with the AVDLR demand-forecasting methodology:
-Too much reliance on historical data
-Inability to integrate changes in the "market basket" ofAVDLRs
-Inability to integrate actual component failure rates due to absence of
MTBF tracking system
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To an extent, CNAP has compounded its own FHP underfunding by not
demonstrating funding shortfalls and the associated "pain" via readiness reporting. When
the FHP Resource Sponsor and higher-level budget analysts see no degradation in Fleet
readiness, there is no justification to provide an increase in funds. Rather, they are
inclined to make further budget cuts and adjustments.
In summary, the key causes of CNAP FHP underfunding and related problems
stem from the following comprehensive factors: 1) Budget dynamics, limited resources
and competing priorities, 2) Unplanned / Unfunded requirements, 3) Deficiencies in the
FHP forecasting methodology and not incorporating the cost of previous year bow-waves,
4) Poor AVDLR component reliability, 5) Insufficient AVDLR Integrated Logistics
Support (ILS), and 6) Variability in the AVDLR pricing methodology and NWCF
surcharges.
C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What is the purpose of the DoN Flying Hour Program (FHP) and how
does the FHP budgeting and funding process work? Is the methodology for
determining FHP requirements adequate and valid?
A comprehensive explanation of the purpose and current FHP budgeting and
funding process is explained in Chapter II. As noted, the process itself is extremely
complex. Understanding all of the FHP budgeting intricacies and functional
responsibilities of the many organizations involved with the process, is a massive
undertaking. For newly assigned CNAP FHP managers and tangential budget personnel,
this complexity is compounded by the fact no formal training is provided. Recognizing
this, the authors explained the FHP budgeting and execution process in detail to facilitate
clearer understanding and insight to the mechanics of the process.
Chapter II began with an explanation of the purpose of the FHP which is to
provide the necessary resources to operate and maintain all Navy and Marine Corps
aircraft, to achieve and sustain Naval Aviation readiness. The FHP is also a systematic
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approach for Fleet Commanders and Resource Sponsors to construct defensible budget
exhibits that justify the resources required to attain aviation readiness goals for combat,
support, and training aircraft. An examination of the DoD Resource Allocation Process
was provided to facilitate understanding of how the DoN FHP fits within this larger
budgeting framework.
The focus of Chapter II was to describe the roles and responsibilities of the FHP
budget players relative to the CNAP FHP financial reporting chain. Budget formulation,
execution and relationships were explained from the CNAP squadron level through
CNAP, CINCPACFLT, the Resource Sponsor (N-88F), FMB and finally to DoD/OSD.
The details of budget formulation and review were highlighted at all levels,
demonstrating the fact that budgeting is a highly social process, requiring intense
communication, negotiation and compromise.
The FHP budget formulation methodology that was explained in Chapter II, was
then further examined in Chapter III to determine the validity of this methodology in
determining the flying hour requirement and associated cost. In that chapter, we
concluded that the former three-year rolling average approach did not adequately forecast
the requirement due to inherent statistical deficiencies in this approach. This averaging
technique consistently lagged behind actual execution costs and did not account for cost
anomalies.
Chapter III also demonstrated that the current FHP forecasting methodology has
some inherent deficiencies, but as a budget tool, the OP-20 is useful in predicting the
FHP requirement for the budget year. The primary deficiency with this methodology is
its exclusive reliance on historical data. Changes in prices and demand for AVDLRs
during the execution year results in a FHP budget that understates the true FHP costs.
Ultimately, it is the effect of many different external factors and dynamics that
cause FHP forecasting inaccuracies and program underfunding. In fact, in view of all the
many different variables discussed in this thesis such as budget dynamics, limited
resources, poor ILS and reliability, LECPs, ECPs, changes in maintenance philosophies.
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cost deferment, inconsistent readiness reporting, varying utilization rates, Operational
contingencies, AVDLR demand and price variance, inadequate application of escalation
rate changes during budget formulation, affordability decisions, budget gaming, and
unplanned events, is there any real reason why the FHP forecast should match execution
year costs? The answer is "no".
Ideally, the solution to capture all of these variable factors is the development of a
"total cost" model that is capable of integrating direct FHP costs and all of the other
external variables that have budget consequences. The AMSR represents the first step
towards this solution, and is attempting to integrate all of the different organizations,
activities and components that constitute and affect the Naval Aviation system.
2. What factors cause Cost Per Hour (CPH) increases and variance in
CNAPs FHP, and is the CPH an adequate metric for assigning program costs?
The reason why CNAP cost per flight hour has increased and varied from the
budgeted CPH is primarily due to receiving inadequate resources in the FHP budget. As
explained in Chapter III, (see Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1) this disparity between the higher
actual CPH versus the lower budgeted CPH occurred due to the deficient three-year
rolling average forecast technique that always lagged behind actual cost experience.
Budget decisions and modifications to FHP forecast, made in the interest of affordability,
also produced an OP-20 that contained a "hollowed-out" CPH. Finally, failure to
recognize and include the previous years' bow-wave in the FHP forecast further
understated the budgeted CPH.
Chapter III also examined other factors that can cause variance in the CPH even
among similar T/M/S aircraft. They are summarized as follows:
• Different Operational Environments. Different operational environments
and conditions can drive cost per hour variance as demonstrated with the
different Marine squadrons based in Southern California versus Hawaii and
Okinawa.
• Utilization rates. Different mission requirements or unplanned Fleet
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operational contingencies can contribute to significant differences in the
budgeted versus actual CPH.
• Unplanned AVDLR reliability failures. Unexpected AVDLR failures for
certain T/M/S aircraft can cause an increase in demand for repair parts that
were not budgeted for and thus cause an increase in the CPH for the respective
T/M/S. The F-404 engine for the F/A-18 is a good example where increases
in demand for engine repair drove-up the F/A-18 CPH considerably.
• Shortages in maintenance manning levels and experience, particularly at
the O and I levels of maintenance.
• Timing of installation of aircraft component modifications and reliability
improvements.
Next, we will summarize the answer regarding the adequacy of the CPH approach
as a metric for assigning and reporting program costs.
The basis for measuring costs in the FHP is flying hours. Several studies and
statistical analyses have been conducted to determine the degree of relationship between
flying hours and the direct program costs: fuel, maintenance consumables and AVDLRs.
Generally, these studies indicated the number of flying hours flown correlates fairly well
with fuel and maintenance consumable costs, but little to no correlation exists with
AVDLRs (concluded by NCCA and some NPS Theses). As of this writing, another
analysis was conducted by CNA (October, 1998), that refuted the NCCA analysis,
indicating that there is a correlation between flight hours and AVDLR costs, which
further obscures the issue. Hence, in response to the question, the CPH approach
ostensibly is a useful metric for reporting and forecasting fuel and maintenance
consumable costs, but recent analyses concluded different results as to the degree of
relationship between the cost per flight hour and AVDLR costs. In view of this
discrepancy, more analysis is required and the question remains: Is the AVDLRs cost per
flight hour really meaningful? This is a challenging question because as noted, there are
some AVDLR costs that are incurred regardless of the number of flight hours flown, such
as hydraulic and electrical components and corrosion repair; and there are some AVDLR
components such as engine components, that do vary with the number of hours flown.
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The integrity and accuracy of the data is also extremely important to ensure any
further statistical analysis produces valid results. It is important to note that the AVDLR
cost component was an adjunct to the original FHP cost pools (fuel and maintenance
consumables), because, AVDLRs were not sponsored and resourced by N-88F. In view
of this, perhaps a different metric could be used for AVDLR costs such as sorties. A
recent study conducted by the Logistics Management Institute, indicated that demand for
aircraft spares is more closely related to sorties versus flying hours [Ref. 70]. Further
analysis regarding the merits of using sorties versus flying hours as a cost basis is
recommended for follow-on research at the end of this chapter.
3. What are some of the reasons causing AVDLR cost increases?
There are many factors contributing to AVDLR cost growth. The most significant
causes are summarized as follows:
•
•
Deficient AVDLR ILS. Many newly fielded and older AVDLR components
do not have adequate logistics support in place to provide timely repair at the
O-level and I-level maintenance facilities.
Actual AVDLR component reliability has been far less than the planned
reliability for many components, thus increasing Fleet demand and FHP
costs.
Deficiencies with the AVDLR forecasting methodology. This approach
relies too much on historical data and does not account for items that skew the
cost of demand outside the norm [Ref. 45]. Further, the FHP budget does not
capture all of the changes in the "market basket" of AVDLRs from year to
year, which understates the true cost ofAVDLRs during execution.
Budget formulation adjustments designed to make the FHP budget fit
within budget controls.
Not including the cost of previous years AVDLR bow-wave costs into the
new FHP budget forecast.
FHP funds reprogrammed to fund other requirements and/or programs.
Variability in the NWCF surcharge rate changes (See question number
four).
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4. To what extent is the Navy Working Capital Fund Surcharge and
escalation rates impacting current year execution funds?
After completing extensive research for this question and over 40 interviews with
budget personnel, comptrollers, supply and maintenance officers and other personnel
from DoD, FMB. NAVAIR, NAVSUP, NAVICP, N-88. CINCPACFLT. and CNAP; the
authors were unable to conclude with certainty whether the Navy Working Capital Fund
Surcharge and escalation rates contribute to Fleet budget underfunding. There are many
varying opinions as to whether it does or doesn't degrade the "customers" execution year
budget. In theory, the process is designed to balance sufficient funding in the customer
accounts for the anticipated wholesale surcharge. As explained in Chapter IV, the
purpose of the surcharge is to recover the cost of operations of the supply system by
balancing total revenues against the total costs of the NWCF organizations. It is
commonly referred to as the "cost of doing business" represented by the formula:
Surcharge = Cost of Operations #• Cost ofGoods Sold. The bottom line is that whatever
the surcharge rate is for the year, appropriate funding is balanced in the customer
accounts. However, many dynamic factors can alter this "balance" and may contribute to
some degree of underfunding. Based on our research the following key issues and
observations regarding the surcharge and escalation rates are provided:
• Surcharge Rate Variability. There is considerable variability in the surcharge
rate formulation process. Part of this variability stems from the fact that there
are pricing components and taxes that constitute the Cost of Goods Sold and
the Surcharge that have nothing to do with Naval Aviation and the FHP.
Additionally, there are other taxes levied on the NWCF and outside policy-
decisions made that are not associated with Supply Management, but do
contribute to variability and surcharge increases [Ref. 71]. Further, the
NWCF rates are forecasted and negotiated in a budget environment that is
similar to, and done concurrently with the DoD ("customer") budget process.
207
As the rates are estimated and forecasted by the NWCF entities, they are
subject to similar budget review processes and adjustments, to include marks
and reclamas, until the rates are finalized and approved by OSD. Hence, there
are similar budget dynamics that transpire and may in fact contribute to some
degree of funding variability once these rates are applied to the customer's
budget.
AVDLR Pricing Methodology. The AVDLR pricing methodology is
interrelated with the surcharge and is another source of variability. The
primary source of this variability stems from changes in the "market basket"
of AVDLRs. This "market basket" is supposed to be a statistically valid
sample of the "universe" of existing AVDLRs that the Fleet is expected to use
in the execution year. Part of the surcharge rate components are based upon
the expected Fleet demand of this representative "market basket". However,
both the market basket and customer demand are subject to change. Each year
there are new AVDLRs that are introduced and used by the Fleet for certain
T/M/S that are not yet part of this market basket sample and hence the current
surcharge does not capture the actual real world costs of these new
components at the T/M/S level. Further, the forecasted customer demand
often changes due to the nature of variable consumption. This customer
demand can change due to increased aircraft utilization rates, changes in
AVDLR component reliability and deficient AVDLR ILS. This demand can
also change as a result of customer decisions to maximize their spending by
purchasing material or services outside of the NWCF.
Some critics in the Fleet are suspect as to the adequacy of the surcharge
and the "market basket". This suspicion is not arbitrary. They assume if in
fact the process works correctly (i.e. customer accounts are properly
balanced), then the funding provided in the OP-20 should match the real world
costs experienced during the execution year. However, in recent years this has
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part, the answer is better communication and mutual understanding between
all affected agencies and customers. The AMSR and other study efforts
continue to analyze the NWCF process to minimize skepticism and confusion.
These study efforts are focused on the pricing methodology and effects of the
surcharge. Additionally, the NAVSUP "Surcharge Reduction Group" is
working diligently to contrive cost cutting strategies and methods to increase
revenue.
Value ofAnnual Demand (VAD) /Annual Price Change (APC). The authors
concluded that the VAD/APC does not directly lead to an increase in AVDLR
prices. As pointed out in Chapter IV, the VAD/APC, is simply a method to
calculate the difference between the surcharge from one year to the next and
provide the appropriate funding amounts necessary to "balance" the
customer's budget against the predicted demand for AVDLRs. The problem
with the VAD/APC occurs when the customer's account has to be "plussed-
up" if the VAD/APC does not adequately "balance" the customers account.
The funds used to offset these plus-ups come at the expense of other aviation
programs. Moreover, these offsets often undermine cost saving initiatives
such as LECPs, and ECPs.
Repair part cost escalation rate changes. The method by which changes in
escalation rates are applied to the OP-20 is backwards and results in program
underfunding. As discussed in Chapter III-D, when the rates do change, the
Resource Sponsor (N-88F) should provide the complete OP-20 budget
adjustment to N-82 and not simply receive an aggregate adjustment to be
spread across the FHP.
Death Spiral of Demand. The effect of the "death spiral" is certainly one of
the biggest challenges facing the Navy Working Capital Fund and its cash
management position. As discussed in Chapter IV, the "death spiral" refers to
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the loss of sales due to changes in buyer behavior. When the customer doesn't
purchase the estimated demand quantity that was projected, a higher surcharge
may occur as a result of spreading the same level of fixed overhead costs over
a smaller revenue base. As explained earlier, this change in buying behavior
is due primarily to the perception of excessively high cost material, which
forces customers to search for alternate and cheaper providers. Another
conflicting problem contributing to the "death spiral" is Navy re-engineering
efforts to improve its supply and logistics management/practices. Initiatives
such as Direct Vendor Delivery (DVD), Contractor Logistics Support (CLS),
and LECPs are intended to make the Navy more efficient, but they work to the
detriment of the NWCF in the form of fewer sales and potentially higher
surcharge rates. To the authors knowledge, there doesn't appear to be a long-
term strategy to account for the loss of sales and revenue. Without
commensurate decreases in the cost of operations, the surcharge will continue
to increase and remain a source of variability affecting long-term budget
planning. Hence, it is particularly critical for the NWCF to stabilize the rates
and devise new ways of cutting costs and generating revenue as the Navy
becomes more efficient through improved logistic support practices and
supply chain relationships.
D. CONCLUSIONS
Based on our research and findings, the following section provides final
conclusions for addressing flying hour program funding problems, logistics support and
cost management issues. Since the flying hour program is formulated and negotiated in
the greater defense budgeting framework, the last section presents an overview of two
budget reform concepts that may increase defense budgeting efficiency and attenuate
DoD resource variability.
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1. Continue with the Aviation Maintenance Supply and Readiness Group
and Other FHP Process Improvement Efforts
Our research shows that no FHP problem or funding issue can be analyzed in
isolation. The FHP budget processes and execution support costs are affected by a
myriad of interrelated organizations, activities and decisions. Often, well intended
decisions and improvements made by one organization can have negative budgetary
consequences on the FHP. The Logistics Engineering Change Proposal (LECP) program
changes in maintenance philosophies, and contractor logistics support arrangements are
good examples that demonstrate the unintended fiscal impact on the FHP.
Therefore, since Naval Aviation is a comprehensive integrated system, the authors
believe the AMSR effort is an excellent forum to systematically and collectively analyze
root causes of problems and allocate the right resources to achieve proper solutions to
improve overall Naval Aviation readiness. Ultimately, the success and outcome of this
effort is contingent on the continued commitment of senior Navy and Marine Corps
leadership and the continued work by the talented experts that comprise the group.
To our knowledge, there are two issues that do not appear to be adequately
addressed by the AMSR, the Navy Working Capital Fund Surcharge, and AVDLR
pricing. Although the group is analyzing AVDLR pricing under issue # 16: "AVDLR
Cost and Reliability^, the magnitude and complexity of these two issues may exceed the
current scope and capacity of the group to isolate root causes of problems and develop
specific solutions to minimize AVDLR price and surcharge variability. Many different
organizations are conducting or have conducted analysis regarding the impact of the
surcharge and AVDLR pricing, but more study is needed to ensure the "customer" is
receiving adequate funding in the FHP budget process and paying the "right price"
for AVDLRs during the execution year. If feasible, the AMSR should specifically
address these issues as a separate long-term action item and to do so, the group requires
greater representation from the specific organizations and personnel involved with
estimating and determining the escalation rates and AVDLR price structure.
212
a. Improving the FHP Budgeting and Requirements Determination
Process
The Resource Sponsor is extremely committed to improve the FHP
requirement determination process. Stating the FHP requirement accurately and linking
this requirement to a level of readiness is critically important. As budgets get tighter, so
does congressional oversight, and Congress wants to see that the Navy has sound criteria
for justifying the requirement and that it is linked to a discrete measure of performance.
Although one of the last GAO reports conducted on the DoN FHP was over nine years
ago, one passage still has relevance:
The scarcity of resources has increasingly led to the request that flying
hours budgets be justified in terms of improved operational capability. In
other words, those responsible for the budget-in the services, in OSD, and
in Congress—want better evidence about what we are getting for the
money we spend on the flying hour program. In the absence of such
evidence, it is likely to become increasingly difficult to justify funding for
the flying hour program [Ref. 72: p. 88].
As explained in Chapter III, N-88F commissioned CNA to develop a new
method of budgeting that better links readiness levels with both the number of flying
hours flown and simulation training conducted. The initial prototype methodology
proved successful with three different T/M/Ss. N-88F plans to continue the study and
validate the approach with the other Navy T/M/Ss as soon as funds are allocated.
b. Increase Spending Authority
*
Operating in a limited resource environment is a significant challenge for
the Navy and clearly one of the biggest drivers of FHP underfunding and budget
instability. As explained in Chapter III, a constrained funding environment often causes
gaming and adjustments to create a FHP budget that fits within the "Top-line". Lack of
proper resources results in trade-off decisions that sub-optimizes and degrades funding
for other Navy programs. Lack of adequate resources also results in the phenomena of
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"cutting less visible" support areas, which ultimately result in underfunding for the FHP.
This problem is seen in the lack of resources programmed for the "Special Interest'"
category FO account, where the FHP has been required to cross-subsidize this
underfunded aviation support program. So what is the ideal solution to minimize the
effect of a limited resource environment? The simplest answer is not a revelation - an
increase in spending authority! Budget critics may view this conclusion as naive or not
practical, but it is consistent with the recent Joint Chiefs testimony (September 98)
before Congress; indicating that current funding levels cannot sustain readiness and that,
"readiness and morale has been suffering from years of tight budgets" [Navy Times. 28
Sep. 98]. In fact, an increase in spending authority has been the solution all along and
precisely why the Commandant of the Marine Corps has requested Congress for a budget
increase for the past three years. Providing more money for the DoN FHP will not solve
all of its problems, but at least the extra resources will minimize causes of underfunding
and execution year "work arounds" resulting from the current constrained resourcing
process. Additionally, some of the solutions recommended by the AMSR require funding
to improve processes and acquire new data gathering systems such as the "MTBF
tracking system" and "NALCOMIS Optimized". Finally, an increase in funding does not
abrogate Fleet requirements for cost management and the need to execute funds
efficiently. The issue of cost management is briefly analyzed next.
c. Continue FHP Cost Management Practices
Some of the interviews we conducted suggested Fleet FHP cost
management practices are "deficient" and/or "suspect". Although cost management and
efficiency can always be improved in any organization, there is no Fleet squadron or
command that operates with the goal of executing scarce FHP funds inefficiently. In fact.
CNAP has improved its cost management and raised the level of FHP cost consciousness
with the implementation of practices and programs like the AIRPAC Financial Analysis
Tool (AFAST). The AFAST program is a "data base" intended to raise the level of cost
214
awareness among CNAP units. It allows unit Commanders to view the amount of AOM
funding spent in direct support of their flight operations as well as the ability to compare
spending status/rates relative to other CNAP units.
Another FHP cost management practice at CNAP is closely monitoring
BCM actions to ensure all possible I-level repair efforts have been attempted before
AVDLRs are sent to the depot. This program is known as "Mother May I" and it has
saved millions of FHP dollars. These savings have been achieved by increasing the
repair capability at selected CNAP AIMD's and by forwarding AVDLR repairs from
smaller, less capable AIMD's to more robust AIMD's, thereby avoiding the higher costs
associated with a depot-level repair.
Although these cost management improvements help CNAP monitor and
manage FHP costs, there is a critical need for standardizing cost accounting and reporting
for the entire FHP. In fact, the lack of a standardized cost accounting system is a major
problem throughout the Navy and DoD. In the DoN, FHP many dynamic factors affect
the accuracy of budget forecasts and FHP management. These dynamics are
compounded when there are different practices and procedures for assigning and
reporting program costs. Perhaps the biggest reporting deficiency with the FHP is the
phenomenon of "cost migration". When other sources of money dry up, there is a
tendency to charge items that are not necessarily associated with the operation and
support of a T/M/S aircraft. The authors do not know the extent of this problem, but it is
obviously an important issue relative to FHP cost reporting and forecasting. The issue
relates to the old axiom "Garbage in - Garbage out'*, and if the right costs are not being
accurately captured, then funding variances will occur. The issue of FHP cost accounting
and cost management was beyond the scope of the thesis and therefore recommended as a
follow-on topic in the last section of this chapter.
d. ILS Issues and Cultural Changefor Better Logistics
Chapter IV emphasized the importance of establishing and maintaining
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sufficient AVDLR ILS for aircraft and aircraft components. Key problems with current
deficiencies in ILS stem from: limited resources resulting in inadequate trade-off
analysis, inflated MTBF projections, compromises in aircraft configuration, initial ILS
fielding and overall insufficient consideration and evaluation of total life-cycle support
needs. To minimize the impact of inadequate ILS on the Fleet, proper logistics support
analysis must be conducted throughout a systems life-cycle to achieve the right aviation
logistics support. During the acquisition process, the best approach is to design
reliability into the aircraft system and AVDLR components, and placing the onus on
contractors to prove their reliability claims. Continuing with reliability improvement
programs for already fielded AVDLRs will clearly benefit Naval Aviation readiness in
the long run, but adequate funding must be provided in the POM process, to prevent the
FHP from being used as the source of financing in the short-term.
The final step to improve ILS, is to change the way logistics is currently
viewed in the acquisition arena. In an acquisition environment that is incentivized by
producing military equipment within cost, on time and achieving the right operational
performance, logistics is often subordinated. When funding constraints force trade-off
decisions in the acquisition process, logistics is typically cut from the procurement
budget. The effect of not adequately planning for and resourcing logistics ultimately
results in higher Operation and Support (O&S) costs once the equipment is fielded to the
"customer". To change this view of logistics support, a cultural change is required in the
•defense acquisition world that prevents poor life-cycle support. As one Naval logistics
expert indicated:
We need to move to a culture where logistics is inextricably linked to
acquisition and everyone's efforts optimize the whole and not just a part.
Our culture must be one where all the players in the game are rewarded for
the same thing: a program that is in equilibrium throughout its life-cycle
and provides optimum logistics results" [Ref. 73: pp. 1-4].
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The next section presents an overview of some budget reform concepts
that may improve the defense resource allocation and execution process, and minimize
overall budget instability.
2. Budget Reform Concepts
As noted in Chapter III, defense budget dynamics and budget process deficiencies
contribute to DoD/DoN resource variability and inefficiency. Although some of the
effects of these dynamics are difficult to quantify for programs like the FHP, their
influences cause budget instability and funding uncertainty. To minimize their effect and
in the current spirit of "process reinvention", perhaps it is time to change the organization
of the budget process and the way defense resource allocation decisions are made. What
follows is a brief discussion of two alternative budget reform concepts that may improve
the defense resourcing process and budgeting efficiency.
a. Multiyear Budgeting
The annual defense budget process is criticized as being shortsighted and
inefficient. As noted in Chapter III, the annual nature of defense budgeting drives much
of this inefficiency. Each year, Congress repeats its line item review of the defense
budget, which consumes a great deal of time and effort. Unfortunately, the time and
effort that Congress devotes to the administrative oversight of the defense budget comes
at the expense of conducting analysis of defense policy issues and strategy. Former
Senator Sam Nunn criticized the annual budget cycle in that it results in the,
"trivialization of Congress' responsibilities for oversight". [Ref. 5: p. 42]. Nunn argues
that Congress needs to maintain a broader defense policy perspective, vice line-item
scrutiny and micromanagement of the defense budget. The late Senator Barry Goldwater
also noted the problem associated with the annual budget cycle:
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In essence Congress is completely consumed by an excessive detailed
scrubbing of the defense budget, conducted line item by line item. Lost in
this maze of financial plusses and minuses is any opportunity for real
oversight... preoccupied by the yearlong budget process and submersed in
budget trivia, the Congress has no time for pivotal issues. [Ref. 5: p. 43].
Similarly for the Services and military departments, defense budgeting is
repetitive, time consuming and inefficient. Despite all of their constant budgeting efforts,
the final output of this process still only amounts to an annual rigid spending plan that
offers little flexibility for military commanders to respond to changing events or
emergent opportunities during execution. Although reprogramming funds occurs during
execution, congressional restrictions and oversight make it difficult to do so.
According to our interviews with FHP budget personnel and Fleet
comptrollers, multi-year appropriations for the operating and support accounts would be a
welcome reform measure that could increase the efficiency in which the budget is
formulated, executed and managed.
For military commanders, a multiyear defense budget would facilitate an
increase in efficiency by providing greater latitude in spending decisions and by
promoting a long-term focus toward resource allocation decisions; similar to most
commercial businesses. Multi-year appropriations would also provide greater flexibility
to respond to emerging opportunities and/or contingency missions without the
requirement to initiate the laborious process of reprogramming funds from other
accounts. Finally, a multi-year defense budget would enable better resource planning and
spending decisions by minimizing the, "spend it or lose it" mentality that tends to
dominate end of year spending activity. The current annual defense appropriation process
incentivizes the military to make inefficient spending decisions toward the end of the
year. The "reward" for being efficient and saving money is the potential loss of budget
authority in future years. Other benefits of a multiyear budget would include less budget
instability, and potentially, less congressional micromanagement of DoD program and
spending decisions.
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For Congress, a multiyear defense budget could lead to greater efficiency
by liberating appropriation committees from their time consuming annual duty of
"scrubbing line items". A "liberated" Congress could then focus more on formulating
and negotiating defense policy, and achieve the broader perspective to which Senator
Nunn alluded. Multiyear budgets would minimize the current congestion and delays in
passing annual appropriations. This congestion is primarily due to excessive committee
debate and protracted hearings that occur each year. Additionally, the time and effort
devoted in passing Continuing Resolutions to permit the DoD (and other agencies) to
obligate funds at the start of each fiscal year, would no longer be needed.
However, Congress has resisted a multiyear approach for defense
appropriations due to perceived loss of control and influence over the defense budget and
defense spending decisions. Further, there is no incentive or reward for Congress for
developing sound defense policies. Rather, as asserted by Jones and Bixler, the "rewards
sought by politicians and constituents alike" are found in the details of the budget, not
deliberating over defense policy. [Ref. 5: p. xxvi]. Ultimately, since the annual defense
authorization and appropriation processes serve as the primary means for controlling the
DoD budget, there is little chance of Congress approving multiyear funding for the
operations and support accounts. Additionally, the incentives fueled by constituent
special interest and committee competition also make the prospect of adopting a
multiyear budget unlikely (Jones and Bixler 1992, pp. 12-46).
Nevertheless, implementing a multiyear budget could result in increased
budget efficiency and minimize defense funding uncertainty. Finally, a multiyear budget
could minimize the tedious and repetitive nature of budgeting for all defense budget
players. Next, we will discuss the concept of mission budgeting for defense that further
extends the argument for a multiyear defense budget.
b. Mission Budgetingfor Defense
Mission Budgeting refers to decentralizing the defense resource allocation
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process and realigning Department of Defense strategy with its structure. This
realignment will facilitate the production of, "mission-driven, results oriented budgets'*
that will help improve budget formulation and execution efficiency [Ref. 34: p. xvi].
What follows is a brief outline of the Mission Budget concept and an analysis of how this
approach could increase defense budgeting efficiency.
One inherent deficiency with the defense Resource Allocation Process is
that it is not linked very well to DoDs mission or its organizational structure. Although
defense resources are programmed across the broad Major Force Program categories, it is
difficult to link these programmed resources with mission outcomes or results.
Additionally, the current resourcing process is very centralized and involves too many
bureaucratic layers and participants that duplicate efforts and have nothing to do with
achieving National Military objectives.
Mission budgeting for defense attempts to improve these deficiencies, by
better aligning responsibility, control and financial structures [Ref. 5: pp. 7-8]. Mission
budgeting provides a more efficient means of allocating and executing defense resources
by decentralizing spending authority and financial management decision making to the
major Warfighting Commanders where defense strategy is carried out. Jones and Bixler
assess the defense strategy and structure misalignment as follows:
In theory, the control and financial structures of an organization serve the
mission or responsibility structure. However, this is not what we find
when we examine the DoD. Rather, the control structure dominates the
responsibility structure, and the financial structure appears either to
dominate or operate independently from the responsibility and control
structures. This is evident in examining the causes of budget-formulation
disconnects between planning, programming, and budgeting in PPBS, and
the difficulty of executing budgets in the Pentagon, in the subsidiary
organizational units around the Pentagon, and at the command and field
levels. [Ref. 5: pp. 210-211]
The responsibility structure that Jones and Bixler refer to is composed of
the specified and unified military commands and the service commands that are
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responsible for executing the National Military Strategy. The control structure refers to
the military operational chain of command that executes the policies and objectives
outlined by the Executive and Legislative branches. The financial structure is comprised
of all of the comptrollers and budget personnel in the military departments extending out
to the Major Claimant and Subclaimant levels and down to the Fund Administrating
Activities. [Ref. 5: pp. 209-210]
Providing a multiyear mission budget that contains both operating and
capital investment funds to the major command level would better link DoD strategy with
its responsibility structure. Allocating these funds directly to the major military
commands would enable commanders to execute their budgets with an efficiency similar
to which the private sector enjoys. Having access to a mission budget could result in
better long term investment decisions and provide greater spending flexibility as opposed
to receiving a rigid annual spending plan. This decentralized approach to allocating
defense funds would negate the need for multiple DoD budgeting organizations and
personnel involved in the current budgeting process. Once this budgeting bureaucracy is
streamlined, the financial structure will then better serve the responsibility structure, that
is the warfighting commands.
Similar to the advantages of a multiyear budget, a multiyear mission-
oriented budget would liberate Congress from the annual line item review of the defense
budget. Congress could then devote more time to developing defense policy and
assessing the performance of military commanders in executing their budgets. Further,
Congress could concentrate more on implementing incentives for the military
commanders to make efficient spending decisions in line with established policy and
previously agreed-upon performance requirements. This means performance reporting
would be more directly linked to the level of expenditure and mission accomplishment.
Congress would maintain control by rewarding those commands that achieve
performance goals and objectives by providing additional funding. Likewise, those that
fail to achieve performance goals would be penalized by having funds rescinded or
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transferred. This control system would facilitate healthy competition among the different
military commands and provide adequate oversight by Congress.
In terms of the duration of this mission budget authority provided to major
military commanders, Jones suggests the following guidelines. The operating portion of
the budget should be appropriated for a minimum of two-years without any restrictive
rules or requirements for spending on individual programs or items in the budget; and
that the capital portion of the budget be appropriated on a five years basis and would be
fully funded. [Ref. 5: pp. 212-13] Often, DoD purchasing practices are fragmented and
result in inefficiency because its budgets are less than fully funded. Hence, fully funding
the capital / investment budget is important to eliminating funding uncertainty and
allowing the budget to support procurement plans, vice the other way around.
The assumption behind the success of decentralizing resource allocation to
military commands is that military commanders would know best what types of
operations, training, hardware, facilities and equipment are required to best support war
plans and operational requirements. [Ref. 5: p. 214]
Within the mission budgeting framework, the PPBS process would
continue, but in a more streamlined manner. Since military commanders would have
greater responsibility and discretion in executing their own capital investment budgets,
programming would be a command function as would budget formulation and execution.
The military departments would retain some comptroller and budget personnel to
integrate the command budgets and present them to OSD and the Congress. [Ref. 5: p.
217] Because much of the budgeting and financial management process would be
decentralized to the command level, the size of current budget organizations and
military/civilian staffs could be reduced considerably, and hence result in considerable
financial savings.
In summary, the concept of mission budgeting requires careful assesment
because it is so different from the current system. However, better aligning DoD strategy




efficiency by directly linking scarce resources with mission output. Other benefits
include: a reduction in congressional micromanagement of the defense budget, more time
for Congress to decide upon a long term defense policy, better accountability and
spending performance metrics, competition, optimizing spending decisions through a
decentralized operating and capital investment budget, and empowering military
commanders to maximize their defense budgets, and providing them with greater
flexibility to respond to a dynamic environment.
Although the Congress and DoD may resist more decentralized budgeting
due to loss of discretionary budget control, they should consider the potential efficiencies
gained by such an approach. In fact, in the Post Cold War era it is likely that defense
spending will continue to decline. If this is the case, the DoD must continue to achieve
greater efficiency in all operating capacities and functions including budgeting and
financial management. Implementing Mission Budgeting at least on a test basis is worthy
of trying. The final section will present recommendations for follow-on thesis research.
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This thesis examined the DoN FHP budgeting and funding process and factors
that have contributed to program variability and underfiinding in the CNAP FHP.
Because the FHP is so complex and involves many different interrelated logistics,
financial management and budgeting areas, there are several related topics worthy of
further research. The following topic areas and questions are intended to facilitate this
effort:
/. NWCF Charges Assigned to AVDLRs. The charges that are assigned to the
cost of repairing a BCM'd AVDLR component sent to the depot are
questionable. Certainly the charges for labor, purchase of material and
specific overhead costs charged to the repair of the component are legitimate.
However, there is an indication that "other extraneous" costs are tacked on to
the AVDLR repair. Therefore, an interesting study would be to track the
migration of selected AVDLR components from a squadron to the depot and
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account for all cost charges to the BCM'd component to assess whether these
charges are legitimate. If there are extraneous costs assigned, are these costs
accounted for in the surcharge and are the customers budgets "balanced" to
absorb such charges? Further, in the spirit of "value added", this analysis may
be able to confirm what agencies truly add value to the shipping, handling and
storage of the AVDLR component, and whether processes and procedures can
be improved, consolidated or eliminated to minimize costs to the "customer".
2. NWCF Rate Formulation Process and A VDLR Pricing. As noted, the process
of forecasting and determining the NWCF surcharges, escalation rates and
AVDLR pricing, relative to the FHP is extremely complex and ripe for
improvement. Comprehensive research in this area is required to mitigate the
complexity and to quantify the funding impact on the FHP (or any program
for that matter). Other questions include: Is the "market basket" of AVDLRs
a statistically valid sample for forecasting AVDLR demand? Is the NAVICP
pricing algorithm adequate determining AVDLR prices? Is there a way to
accurately predict the escalation rate changes for the FHP Resource Sponsor?
Can the use of a Variable Surcharge rate reduce the cost of AVDLRs and
more accurately identify true component cost to the customer?
3. Marine Aviation Campaign Plan (MACP). Further study of the MACP would
prove to be an interesting and useful analysis. Specifically analyzing the pros
and cons of the "sortie-based approach" for executing the FHP. The key
question to answer is this: Is the sortie methodology a better cost basis for
executing the FHP than the CPH approach, and are FHP costs more correlated
to sorties or the number of flying hours? Other questions relative to the
MACP include: Is the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan helping the Marines
control FHP costs and are there any lessons learned that may be applied to the
Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific FHP management? Additionally, one of
the tenets of the MACP is to increase usage of simulators to sustain pilot
proficiency and readiness. Hence, another area to examine is how the
readiness achieved from simulation training can be measured and integrated
into current aviation readiness reporting.
4. FHP Cost Accounting Procedures. There is concern that extraneous costs are
being charged to the FHP at the Air Type Commander level. This "cost
migration" may be contributing to FHP cost increases and if so, will
contribute to errors in future FHP forecasts. Therefore, is this cost migration
phenomenon occurring in the Air Type Commanders FHPs, and if so, what
are the driving factors. The bigger issue relates to the fact that the Navy lacks
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a standardized cost accounting system. A useful thesis would analyze the
number of disparate accounting systems and procedures used throughout the
Navy and the feasibility of designing and implementing a standard Activity-
Based Costing system. Perhaps benchmarking or analyzing private sector
successes in improving their accounting systems would be relevant to this
analysis.
5. Improving A VDLR Reliability. Can AVDLR component reliability and other
effectiveness factors be improved through better incentives, performance
measurement and meaningful contracting? What are some alternatives for
placing the onus on the contractor vice the government for proving reliability
thresholds? Are thorough and sufficient LORA's properly evaluating all life-
cycle costs for AVDLR' s, and what has been the impact on component
reliability, pricing and Fleet readiness?
Special Interest Category Funding Other (FO). The underfunding of the FO
account and its impact on the CNAP FHP was explained in Chapter IV. A
lack of resource sponsorship during the POM process has resulted in
underfunding of the FO account, and has routinely required CNAP to
reprogram FHP funds to sustain critical FO support programs. A recent FMB
meeting (Oct 98) was held to discuss the best method to budget and resource
the FO program. It was decided that N-88 would provide "requirements
officers" to represent the various FO programs in the POM process. The
current method for forecasting the requirement is based on historical data and
professional judgement. An interesting follow-on study would be to assess
the effectiveness of the new requirements officers in defending the FO
program from cuts, and whether a more systematic formula or model could be
developed to help the requirements officers defend the FO requirement. Since
the FO program contributes directly to aviation readiness and the FHP,
another interesting question to pursue is can the FO requirement and costs be
integrated into the OP-20 model?
Maintenance Philosophy Changes. What has been the effect of the increased
O-D maintenance philosophy on FHP costs? What have been the effects of
outsourcing initiatives such as DVDs, CLS, and LECP upon AVDLR prices
and the quality of ILS and aircraft readiness?
8. Reliability Centered Maintenance. What impact has Reliability Centered
Maintenance (RMC) had on the cost, the demand-forecasting and adequacy of
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AVDLRs and ILS? Does it hinder or improve mission readiness?
9. FHP Cost Management Practices. Can more efficient use of FHP funds be
accomplished by assigning unit (squadron) commanders financial
responsibility for AOM (AVDLR) funds? What would be the implications of
doing so, on readiness, aircraft material condition and aviation safety? What
type of incentives are required to make commanders more cost conscious, and
would these incentives influence behavior that would result in "cutting
corners'
,
and aviation safety problems?
226
APPENDIX A. AFO & AFM LISTING
(OFC-01) Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO). This account is the primary fuel and
petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) account used during flight operations and any
required flight equipment used in the operation of the aircraft. Authorized expenditures
include:
Aviation fuels consumed in flight operations
Initial and replacement issues of authorized items of flight clothing and flight
operational equipment for pilots and flight crews.
Consumable office supplies for aviation squadrons
Aerial film, recording tape, and chart paper consumed in flight
Flight deck boots and safety boots used by squadron personnel directly
involved in the readiness, launch, and recovery of aircraft.
Liquid and gaseous oxygen consumed during flight by the aircrews.
Aircraft maintenance costs and repair parts when obtained from any other
military source.
COG 2 forms when not directly used in support of maintenance.
Consumable ASW operations center supplies when consumed in flight.
Publications (other than those of a recreation nature) used to impart technical
and professional knowledge of officers and enlisted personnel in the command
Plaques for the CO and XO offices only.
Special identification clothing, for example, flight deck jerseys, and helmets,
used by squadron personnel in the readiness, launch and recovery of aircraft.
(OFC-50) Aircraft Operations Maintenance AOM . The AOM account is broken down
into Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) and Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM):
AVDLR : AVDLRs represent the largest portion of funding within the FHP.
Depot level repairable are financed by the Navy Working Capital Fund
(NWCF). Under this process, the squadron finances the depot level repair and
procurement of 7R COG repairable components through the local
[Ref. Appendix A: "The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP)'\ OPNAVINST 4790.2g February 01, 1998].
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APPENDIX A CONTINUED
replenishment of these repariables to replace Beyond Capability of
Maintenance (BCMd), lost, or missing components. Although the squadron
initiates the repair requirements, the supporting Intermediate Maintenance
Activity (IMA)/station holds theses funds on behalf of the squadron. The
IMA acts as the broker in deciding whether an AVDLR charge is made if
repair is not possible. Thus the IMA and air station retains control of the
AVDLR replenishment OPTAR via the local comptroller.
AFM: Aviation Fleet Maintenance expenses include:
Paints, wiping rags, towel service, cleaning agent, and cutting compounds
used in preventive maintenance and corrosion control of aircraft.
Consumable repair parts, miscellaneous material, and Navy stock account
parts used in direct maintenance of aircraft, including repair and
replacement of FLRs, AVDLRs, and related SE.
Pre-expended, consumable maintenance material meeting requirements of
NAVSUP Publication 485 and NAVSUP Publication 567 used in
maintenance of aircraft, aviation components, or SE.
Aviation fuel used at I-level in test and check of aircraft engines during
engine buildup, change, or during maintenance. Oils, lubricants, and fuel
additives used at both O-level and I-level.
Allowance list items (NAVAIR 00-35QH-2) used strictly for maintenance,
such as impermeable aprons, explosive handlers coveralls, industrial face
shields, gas welders gloves, industrial goggles, and nonprescription safety
glasses.
Fuels used in related SE (shipboard only).
Replacement of components used in test bench repair Maintenance or
equipment replacement of aircraft loose equipment listed in the AIR.
Consumable hand tools used in the readiness and maintenance of aircraft,
maintenance and repair of components, and related equipment.
Safety and flight deck shoes used in maintenance shops.
Repair and maintenance of flight clothing and pilots and crew equipment.
Authorized decals used on aircraft.
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APPENDIX A CONTINUED
Replacement of consumable tools and IMRL allowance list items.
Items consumed in interim packaging and preservation of aviation fleet
maintenance repairables.
Items, such as MAFs, MAF bags, equipment condition tags, and COG II
forms, and publications, used in support of direct maintenance of aviation
components or aircraft.
Authorized special purpose clothing for unusually dirty work while
performing maintenance of aircraft.
Civilian labor only when used in direct support of AFM (requires
ACC/TYCOM approval prior to use).
Costs incurred for IMRL repair.
Replacement of general purpose electronic test equipment allowance items
which are missing or unserviceable (COG Z).
Oils, lubricants, and fuel additives consumed during flight operations.
Navy stock account repairable material (non-AVDLR) used in direct
maintenance of aircraft component repair, or related SE.
The requisitioning of material incidental to TD installation, for example,
fluids, epoxies, and shelf life items, not to exceed one thousand dollars per
TD per squadron.
IMRL/TBA replenishment/replacement.
AFM funds shall NOT finance:
• Housekeeping, office supplies, or habitability items.
• Services, such as printing and office equipment maintenance.
• General station collateral equipment, including labor-saving devices
(Section C allowance list items).
• Packing, crating, and preservation for storage or shipment.
• Data processing equipment and supplies.




Non-aviation miscellaneous equipment, even though repair may be
performed in the ship's AIMD, for example, MG-5, automotive vehicles,
crash cranes, deck scrubbers, and fork lifts.
Maintenance of SE by Public Works Departments or Centers.
TDs requiring the local requisitioning of significant chargeable materials
for the purpose of modifying or improving assigned airframes or
equipment. These will be funded by COMNAVAIRSYSCOM, upon
submission of a request citing TD number, aircraft type, or other system
application, and total funds required. Significant chargeable materials are
considered to be materials valued at one thousand dollars or more per TD
per unit.
Initial outfitting of IMRL and TBA allowance list items. NOTE: OFC-
01/09 funds with Fund Code 8X will be used to fund IMRL and TBA
initial outfitting.
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APPENDIX C. DESCRIPTION OF FO PROGRAMS
1A1A-FO
TAD
Funding in this program finances TAD requirements associated with operations
and operational training for deployment of both Navy and Marine Tactical
Aviation (TAC AIR) squadrons. TAD funding is used to finance Navy and
Marine travel of aircraft squadron detachments from combat training sites;
training of Functional Wings (FUNCWINGS), TYPEWINGS, squadron personnel
at designated training sites; travel for maintenance and operations related
technical support conferences, travel to "A" school training sites; six-month P-3
deployments; shore basing of deployed CV and CVN units.
Individual Material Readiness List (IMRL)
Funding in this program supports IMRL requirements for both Navy and Marines
active aviation squadrons. IMRL specifies quantities of aviation support
equipment that is needed by a command to perform its maintenance functions.
This list is kept current by a monthly report called Support Equipment Resource
Management Information System (SERMIS). IMRL equipment tools are
essential in order to ensure our aircraft are in good condition and meet the
required mission.
Operational Staffs
The operational staffs in this program are the two Functional Wings
(FUNCWINGS) and nine TYPEWINGS that provide all administrative support to
Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) aviation squadrons. Labor/materials, training, etc.
However, ADP is funded out of 1 A2A-FO.
1A2A-FO
TAD
This program finances travel for Fleet Readiness Squadrons (FRS) aircraft
squadron detachments to and from combat training sites; both Navy and Marine
training of FUNCWINGS/TYPEWINGS squadron personnel at designated
training sites; travel to maintenance and operations related technical support
conferences; travel to "A" schools, emergency leave, and travel of designated
maintenance personnel to effect repairs on aircraft away from home base.
[Ref. Appendix C: "Description of Programs Including The "FO" Special Interest Item" CINCPACTFLT FHP Staff
Memorandum. October 14, 1998.]
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Fleet Imaging Command Pacific
FLTIMAGCOMPAC provides audiovisual and Fleet Combat Camera Group
Support. The Fleet Combat Camera Group provides documentation of both
combat and non-combat areas as directed by CINCPACFLT. They have played a
vital part in the Persian Gulf, SOMALIA and Joint Exercises.
Transportation of Things
This program provides support to squadrons deployments away from their base
which permit the squadrons to use ranges/ordinance not routinely available to
them. Funds are used to finance transportation of aviation supplies and equipment
to and from exercises, purchases of aviation supplies and equipment/tools, and
other material requirements in support of PACFLT aviation program.
Tactical Support Centers (TSC)
This program finances COMPATWINOSPAC and NAS North Island Technical
Support Centers (TSC). Funds are provided for maintenance, operational and
administrative requirements for Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) squadrons. The
TSC provide the ASW squadrons with flight data utilized in ASW operations.
HQ at Barber's Pt, and Dets at North Island, Whidbey Island, Diego Garcia,
Misawa, Kadena, and Kami Seya.
FMFPAC Other Aircraft Support
This program supports the Marines Flight Hour Program (FHP). It provides
Automated Data Processing (ADP), meteorological, INMARSAT, van
maintenance and other aircraft support.
Marines Air Traffic Control Squadrons (MATCALS)
Provides air traffic control to Marine squadrons. Funding is used to operate and
repair/replace end items related to MATCS and Landing Systems radar and
AN/TPN-22 Precision Approach equipment.
Marines FAST Contact
This contract provides Marines Aviation logistics Squadrons with supply
management analysis, on-site assistance visits, development of system procedures
and documentation, designing/development and presentation of training, and
general supply/management problems analysis.
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Staff Fleet Automated Data Processing (ADP) Support
This program provides ADP support to COMNAVAIRPAC staff and Fleet
squadrons. Finances computer purchases, software, maintenance, and training in
microcomputers.
Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility (FACSFAC)
FACSFAC provides scheduling, coordination, and control of operational areas for
subsurface, surface, and airborne military platform operations within and
transiting to and from these areas. Funds are also used to support the maintenance
ofFACSFAC electronic radar equipment. We have FACSFAC HQs at San Diego
and a Det a Barber's Pt.
Commercial Air Services
This program provides contractual services for Air Intercept Control (AIC),
tracking (IRACK), Anti-Submarines Air Control (ASAC), Over-The Horizon
(OTH), and Aerial Target Towing for both WESTPAC, Mid-PAC and West Coast
training units.
Navy/Marines Drones/Target/Range Services Support (transferred to 1C4C/1A7A)
This program provides for the maintenance of PACFLT targets and drone usage at
non-PACFLT ranges and launch consumables (missile shoots).
FUNCWINGS/TYPEWINGS
Provides civil service personnel support and materials in support of PACFLT
simulators. The personnel required for this support are a Contact Officer
Technical Representative and Education Specialist.
Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group Pacific (FASOTRAGRUPAC)
FASOTRAGRUPAC provides training in aviation maintenance, administration,
acoustic analysis, NALCOMIS, microcomputers, Survival-Evasion-Resistance-
Escape (SERE) training, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)/Electronic Warfare~w)
training on systems equipment and tactics. FASOTRAGRUPAC also provide
approved audiovisual aviation training support and other related media services,
and specialized ship's and mobile training team support as directed. We have five
FASOTRAGRUPAC Dets and a HQ at NAS North Island. UIC:57094 HQ at
NAS North Island; UIC:45002 Det at Whidbey; UIC:44997 Det Guam;





The funds used in this program are to finance Advance Acoustic Analysis
Training (AAAT), Aviation Training Support System (ATSS), Command Aircraft
Crew Training (CACT), Contractor Operation and Maintenance of Simulators
(COMS) and Instructional Systems Development (ISD). These programs provide
the operations and maintenance, software development, and air-crew training
needed to support PACFLT aviation simulators training.
TYPEWINGS/Simulator School Training
Funding for administrative, personnel, training and maintenance support for
TYPEWINGS and three training school: a) Sea-Based Weapons and Advance
Tactics School, Pacific at NAS North Island; b) Electronic Combat Weapons
School at NAS Whidbey; c) Carrier Airborne Early Warning Weapons School at
NAS Fallon (CAWS was transferred to CNO 09BF Jul 96 DON Budget); d)
STRIKE Fighter Weapon School, Pacific at NAS Lemoore.
Miscellaneous Support
Any other funding support that does not fall under the above categories and is in
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